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Part I
Lexical Phonology

Chapter 1
Finite State Devices in Phonology
1.1 Introduction
Phonology -  or at least part of phonology -  is claimed to be the component of the language most 
closely attached to the lexicon. Within a widespread framework, Lexical Phonology (cf. Kiparsky 
(1985), Kenstowicz (1994)), a number of phonological processes apply in the lexicon itself. Hence, 
the theory of phonological rule systems and phonological representation is crucial in the investi­
gation of the lexicon-grammar interactions. This paper intends to give a brief introduction to the 
formal (mathematical and computational) handling of phonological rules, based on three influen­
tial articles: Kaplan and Kay (1994), Antworth (1990) and Bird and Ellison (1994).
In traditional -  SPE-based (Chomsky and Halle (1968)) -  framework, the phonological com­
ponent of the grammar consists of a set of ordered rewrite rules, which connect underlying and 
surface representations. These representations are viewed as linearly ordered feature matrices; the 
two representations differ in that respect that the former allows not fully specified (underspecified) 
matrices whereas the latter does not. This means that underlying representations permit abstract 
segments while surface representations exclude them. (On the controversial issue of abstractness, 
cf. Kenstowicz (1994, pp. 107-114.)) However, the situation is less straightforward when rules are 
taken into account. In principle, nothing prevents a rule from applying on another rule's output 
(or even on its own output, cf. below), and indeed, phonologists often claim this to be the case. 
This leads to the -  in principle unbounded -  proliferation of intermediate representations.
At a first glance, phonological rules have the context-sensitive format:
( 1 ) </> - »  i p / \ _ p
where each symbol refers to a feature matrix, probably with finite feature variables, such as a 
vowel harmony rule:
(2)
[+ consonantal] *___
This kind of formalism, however, seems to be too powerful, especially taking the fact into account 
that syntax relies solely on context-free rewrite rules. This overgeneralisation made many theorists 
and computational linguists suspicious, till Johnson (1972) proved that phonological rules of this 
formalism generally are equivalent in power to finite-state devices. The only exceptions to this 
claim are cyclic rules (though cf. next section) and the rules which can apply to their own output, 
such as:1
(3) e —> ab/a_b
This rule generates the language {anbn\n £ N}, which is not regular. However, phonologists 
tend to disfavour such rules. Hence, this finding has the straightforward consequence that phono­
1 e stands for the empty string.
+ syllabic 
- consonantal [aback] /
aback 
+ syllabic 
• consonantal
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logical rule systems can be modelled by finite-state devices, such as Finite State Automata or Finite 
State Transducers. Furthermore, as regular relations are closed under serial composition (cf. be­
low), a single Finite State Transducer (FST) can be constructed algorithmically to represent a whole 
phonological rule system. This reduces the number of representations to two again, i.e. to lexical 
and surface forms.
A further problem for traditional SPE-type rule systems is their application in recognition. If 
we want to revert these phonologically well-motivated rules, we end up in an amount of inde­
terminacy which is impossible to handle effectively. Consider, for example, the following two 
ordered rules accounting for nasal place-assimilation:
Rule 1 N -* m / _[+ labial]
( ' Rule 2 N -> n
These two rules produce one surface form for an underlying form. On the other hand, application 
of these two rules in finding the underlying representation of the surface form intractable results 
in two forms: intractable or iNtractable. If our system contains more rules, the number of possible 
underlying forms of a given input multiplies. This requires so much memory (every path needs 
to be pursued, maybe for a considerable distance) and computational time that this cannot be 
implemented. However, finite state devices, especially FSTs, help overcome this problem as well.
The overall presentation of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we sketch the mathematical 
tools and concepts important for the further parts of the paper. In Section 3, we illustrate Kaplan 
and Kay (1994)'s method to translate SPE rules into regular relations. The following section gives 
a brief introduction to the Kimmo-formalism (cf. Antworth (1990), Karttunen (1993)), and the way 
it views the organization of phonology. Finally, Section 5 deals with a possible incorporation of 
autosegmental phonology into the finite-state paradigm, following Bird and Klein (1990) and Bird 
and Ellison (1994).
1.2 Mathematical Background
This section gives the definitions of mathematical and computational tools and devices crucial for 
the understanding of the remainder of the paper. One may, however, use this section as a reference 
section, turning back some pages when necessary. Throughout this section, we adopt the notation 
of Kaplan and Kay (1994).
One of the most basic concepts of the articles this paper is dealing with is (binary) string relation. 
This is a set of ordered pairs of strings, namely the subsets of E* x E*,2 where E* denotes the 
alphabet. If X  =  (x i,x2) and Y  = (yi, y2) are string relations, then we define their concatenation 
as:
X  Y = X Y  =df (zi2/1 , 2:22/2 )
With these definitions at hand, we can construct a family of string relations similar to that of 
formal languages, namely the family of regular relations. The definition is parallel to the recursive 
definition of regular languages, (e is the empty word in the definitions, Ee = E U {e}, whereas 
superscript i indicates concatenation repeated i times.)
(5) Definition. Regular Relations
i. The empty set and {a} for all a e Ee x Ee are regular relations.
ii. If L\ and L2 are regular relations, then so are
L\L 2 =  {xy\x € Lx, y e L2} (concatenation)
L\ U L2 (union)
L* — C?2-0L' (Kleene closure)
iii. There are no other regular relations.
Another important device in computational linguistics is the (nondeterministic) Finite State Au­
tomaton (FSA), which is a quintuple {E, Q, q, F, <$}, where E is a finite alphabet, Q is a finite set of 
states, q 6 Q is the initial state and F  C Q is the set of final states. The transition function (5 is a total
2We only defined binary relations here, n-ary relations, however, may be defined in the same vein; they might be applied 
in autosegmental representations (cf. Kay (1987)).
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Q x Ee -» 'P(Q) function, and for every state s 6 Q,s 6 <5(s, e) vacuously holds. The definition of 
Ő is usually extended to S* on E* as follows: for all r € Q: S*(r, e) = 6(r, e) and for all u € E* and 
a € Ee: S*(r,ua) = 6(S*(r,u),a), where in the case of P C Q and a € Ee, S(P,a) = UpepS(p,a). 
Now, the machine accepts a string x € Ee just in case (g, x) D F  is nonempty. The machine blocks 
in a state if there is no possible transition defined by 6. The definition of Finite State Transduc­
ers is the same, except for the difference in the transition function, which is in the latter case is a 
S : Q x  Ee x Ee —> V(Q) function. Thus an FST can be viewed as an FSA defined over the product 
alphabet Ee x Ee.
The basic theorem connecting regular languages and FSAs, on the one hand, and regular rela­
tions and FSTs, on the other, is the following:
(6) Every regular language is accepted by an FSA and every FSA accepts a regular language. 
Every regular relation is accepted by an FST and every FST accepts a regular relation.
This theorem emphasises that regular languages and regular relations (or FSAs and FSTs) are basi­
cally the same. Both families are closed under union (X  U Y), concatenation (X • Y), Kleene-star 
(X*), inversion (X-1) and serial composition (X  o Y). There is, however, a crucial difference be­
tween the two families: regular languages are closed under intersection, while regular relations are 
not. An example is the following: suppose that Ri = {(an, 6nc*)|n > 0} and R2 = {(an, b*cn)\n > 
0}. These relations are clearly regular, whereas their intersection {{an,bncn)\ri > 0} is not. Nev­
ertheless, a subclass of regular relations, namely the same-length regular relations, is closed under 
intersection. These relations contain only string-pairs (a;, y), where the length of x is the same as 
the length of y. It can be proved that
(7) R is a same-length regular relation iff it is accepted by an e-free FST.
Finally, as an illustrative example, consider how a generative rule, such as Rule 1 can be im­
plemented by a FST. The details of such an implementation will be discussed in the next section 
summing up the methods of Kaplan & Kay.
N:N, N:n
The circled numbers are the states of the FST, double circles denote final states (in the present 
case, both states are final), state 0 is, by convention, the initial state. The transitions are indicated 
by labelled arrows, the two symbols on the two tapes are separated by the colon The term others 
represents all other feasible pairs not explicitly mentioned in the diagram (such as a:a, n:n, t:t, d:d, 
t:D, d:D, etc.).3 Let us see how this machine accepts the relation iNpracticaLimpractical:
o—> o m ^  N
o P o 
P
On the other hand, the machine blocks in the case of iNpracticalinpractical relation:
o o n  i
N
BLOCK, no p:p transition in state 1
3Note that we assume that N can only participate in three feasible pairs, namely: N:N, N:n, N:m.
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However, FSTs can be interpreted in a different way, which interpretation is more fruitful in 
linguistic application. Namely, the two tapes of an FST can be viewed as the input and output 
tapes, thus the machine can be regarded not only as an accepting device, but as a generating device 
as well. If the input string of the FST is the underlying representation of a string (iNpossible), then 
the machine works in a generative fashion. If, on the other hand, the input is a surface string 
(input), then the machine is applied for recognition:
(8) Generation of impossible
m  p o
N  P o
- 1  BLOCK-no
N
p: transition
(9) Recognition of input
0
n p u t
n  p u t
n
------1 BLOCK -  no :p transition
N
As we can see, the major goal of this treatment is that we no longer differentiate between genera­
tion and recognition, since the same algorithm (and the same FST) can account for both procedures.
1.3 Kaplan and Kay (1994)
In their article, Kaplan and Kay prove that every non-cyclic phonological rule system is regular, i.e. 
it can be modelled by one (though very complex) FST or, to put it in an other way, every non-cyclic 
phonological rule system defines a regular relation between underlying and surface forms. This 
treatment has two important benefits:
(i) intermediate representations can be done away with;
(ii) it provides for an effective machine for recognition as well as for generation.
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The paper shows an algorithm how context-sensitive generative rules can be interpreted as regular 
relations. After this implementation, the authors rely on the closure properties of regular relations 
(such as closure under serial composition), which gives the desired result, namely that a whole 
rule-system also defines a regular relation. In tire present overview, we would like to give only a 
taste how this implementation can be achieved.
Before we go into the necessary details, some definitions concerning regular relations and 
languages are in order. Let R be a regular relation. The image of a string x under the rela­
tion (x/R) is the set of all strings y for which (x,y) E R. If X  is a regular language or rela­
tion, let Opt(X) be X  U {e}, where e is the empty string. If L is a regular language, then the 
relation Id(L) = {{l,l)\l E L} carrying every member of L onto itself is regular. Moreover, if 
L i and L2 are regular languages, then the relation Lx x L2 = {{l\,l2 )\U € Li) is also regular. 
Note the difference between Id(L) and L x L: if L = {a, 6} then Id(L) — {(a, a), (b,b)}, while 
L *  L = {(a, a), (b, b), (a, b), (b, a)}.
We need five other operators as well, which preserve regularity.
(10) i.Let 5 be a designated finite set. The Intro(S) relation, defined by the expression 
[Iof(£) U [{e} x 5]]* freely introduces symbols from S.
ii. Let 5 be a finite set and L a regular language. .The language Ls (read 'L ignoring S') 
is also a regular language, where Ls = Range(Id(L) o Intro(S)). Language Ls differs 
from L in that occurrences of symbols in S may be freely interspersed in a string.
iii. If L\ and L2 are regular languages, the language If-P-then-S(L\,L2) ("if prefix then 
suffix") contains an string a if each of its prefixes in L\ are followed by a suffix in L2. 
Formally:
lf-P-then-S(L\, L2) — {o| for every partittion a = x ix 2, 
if £ i E L\ then x2 E L2} = L\L2
iv. The definition of lf-S-then-P(L\ ,L 2) — L\L2 is analogous.
v. Finally we can combine these two operators to impose that the prefix be in Li if and 
only if its suffix is in L2\
P-iff-S(Lu L2) = If-P-then-S(Li,L2)r\If-S-then-P(Li,L2).
Now, we can set out to define the regular relation properly accounting for the following SPE- 
rule:
(11) cj> -> i P / \ _ p
We assume, for the time being, that all letters represent strings in £*, and that this rule is optional. 
As an initial step, we can define the relation Replace modelling the rule as follows:
(12) Replace = [Id(L*)Opt{cp x V»)]*
The asterisk allows for repetitions of the <p x tp relation (multiple application of the rule), whereas 
/d(£*) accepts identical string pairs between the replacements. The image of the input string un­
der the Replace relation is identical with the input except for possible replacements of <p substrings 
in x with ip. However, this relation is not sensitive to the contextual part of the rule. As a second 
step we may simply add context requirements to the operator:
(13) Replace = [Id(E*)Opt(Id(\)(p x xpld(p))]*
At a first glance, this relation includes pairs of strings which differ in that respect that some occur­
rences of </> in the input may be replaced with ip in the output in the context required by the rule; 
this, indeed, is the thing we need. A closer inspection, however, shows that this relation, in fact, 
undergenerates. Consider, as an example, the following simple rule:
(14) B —► b /  V_V
Our Replace relation accepts the pair on the left but not the one on the right:
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V B V B V  V B V B V
V b V B V  V b V b V
The problem is that, in general, the right context of a rewrite rule in one application may serve as 
the left context of the same rule in another application on the same string. The Replace relation 
of (14) does not allow for such an application. We should incorporate this requirement into the 
definition.
Kaplan and Kay (1994)'s solution to the problem is ingenious. In order to keep track of the 
contexts, let us introduce two markers: < and >. If we put a marker < after each left-context (A) 
and the other one, > before each right context, then the possible sites for replacement are bracketed 
(< >), as it is shown below:
>V<B>V<B>V< >V<B>V<B>V< >V<B>V<B>V<
>V<b>V<b>V< >V<b>V<B>V< >V<B>V<b>V<
Now, the Replace relation would be:
(15) Replace = [/d(£^)Opt(/ci(<)dm x ipmId(>))]*
where m — {<, >} is the set of markers and the subscript m stands for the Ignore operation.4 But 
how do the markers get into the string? They are introduced freely by the Prologue operator:
(16) Prologue = Intro(m)
Our final task now is to construct an appropriate filter which only allows for properly placed 
left-context markers <. This filter would require that the left-context bracket < appears if and only 
if it is preceded by the left context A. Such an operator is P-iff-SfE*A, < £*). However, the situation 
is slightly more complex. Suppose that A = ab*. In this case, this operator accepts the bracketing 
a < b <, but refuses the bracketings ab < and a < b. The brackets of the shorter prefixes must not 
prevent the proper bracketing of longer prefixes either. A possible reaction to this requirement is 
to ignore the occurrences of the left-context bracket < in A (and £*). Furthermore, right-context 
brackets > should also be disregarded. Hence, the operator:
(17) P-iff-S( E*<A < ,< E ^)>
Unfortunately, this relation disregards slightly too many brackets, since the left-context A< fol­
lowed by a bracket < is also an instance of A<, so it should be followed by another <, which 
should also be followed by another < and so forth. To identify left-contexts properly, we should 
not disregard left-context brackets < following an instance of A<. Hence, the correct left-context 
identifier operation (filter) is:
(18) Leftcontext{A, <, >) =  P-iff-S(Y,*<\ < — £<<, < £<)>
A parallel definition of the filter Rightcontext(p, <, >) can be obtained.
So, the following regular relation implements the optional, left-to-right SPE-type rule (12), 
where o stands for (serial) composition:
(19)
Prologue o
Id(Rightcontext(p, <, >)) o 
Replaceo
Id(Leftcontext(A, <, >)) o 
Prologue- 1
In fact, there are some minor issues not addressed here, such as the problems of empty con­
texts, of obligatory rule applications, of various directions of application (left-to-right, right-to-left, 
simultaneous), of feature matrices and variables and of unordered rules. These are discussed thor­
oughly in Kaplan and Kay (1994), and the authors prove that they do not constitute a problem for 
the regularity of the model. Since this section is planned to give just a taste of the methods and 
tools of Kaplan and Kay (1994), we refer the interested reader to the original source.
The main theorem in the center of investigation in the section was:
4The markers must be ignored in the replacement proper, since they may occur within <j> or xp.
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(20) Every non-cyclic phonological rule system defines a regular relation between the underly­
ing and surface representations.
This is a very important result, however, the term 'non-cyclic' imposes certain restrictions on the 
grammar. First of all, it cannot contain a rule which can freely apply to its own output, such as (3) 
repeated here for the sake of convenience:
(21) e —t ab/a_b
Fortunately, this kind of rule is rare (if not non-existent) in phonological rule-systems, so it does 
not constitute a real problem for phonologists. We also saw that multiple applications of a rule on 
the same string (but not on its own output!) is not problematic either for the regular approach (cf. 
14). However, in principle, nothing prohibits that the output of a rule R1 is the input of another 
rule R2 whose output is the input of the first rule, etc. This kind of application is indeed possible, 
and, in fact, it is one of the basic tenets of a widely-accepted phonological framework, Lexical 
Phonology.
In Lexical Phonology, ordered lexical (cyclic) rules are claimed to apply in consecutive cycles. 
The morphological information is reflected by brackets when a word enters the phonological mod­
ule: [un[[en[force]]able]].5 The rules first apply on the string between the innermost brackets. Then 
these brackets are deleted (Bracket Erasure), and the rules reapply on the material between the ap­
propriate brackets, and so on until all brackets are deleted. This process results in -  in principle 
unbounded -  reapplication of the rules; the relation thus obtained is no longer regular.6 Let us see 
the authors' opinion on the problem:
(22) 'The cycle has been a major source of controversy ever since it was first proposed by Chom­
sky and Halle (1968), and many of the phenomena that motivated it can also be given 
noncyclic descriptions. Even for cases where nonrecursive, iterative account has not yet 
emerged, there may be restrictions on the mode of reapplication that limit the formal power 
of the grammar without reducing its empirical or explanatory coverage.' (Kaplan and Kay 
(1994, p. 365.))
In their article, Kaplan and Kay prove that -  in general -  phonological rule systems are equiv­
alent with two-tape FSTs, i.e. phonology of a given language can be viewed as a two-level regular 
relation, or equivalently, as an FST. This treatment has the advantage in generation and especially 
in recognition. It is criticised, however, for two reasons:
(i) the a lgorithm s for con stru ction  o f the sin g le  FST are v er y  s lo w  an d  in effective , h e n c e  n o  real 
im p lem en ta tion  o f  a w h o le  p h o n o lo g ica l sy stem  h as ev er  b een  g iven ;
(ii) the FST con stru cted  from  the ru les is so  com p lex  that it lo se s  its exp lan atory  p o w e r  for p h o ­
n ologists.
In the next section, we shall see another two-level model, the KIMMO formalism, which allows 
for both straightforward, efficient implementation and phonological plausibility.
1.4 The KIMMO formalism
This section is a gentle introduction to the formalism of Kimmo Koskenniemi (1983) based on 
Antworth (1990) and Karttunen (1993). The formalism relies on the knowledge that phonological 
rule sytems are in fact regular relations between underlying and surface forms. This relation can 
be decomposed into individual rules but in a different fashion that has been seen so far. In this 
model, rules (individulal FSTs) do not apply serially but they work as parallel constraints on the 
input-output pairs. Such a treatment has two advantages over the single complex FST approach:
(i) it is easy to implement (in fact, this implementation has already been carried out for languages 
such as Finnish, English, Russian and French); (ii) it is phonologically plausible.
5Under other views, phonological processes apply within the lexicon itself, after each morphological process.
6In fact, it cannot be modelled by any relation, since we cannot know how many items the composition of rule will 
consist of.
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The KIMMO system consists of two major parts: the set of lexical character-.surface character 
correspondence pairs (feasible pairs)7 and the set of the rules, like:
(23) t:c => _  i
Feasible pairs have two subtypes: default correspondences, such as i:i, t:t, (i.e. the elements of 
7d(E)) and special correspondences like t:c in the example above.
The rules, at a first glance, seem to be similar to the traditional transformational rules. How­
ever, there are important differences. Transformational rules are rewrite rules in the sense that 
they change lexical (underlying) representations into surface forms (via unbounded number of in­
termediate representations). So the rule:
(24) t -* c / _i
actually turns t into c, thus the lexical t no longer exists after the rule applied. In contrast, two-level 
rules of the KIMMO formalism are declarative rules expressing correspondences between lexical 
and surface forms, and not changing the former into the letter. A further difference between the 
two formalisms is that two-level rules do not apply sequentially (like transformational rules do) 
but in a parallel fashion.
A two-level rule is made up of three parts: the correspondence, the rule operator and the environ­
ment or context. The notation allows a number of possible shorthands in the rules:
(25) i This stands for the correspondence i : i.
i:@ The notation means 'any possible feasible pair with lexical i regardless of how it is re­
alised on the surface.' This is usually simplified to i :.
@:i The same as above but now the surface realisation must be i. The shorthand for this is
: x.
The rules can also refer to subsets of sounds such as:
SUBSET D t, d, s, z (dental stops)
(26) SUBSET P c, j, S, 2 (palatal stops)
SUBSET Vhf i, e (high, front vowels)
A palatalization rule can now be expressed as:
(27) D:P => _  Vhf
An important feature of two-level rules is that they do not allow deletion in the literal sense, rather 
they introduce the symbol 0 to express material not phonologically or lexically realised. These can 
be stress marks (') in lexical representation and morpheme boundaries (+) in the surface form:
(28) LR: O t a  t + i SR: ' t a c 0 i
The rule operator expresses special logical relations between the correspondence and the envi­
ronment it may occur. There are four types of rule operators, expressing conditional or implica- 
tional relationship.
(29) t:c =>_i:i
The operator => means 'only but not always.' That is, the rule can be translated as 'lexical t cor­
responds with surface c only if it is followed by i : i’ but not necessarily always does so in that 
environment. This is roughly the optional rule application in the SPE-formalism. When imple­
menting this rule, we first have to construct an FST modelling it. It is quite easy:
7In fact, this set need not be constructed, since the correspondence pairs can be learned from the rules. Nevertheless, 
this approach does not make any difference.
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t:c
t i @
c i @
0: 1 0 0
1. B 0 B
The arc @ : @ indicates any feasible pairs except for the ones explicitly mentioned in the transducer 
(t : c and i : i in this case). The table on the right is the corresponding state table: capital B means 
that there is no transition from the given state, i.e. the machine blocks. The colon : next to the states 
indicates final states, the d o t. non-final states.
The second type of operator <= expresses obligatory rule application ('always but not only'): 
(31) t:c <= _  i:i
Thus, the rule means: lexical t always corresponds with surface c if it is followed by i : i. However, 
such a correspondence may exist in other environments as well. The corresponding state table is:
t t i @
c @ i @
0: 0 1 0 0
1: 0 1 B 0
Here, the column t : @ expresses any feasible pair with lexical t except for the one explicitly men­
tioned, i.e. t : c. The machine blocks if and only if a pair t : @ is followed by i : i, or equivalently, 
if i : i is preceded by a lexical t which does not correspond with surface c.
The two operators seen so far can be combined into one <=> operators, meaning 'always and 
only':
(33) t:c <$=> _i:i
t
c
t
@
i
i
@
@
0: 2 1 0 0
1: 2 1 B 0
2. B B 0 B
The rule can be formulated as: lexical t corresponds with surface c if and only if it is followed by a 
lexical i which is realised on the surface as i. The transducer is simply the combination of the two 
FSTs seen before.
The last operator is /<= can be translated as 'never':
t i @
c y @
1  Ö ( T
1 B 0
The rule prohibits the occurence of the pair t : c if followed by a lexical i realised as y on the 
surface.
Finally, let us see how a two-level rule such as:
(34) t:c /<= _  i:y
1:
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(35) R t:c =>•_i
works in the case of, for example, generating the surface form. The correspondence of the rule is 
a special correspondence; the two-level description of tire language must also contain the default 
correspondences such a : a ,i : i and t : t.8 Beginning the first character of the input, the generator 
finds a correspondence with lexical t (our rule):
LR:
(36) Rule:
SR:
At this point, the generator entered the rule R, which states, however, that a t : c correspondence 
must be followed by the correspondence i : i, which is not the case at present. Hence, the generator 
must back up, and try the default correspondence t : t. It in fact works so the generator can 
continue with the next lexical character a. The only feasible pair defined for lexical a is a  : a, thus 
the generator proceeds onto the next segment t. At this point, it can enter the rule R again, positing 
a surface c:
LR:
(37) Rule:
SR:
Now, the generator encounters a lexical i, which must correspond with a surface i by the rule R. 
Hence, the generator produces the surface form taci. However, the generator is not done yet. It will 
continue backtrackig, trying to find alternative realisations. First, it will undo the correspondences 
i : i and t : c and try the default t : t:
LR: t a t i
I I I
(38) Rule: | j j
SR: t a t
Now, it will continue with the default i : i correspondence, generating the other correct surface 
form tati. Since there are no other backtracking paths, the generator exits. If the system contains 
more than one rule, the procedure is similar. Parallel application means that in each step the pos­
sible correspondences are the intersection of the correspondences posited by the rules involved.9
A final note is in order concerning the formalism developed in this section. Two-level rules 
have the advantage of simplicity and plausibility over the single-FST approach of the previos sec­
tion. The regularity of the system, however, seems to be questionable: two-level rules, in fact, 
define regular relations between lexical and surface representations. Parallel application means 
intersection of these regular relations, which -  as we saw above -  may no longer be a regular re­
lation. That is, the KIMMO formalism seems to have more formal power than the traditional SPE 
rule-sytems, which have been critcised for overgeneration. A closer inspection, however, reveals 
that the relations of this formalism are same-length regular relations, which family of regular rela­
tions has been proved to be closed under intersection by Kaplan and Kay (1994). Thus, the two 
approaches have equal power.
The SPE-formalism has been criticised for overgenerating. Rewrite rules can express phono- 
logically implausible changes with the same simplicity as plausible events can be stated:
(39) (i) [- sonorant] —> [+ nasal] / _# vs.
(ii) [- sonorant] —> [- voiced] / __#
8Note, if Id(E)  is necessarily a subset of the correspondence set, then this formalism does not permit absolute neutrali­
sation, i.e. underlying segments that do not appear on the surface.
9An alternative approach might be generating the sets of possible outputs for each rule and the output of the system 
will be the intersection of these sets.
t a t i
t a c
t a t i
I
R
I
c
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There is no language which would work in the way the first rule requires, whereas the change 
expressed by the second rule is very frequent. This problem along with similar cases led to the 
emergence of a new framework, i.e. Autosegmental Phonology in the late 1970s and 1980s (eg. 
Goldsmith (1976)). The formalisms considered so far are, however, unable to model autosegmental 
representations. In the following section we shall see an approach coping with the problems raised 
by modelling Autosegmental Phonology, namely the one-level approach of Bird and Ellison (1994).
1.5 One-Level Phonology
Phenomena such as vowel harmony, the regularity of tonal patterns and the behaviour of tones in 
Bantu languages and problems like in (39) gave a rise to Autosegmental Phonology. Within this 
framework, representations are no longer viewed as linear sequence of feature matrices but rather 
as autonomous segments or autosegments -  like [+ nasal], [+ high], etc. -  associated with skeletal 
positions. Thus, under this view, the representation of i  bearing high tone would be something 
like:10
The possible associations are constrained by the No Crossing Constraint, which ensures that 
association lines cannot cross. In this framework, the most important (if not the only) phonological 
processes are spreading, delinking and deletion of autosegments.
Autosegmental representations are more or less accepted in all current phonological frame­
works; there is, however, a frequently debated issue, the Obligatory Contour Principle, stated as:
(40) OCP: At the melodic level of the grammar, any two adjacent [autosegments] must be dis­
tinct. Thus HHL is not a possible melodic pattern; it automatically simplifies to HL. Bird 
and Ellison (1994, p. 59.)
Autosegmental representations have always been a challenge for computational linguist, try­
ing to interpret and formalise autosegmental charts. Several authors, such as Kay (1987) or Komái 
(1991), have also tried to incorporate them into the finite-state phenomena. One of the most suc­
cessful approaches was that of Bird and Ellison (1994), especially when measured against Kornai's 
four desiderata (Bird and Ellison (1994, p. 72.)):
i. Computability The number of terms in the encoding is equal to the number of autosegments, 
and each term has a fixed size. Therefore, the encoding can be computed in linear time.
ii. Compositionality If D\ and £ > 2 are two autosegmental diagrams then £(D\D 2 ) = £{Di )£(D2 ), 
where concatenation of encodings -  £ -  is done in a tier-wise manner. Thus the encoding is 
compositional.
iii. Invertibility A representation can be reconstructed from its encoding.
10In fact, autosegments are hierarchically ordered; they have a certain geometry, called feature geometry (cf. Clements 
(1985)). Note also that it is not customary to use the feature [+ long]; rather, length is represented by association to two 
timing units.
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iv. Iconicity If an autosegment in the diagram is changed, the effect on the encoding is local, 
since only one term is altered. However, if an association line is added or removed, two 
terms must be altered.
In this section, we will introduce the notation and methods of this article, which model incorpo­
rates the OCP as well.
First we have to formalise what the association in (41) exactly means:
... A ...
(41) I
... B ...
It can be interpreted as a partial overlap (cf. Bird and Klein (1990)) of the intervals representing A 
and B. Thus, any of the following strings is described by the diagram above:
(42) A A A • •• • B B B
A A A • •
• • B B •
• • A
B B B
This treatment has two important advantages over any other approach to autosegmental rep­
resentation. First, the problem of line-crossing is evaded, since intervals are sequenced linearly 
on their tier. Secondly, but more importantly, the intervals can extend freely, thus the OCP is ren­
dered trivial in this model: two adjacent intervals of the same feature is in fact one -  though longer 
-  interval of the feature.
For the representation of such an association, however, we must introduce a new device, the 
State-Labelled Finite Automaton (SFA),11 which is a septuple (V, E, A, 6, S, F, a), where:
V is a finite set of states;
E is a finite alphabet;
ACV x E is the labelling relation (i.e. the states are labelled with subsets of the alphabet);
<J C V x V is the transition relation;
S C V is the set of start states;
F C V is the set of final states;
a is a Boolean flag that is true if and only if the null string e is accepted by the automaton.
A situation of an SFA A is a triple (x, T, y) where T  C V is the set of currently active states, and 
x and y are the portions of the input string to the left and right of the reading head, respectively. If 
(x, T, y) and (x7, T', y') are two situations, then (x, T, y) h a  (x 1, T', y') iff there is a a £  E such that:
(i) y = ay' and x' =  xa (a is the first symbol in the string x and the last in ?/),
(ii) for each t' £ T' there is a t £ T  such that (t, t') £ 6 (the new situation must be reachable from
the previous one), and
(iii) (t7, o) £ A for each t' £ T' (<x is the label of each currently active state).
The transitive closure of \~a is \-*A. Finally, the automaton A accepts a string w iff either w = e and 
a is true, or (ex, {s},ß) \-*A {aß, F',e), for some (s,a ) £ A, s £ S, ß £ E* and PDF'  ^  0, and where 
w — aß.
The SFAs are, in fact, equivalent to FSAs in formal power, but -  Bird and Ellison (1994) claim -  
they are empirically more adequate. Consider, as an illustrative example, the following automata 
that prohibit two adjacent occurences of any symbol (out of the four: {a, b, c, d}), the constraint of 
OCP. The machine on the left is the FSA, the one on the right is the corresponding SFA. Note the 
differences of notation from what we have seen so far: bullets stand for states, circles final states, 
whereas initial states are marked by >-. The state labelled with 0 indicates that the automaton 
accepts the empty string e. *
"Bird and Ellison (1994, p. 59ff.)
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(43) The OCP automata
How can an autosegment P be modelled by this new machine? It is fairly easy:12
x
(44)
Now, consider the association:
A B
(45)
How can we model this diagram with an automaton? First, we construct a synchronised SFA: this 
is in fact two automata running in parallel, but the states linked by vertical lines must be active 
simultaneously.
(46)
As a second step, we simulate this synchronised SFA with adding indices to each state: 0 is associ­
ated with unsynchronized states, whereas 1 with synchronised states. Then we erase the lines.
12Here, the interpretation of P  is in fact the set of all segments bearing the autosegment P. Thus, for example, [+ high] 
stands for the set (i, u, y}.
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(47)
Now, let us see the intersection (fl) of these two automata (defined over the alphabet E x {0,1}):
(48)
The function of indices was to rule out certain states in the intersection. Now, they have served 
their purpose, so they can be omitted. Thus we arrive at our final SFA representing the autoseg- 
mental association in (49):
(49)
Thus, we managed to construct an automaton, representing the autosegmental diagram in (45). 
In fact, we can construct automata for more elaborate charts with the same ease. Furthermore, it 
is obvious that this treatment can be easily extended to multiple tiers. Thus, the autosegmental 
representation of a string can be viewed as an SFA. The only thing left we have to cope with is the 
account for autosegmental rules in this model.
Any generative rule has the format: SD  —> SC, i.e. any string that meets the structural descrip­
tion of the rule must undergo the structural change. In an equivalent formula: ->3s C S, SD(s) A 
-iSC(s). This can be expressed as: ->(**(SD fl SC)**). Autosegmental rules have the same format, 
though this is not necessarily transparent for the first glance. Consider, for example, our familiar 
nasal place-assimilation rule (Rule 1):
N C N C
(50) is
+ labial + labial
N C
+ labial
Now, the corresponding rule format is the following:
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(51)
, •: O’ N:0 C:1 »:0* *:0:0* N:0:1 C:1:0 »:0:0*
* e : 0“ +labial:l *:0* n ^ e:0:0* +labial:l:l »:0:0*
In evaluating (51), we intersect the two tiers of the SC part, and then delete the second index of 
each tuple. Next, the complement of this automaton is intersected with the SD part. Then, we 
delete the first index of the tuples. Finally, we add the •* wildcards and form the complement. 
Thus, we obtain the SFA rejecting all nonhomorganic nasal-labial clusters:
scJ SD-
(52)
The algorithm for more complex rules is the same; thus, all autosegmental rules can be repre­
sented by an SFA. Note that the rules are modelled in the same way as lexical representations in 
this framework. Indeed, both the lexical form of a string and the rules are inviolable constraints on 
the surface forms. Thus, these constraints work in a parallel fashion, i.e. we have to intersect of the 
SFAs to account for the strings on the surface.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed three important finite-state approaches to phonological represen­
tations and rule systems. The first model, that of Kaplan and Kay (1994), the single-FST approach 
differed from the others in that respect that it implemented serial generative rule-systems. On the 
other hand, the KIMMO formalism and Bird and Ellison (1994) view the grammar as parallel con­
straints. Though these two approaches (the serial and the parallel one) are equivalent in formal 
power (both define regular languages and relations), the question -  which is more appropriate for 
the description of phonological processes? -  may well arise. This is briefly discussed in Karttunen 
(1993, p. 186ff.).
Another difference between the three approaches groups the KIMMO formalism and the single- 
FST model together: they both differentiate between lexical and surface representations on the one 
hand, and representations and rules, on the other. In contrast, in the one-level phonology of Bird 
and Ellison (1994), rules and representations are viewed as the same: they both are SFAs, and they 
both represent constraints on the surface realisations of a string. This roughly means that there is 
no such a thing as underlying form (hence the label 'one-level' phonology).
Finally, the KIMMO formalism differs from the other two in one important respect. While 
Kaplan and Kay (1994) and Bird and Ellison (1994) both encode the traditional generative rule 
format: SD -> SC, the KIMMO formalism relies on rules of a different kind, the two-level rules. 
Here, apart from the implication SD —> SC, SD  <— SC, SD f-t SC  and SC/ <— SD  can also 
hold in the rules. This results in easier computational implementation and greater phonological 
transparency, though this approach bears the same formal power as the others, namely that all 
non-cyclic (or having a bounded number of cycles) phonological rule-systems define a regular 
relation between lexical and surface forms, i.e. they can be modelled by finite-state devices.
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Chapter 2
Three-level Phonology
2.1 Introduction
Classical generative phonology, as formulated in the Sound Pattern of English (Chomsky and Halle, 
1968) has received much criticism and has by now been developed into several new theories within 
generative phonology itself: lexical phonology, for example, was an attempt to integrate morphol­
ogy and phonology, while autosegmental phonology announced the break with linear forms of 
representation. Yet all generative approaches maintained the idea that phonological processes are 
a set of symbol-manipulating rules which mediate between two levels of representation -  the un­
derlying or phonological and the surface or phonetic levels -  and which apply sequentially, in a 
language-specific, often extrinsic order. These core concepts of mainstream derivational phonol­
ogy are challenged by several new non-generative frameworks all belonging to the broader per­
spective of Declarative Phonology (DP). Common to every new theory under this name is the pur­
suit of a restricted phonology which, describing processes in a radically different way making its 
theoretical constructs better approximations of real-time mechanisms, is of greater psychological 
plausibility than its generative predecessors. In compliance with such an endeavour, DP accounts 
share the conception that constraints should replace rules. Some of them use formalisms that can 
be naturally implemented on connectionist networks, which are now thought to be a model of 
the physical structure and the parallel operation of the brain. Here we would like to introduce 
a three-level declarative approach, which is termed Cognitive Phonology (Lakoff, 1995) or Har­
monic Phonology (Goldsmith, 1995a) in the literature, but the name Construction Phonology, in 
the light of its similarities to Construction Grammar, would also be appropriate. Throughout the 
paper we will use all these terms as synonyms. After outlining the general principles of declara­
tive approaches and Cognitive Phonology, we will focus on the question concerning the number of 
levels. In the second part of the paper, armed with the formalism of the theory, we test the frame­
work, and hope to prove that it stands the trial: we present three-level declarative reanalyses of 
two textbook examples of the need for rule ordering, and also show through a third example that 
iterative rules receive a simpler treatment in DP.
2.2 Declarative phonology
One of the main criticisms concerning generative phonology is levelled at the concepts of rules 
(rewrite rules of the form A-»B/C_D) and rule ordering. Declarative Phonology's central objec­
tive is to rid itself of both mechanisms. Declarative grammars replace transformational rules with 
constraints on well-formedness. Ordered rules are symptoms of a theory of many levels, and, 
more importantly, of levels which cannot claim the status of being mentally real: in an ordered 
set of rules the application of each rule would result in a representation on a new stratum, but 
there is no evidence of the existence of multiple levels of intermediate representations in the mind; 
besides, speakers of languages with different number of ordered rules would differ in the num­
ber of their representational levels. As a consequence DP has developed systems that only admit 
a small number of levels that have a psychological parallel in representation, and no intermedi­
ate representations. Cognitive phonology assumes that three levels are necessary and sufficient.
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Another reason for eliminating rule ordering is that linear application of rules would result in an 
absurdly long computation in our brains: cognitive mechanisms occur much faster than sequential 
rule operation would permit. Rules and especially rule ordering are computationally expensive; a 
declarative approach has to offer a simpler set of representational devices. The theory was termed 
cognitive phonology by George Lakoff, who emphasised that "Cognitive phonology is to be seen 
as part of cognitive grammar. As such, it assumes that phonology, like the rest of language, makes 
use of general cognitive mechanisms, such as cross-dimensional correlations". The attribute 'cog­
nitive' reveals two features in point: psychological plausibility and a mechanism to replace rules, 
'cross-dimensional correlations'.
Declarative approaches are constraint-based grammars. Rules, if they are considered processes 
of symbol-manipulation the application of which is a derivation, find no place in declarative 
phonology. DP makes reference only to rules in the sense of generalisations, 'in the form of a 
filter, implication or positive template' (Scobbie, 1993, p. 161). The theory expresses generalisa­
tions about the phonology in the form of well-formedness constraints. Three-level phonology in its 
specific formalism uses constructions that are either correlations between levels or well-formedness 
constraints concerning a particular level. A possible construction scheme is given in (1). Letters 
from the end of the alphabet denote levels; letters from the beginning of the alphabet stand for 
features or bundles of features. The construction reads as follows: An X-level A corresponds to B 
at the Y-level, if it precedes a C at the X-level:
(1) X: A C
I
Y: B
Identity across levels is the default, which is outweighed by constructions. Constraints, unlike 
rules, do not apply sequentially but are satisfied simultaneously and are in continuous operation: 
they are invoked as long as their conditions are met, without extrinsic ranking. They are, in con­
trast with the constraints of Optimality Theory, inviolable or 'hard' constraints which have to be 
compatible with each other: any true conflict (the Elsewhere Condition1 does not lead to a true 
conflict) would mean that the set of constraints describing the language is inconsistent (Scobbie, 
1993).
Direction-neutrality is an additional characteristic feature of constraints which makes the the­
ory simpler: what in generative theory had been an outcome of a rule identified as left- or right- 
iterative, are now results of the combination of continuous constraint-satisfaction and application 
from left-to-right, proceeding in the representation in accordance with the natural flow of time. 
Direction neutrality is also a property of correspondences across levels: in contrast with genera­
tive rules, any two-level constraint, describing a correlation rather than a change, is unspecific and 
neutral to its direction: an X-Y constraint holds in both directions, and is thus a mechanism of both 
production and perception.
The term three-level phonology implies the theory's concern with levels of representation in­
stead of rules and representations, which were in the forefront of previous scrutiny. Dispensing with 
rule ordering and striving for psychological plausibility, the number of levels has to be small, as 
we have pointed out earlier. The three levels are (Goldsmith, 1995a, p. 32)
i. M-level: a morphophonemic level, the level at which morphemes are phonologically speci­
fied;
ii. W-level: word-level, the level at which expressions are structured into well-formed syllables 
and well-formed words, but with a minimum of redundant phonological information,
iii. P-level: phonetic level, a level of broad phonetic description that is the interface with the 
peripheral articulatory and acoustic devices. *
'Kiparsky's Elsewhere Condition is cited in Kenstowicz (1994, p. 216):
Rules A and B in the same component apply disjunctively to form 0  if and only if
a. The structural description of A (the special rule) properly includes the structural description of B (the general rule).
b. The result of applying A to © is distinct from the result of applying B to 0 .
In that case A is applied first, and if it takes effect, B is not applied.
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These levels appear psychologically real if one conceives of the morphophonemic level as the 
one at which morphemes are stored in the mental lexicon of the mind. The word level is phonol­
ogy, as declarative phonologists think of it, i.e. a set of well-formedness constraints -  most of 
which operates at this level. The phonetic level stores instructions sent to the articulatory organs 
and information of the inputs decoded by the acoustic ones. The characteristics of the three levels 
are independent of each other.
2.3 Why three levels?
This conception of phonology aims at a maximally constrained grammar. Other more computa­
tionally oriented branches of the theory restrict the number of levels to just two (Karttunen, 1995) 
and declarative phonology in its more restricted form aims at monostratality (e. g., Bird and El­
lison (1994)). Cognitive phonology works with three levels, which according to both Goldsmith 
and Lakoff are necessary and sufficient. Goldsmith puts down the need for three levels to specific 
types of orderings (cf. (2)). For feeding relations, he says, two levels would suffice, but bleeding 
and counterfeeding relations require three. As we will see, none of the four types of conjunctive or­
der of two rules demands more than two levels. Yet a two-level constructionist phonology would 
not be able to accommodate certain phenomena: languages with more than two rules in strict (and 
specific types of) order cannot be adequately described by constraints making reference to only 
two levels.
Analysis of any kind of conjunctive order -  in which the ordered rules apply subsequently 
so that "if rule A applies to derive a representation x, a subsequently ordered rule B must apply 
to x if satisfies the structural description of rule B, the final output is thus the conjunction of the 
application of the two rules" (Kenstowicz, 1994, p. 216) -  is fairly straightforward in cognitive 
phonology, since we can formulate a systematic way of representing each kind of order as a two- 
level construction.
The definitions of the four types of extrinsic orders (feeding, counter-feeding, bleeding and 
counter-bleeding) are given in (2), taken from Kenstowicz (1994, p. 94) for recapitulation.
(2) a. Two rules A and B stand in a potentially feeding relation if the application of A creates 
new input to B. If B applies, then A is said to feed B, if B does not apply, then A and B 
stand in a counterfeeding relation.
b. Two rules A and B stand in a potentially bleeding relation if the application of A re­
moves inputs to B. If B does not apply, then A is said to bleed B, if B does apply, then A 
and B stand in a counterbleeding relation.
It is important to note that though the order and the relation of rules is conceived of as being sub­
ject to language-specific parameter-setting, sometimes the relation of rules cannot be classified as 
belonging exclusively to one of the four. A feeding rule can also bleed the consequent rule de­
pending on the specific representation, and in like manner a counterfeeding relation can also be 
counterbleeding applied to a specific class of inputs. The relatedness of feeding and bleeding on 
the one hand, and counterfeeding and counterbleeding on the other, is not realised by the repre­
sentational inventory of generative phonology; we will see that the constructions corresponding to 
the ordering relations describe this phenomenon adequately by using just two kinds of interlevel 
correlations, simplifying the grammar one step further.
In a feeding or bleeding relation it generally holds that the rule ordered earlier does not create 
or take away the target of the second rule; its effect is producing or erasing potential environments 
of the second rule2
i. A ->B /_C3
2We can conceive of an ordering in which the first rule creates targets for the second rule, but these rules, if they apply 
in the same environment can be just as well stated as one rule, dismissing the intermediate step; if the environment of one 
is the proper subset of the other, the two rules can be reformulated as two rules standing in a disjunctive order (i. e. one is 
the Elsewhere Condition of the other).
3All generative rules and constructions are given with a right-environment. The environment of both the generative 
rules and the construcions could be written as left- or two-sided environment without any significant change to the gener­
ality of the the statements.
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ii. feeding: D -* E /_B bleeding: D - » E / _A
The constructions have to be of the following kind (the symbols are to be interpreted as above)
i. X: A C
I
Y:
1
B
ii. feeding bleeding
X: D X: D
Y: E B Y: E
Thus, two level constructions take the place of three-step derivations. A crucial feature of both 
representations is that the environment of the second rule is stated on the second level, where 
every first level A corresponds to B, which, in a feeding order, is the required environment; the 
same arrangement blocks the application of the second rule in a bleeding order. The environment 
of the first rule is not necessarily stated at the first level (if there is no rule that feeds or bleeds it). 
As a consequence, any number of rules which stand in a strict feeding or bleeding order, or any 
combination of orders of these kinds can be represented by making reference to just two levels in 
cognitive phonology.
Patterns of counterfeeding and counterbleeding rules are illustrated with the same three rules, 
with reversed order.
i. counterfeeding: D -> E /_B counterbleeding D —» E /
ii. A -+B/ _  C
The corresponding constructions are shown below:
i. counterfeeding counterbleeding
X: D B
1
X: D A 
11
Y: E
1
Y: E
ii. X: A C 
11
Y: B (C)
In counterfeeding and counterbleeding orders, rules do not affect each other's application. 
The necessity of ordering in these cases is created by the need to block the application of the 
rules in the reverse arrangement, in which they would stand in a feeding and bleeding relation, 
respectively. We have shown constructions representing these orders by stating the environment 
of the two rules on the same level. In counter-relations, though, it is only important that the 
environment of the first rule be stated in the construction on an earlier level than the output of the 
second rule. Since the environment of the second rule can be given on either levels, any number 
of counterfeeding or counterbleeding relations or any combination of just these two kinds can be 
described on two levels, provided all the environments are stated on the first level. In this way, 
whatever the effect of one construction is, it does not concern the other construction. The reader 
can verify for himself the validity of the constructions for different empirical cases of orderings. 
Some of the types will be shown in the examples. Of primary interest here is the systematic way 
of rewriting different orders (which in any case made reference to three levels of representation) 
and the conclusion that all four relations can be described with the help of correlations between 
two levels. These achievements also allow (and force) us to use the same kind of constructions 
for related types of conjunctive order and to organise them into two natural groups, feeding and 
bleeding orders constituting one group, whereas counterfeeding and counterbleeding orders form 
the other.
Up to this point we have not verified the need for three levels. All we have shown is that 
no type of conjunctive ordering between two rules necessitates a three-level representation. Now
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imagine a language with 3 rules, standing in an order so that rule 1 feeds rule 2, which in turn 
counterfeeds rule 3.
The rule schemes could be written as
i. A ->B/__C
ii. D -> E /__B
iii. F —t B /__G
Let us look at the potential constructions
X: A
1
C
Y:
1
B
X: D
Y: E B
We have already shown that in a feeding relation the second construction has to have a second- 
level environment, so that the output of the first rule, which is also on the second level can trigger 
the application of the second. We have also seen that in any kind of counter-relation the environ­
ment of the first construction should be at an earlier level than the output of the second. Since 
crucially the environment of the construction for rule 2 is already on the second level, we need a 
third level for the output of the construction for rule 3. So the third construction would be:
3. X: F G
I
Y: B
For any strict ordering of three rules in which the first two rules stand in a feeding or bleeding 
relation (where the environment of the construction needs to be stated at the second level) and the 
second two rules stand in a counterfeeding or counterbleeding relation (where the environment of 
the second rule (already at the second level) has to be stated at an earlier level than the output of 
the second) requires three levels in a constructionist approach. It is also clear that a strict order of 
three rules where the first two stand in a counterfeeding .or counterbleeding relation (where both 
constructions can have their environment described on the first level) and the second rule either 
feeds or bleeds the third (so that the same two levels again will do, since it is only needed that the 
second level output of the second rule be on the same level as the environment of the third rule) 
two levels exhaust the set of necessary strata.
Another argument for three levels might be the psychological plausibility of representations. 
All three levels of cognitive phonology can claim the status of being real, as we explained in the 
paragraph introducing levels. The characteristics of the levels are independent of each other: all 
three have different phonotactics and their representations are constructed from different sets of 
components. A grammar then has the task to assign the adequate representations to each level. If 
there are three levels of representation, phonology should reflect this property of human cognition.
John Goldsmith's harmonic phonology underlines another important feature of the theory: the 
focus on phonotactics, stated in the forms of intralevel rules or constraints. One of the theory's 
metaconstraints is that these constraint (of which there are three possible types, corresponding 
to the three levels) can only operate and they operate as long as they make the representation 
more harmonic, i. e. closer to satisfying the phonotactics of that level (the significance of contin­
uous application lies in describing phenomena that were describable only by iterative rules and 
cyclic application before). This metaconstraint does not hold for interlevel constructions, though 
-  correspondences between levels do not necessarily improve the phonotactics of levels. The only 
limitation concerning such constructions is that they cannot lead to derivations with intermediate 
levels.
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2.4 Examples
Let us look at some three-level reanalyses of well known phonological phenomena. All three 
accounts were chosen to show that cognitive phonology as a highly restricted theory is able to 
handle processes that were counted among the most problematic cases in generative phonology. 
To show that cognitive phonology has advantages besides the theoretical considerations as well 
and to demonstrate that constructions are more than just a rewrite-formalism of previous accounts, 
we have to provide spectacular examples and refer to linguistic phenomena that required extrinsic 
rule-ordering in the generative framework. All three examples are taken from Lakoff (1995).
2.4.1 Canadian dialect variation
This simple example is a good start to show what three-level phonology can do. It also illustrates 
how the generalisations about the systematic correspondence between specific kinds of orders 
and their constructionist account work. Classically, this example is invoked to show that in some 
cases minimal variation between dialects which otherwise apparently have the same set of rules 
can only be explained by the different orders imposed upon their rules. The difference between 
two Canadian dialects is reflected in the way their speakers pronounce the words writing vs. rid­
ing and clouted vs. clouded. Dialect A has the following surface pairs: rfayD]ing4(rii/my) vs. 
r[AyD]ing (writing), and cl[awD]ed (clouded) vs. cl[AwD]ed (clouted). In Dialect B the differences 
are neutralised: both writing and riding are pronounced r[ayD]ing, both clouted and clouded are 
pronounced cl[awD]ed. The two rules offered by generative theory are given as (3) and (4):
(3) / a y / , / a w / / A y / , / a w / /  voiceless consonant Vowel Raising
(4) [—cont, +cor] —> [+voice] /  [—cons, +stress] [—cons, -stress] Flapping Rule
The differences in surface forms are differences of ordering. In Dialect A Vowel raising applies 
before Flapping (resulting in a counterbleeding order), while in Dialect B the two rules apply in 
the reverse order, and thus Flapping bleeds Vowel Raising (na=not applicable):
Dialect A 
write ride writing riding
rAyt rayd wr[Ayt]ing r[ayd]ing Vowel Raising
na na wr[AyD]ing r[ayD]ing Flapping
Dialect B 
write ride writing riding
rayt rayd r[ayD]ing r[ayD]ing Flapping
rAyt na na na Vowel Raising
This seems to be convincing evidence of a grammar's need for rule ordering. Yet, interlevel con­
structions of three-level phonology are able to describe the dialectal differences without having 
to reconcile to the arbitrary and computationally expensive device of rule ordering, and actually 
making reference to only two levels of the three (the word- and the phonetic levels):
(6) The Flap construction (common to both dialects)
W: [—cont, +cor]
P: [—cons, +stress] [+voice] [—cons, —stress]
The two dialects have then different Raising constructions, the difference being on the level at 
which the environment of raising is stated:
(7) The raising construction -  Dialect A 
W: [—cons, +stress] [—voice]
P: -low
4The small capital D denotes a flap.
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(8) The raising construction -  dialect B
W: [—cons, +stress]
I
P: [—low] [—voice]
In Dialect A, the voicing distinction at the W level where the environment of raising is stated, 
matches (or unifies with) the raising construction in the case of writing and clouted, but not in the 
case of riding and clouded, so a surface distinction results. In Dialect B, where the environment of 
vowel raising is given at the P level, neither of the words writing, riding, clouted, clouded unifies 
with the construction, since all matches the flap construction and has a voiced consonant at the P 
level, yielding homophonous word pairs.
In Dialect A, Flapping counterbleeds Vowel Raising, so the environment of the raising con­
struction is crucially on the first level. Dialect B's Flapping rule bleeds Vowel Raising, thus the 
environment of Vowel raising is at the second level. Notice also that although only two levels are 
mentioned, these are the Word- and Phonetic levels, the reason being that the Flapping construc­
tion makes reference to a segment (the flap D) which is not a phoneme of either dialect, but a result 
of a phonetic neutralisation mechanism.
2.4.2 Icelandic
Armed with the basic devices and mechanisms of the theory, let us look at a more complicated 
case of rule interaction. Icelandic is a language often cited by Lexical Phonology to prove the need 
for strict ordering on the one hand and cyclic rule application on the other, making the distinction 
between lexical and postlexical rules a fundamental component of grammar. Kiparsky also intro­
duces two general stipulative principles of Lexical Phonology, to which the phonology of Icelandic 
also makes reference: the Strict Cyclicity Condition and the Strong Domain Hypothesis. Three-level 
phonology offers a description without rule ordering and cycles; what previously had been lexical 
rules are now delegated to the M-W either intra- or interlevel correspondences, while postlexical 
rules reside somewhere on the W-P part in the form of constructions. This example also shows 
what the previous example did not make clear: that in some cases three levels are necessary to 
give the proper account
Kiparsky (1984) lists 6 rules, of which the relevant ones are listed below in the order imposed 
upon them (we will not verify every part of the ordering, the interested reader is referred to 
Kiparsky (1984)). As Kiparsky states "unless specifically indicated they apply both lexically and 
postlexically, where permitted by the constraints of the theory" (p. 150).
(9) Syllabification (lexical and postlexical)
(10) [+syll, —stress, +lax] -» 0 /  [—syll, +cor, +lax]5 Syncope (lexical)
(11) a —tö /  C0u u-Umlaut (lexical)
(12) 0 -» u / _r (unsyllabified) u-Epenthesis (lexical and postlexical)
U-Umlaut and Syncope display a strange phenomenon. Let us look at the two forms böggli and 
bögglu, derived from the underlying forms bagg+ul+i and bagg+il+u. The correct surface forms 
only result if the both rules apply to both underlying forms, though in different orders:
a. bagg+ul+i
bögguli u-Umlaut
böggli Syncope
b. bagg+il+u
bagglu Syncope
bögglu u-Umlaut
Lexical Phonology's way out is to posit cyclic rule application (and specific principles) in the Lex­
ical part of phonology. As can be seen looking at the morphology of the words, both require two 
cycles of lexical rule application. The list and order of Icelandic rules shows that syncope pre­
cedes u-Umlaut (it cannot apply across the board, as forms like dag+r -+dagur show: an epenthetic
51, r, n, d (th), s -  a lax dental in onset position
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u never triggers u-Umlaut, so u-Umlaut clearly has to be ordered before u-epenthesis.) In the 
derivational history of böggli, the first cycle only makes the process of u-Umlaut available, since 
the word-final Z, not being in onset position, does not match the environment of the syncope rule. 
In the second cycle, prompted by the attachment of the i suffix, resyllabification relinks the / to the 
onset of the final syllable, creating an environment for syncope, by which now the u is deleted. 
Bögglu has a different derivation, with both syncope and u-Umlaut unavailable on the first cycle, 
and both applying in the same, second cycle, in the canonical order, syncope applying first and 
feeding u-Umlaut.
Let us summarise how lexical phonology would depict the representations and changes show­
ing the differences between the two words:
(14)
bagg+ul
baggul
böggul
bagg+il
baggil
dag+r
dag(r)
dag(ur)
Lexical Rules 
Cyclel
Morphology
Syllabification
Syncope
u-Umlaut
u-epenthesis
böggul+i baggil+u _
Cycle 2
Morphology
bögguli baggilu - Syllabification
böggli bagglu - Syncope
- bögglu - u-Umlaut
- - - u-epenthesis
_ _ dagur
Postlexical Rules
syllabification
- - - u-epenthesis
Lakoff suggests a much simpler solution in the framework of cognitive phonology. Four construc­
tions are needed. A one level well-formedness condition on syllables holding at both the W and P 
levels states that a syllable consists of an onset cluster, a vowel and an optional coda cluster. Since 
in Icelandic Cr and Cj clusters are not legal coda clusters, this construction will leave the r and j of 
any CrC, Cr#, CjC and Cj# clusters unsyllabified.
(15) The syllable construction 
W, P: [Ci V (Q)]ff
(16) The construction for syncope
M: V C[-syll, +cor, +lax] + V
I
W: 0
The symbol + appearing outside a feature matrix designates morpheme boundary, thus the final 
vowel at M-level in this construction is suffixal.
(17) The construction for u-Umlaut
M: a
I C0 u 
W: ö
The statement of the environment of the construction reads: _Cou either at the M-level or the
W-level
(18) The construction for u-epenthesis
W: 0 [r]_ff
I
P u
These four constructions yield the following representations for the three words discussed above:
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(19) M: bagg+ul+i
I
W: böggli
P: dagur
The word bagg+ul+i matches the u-Umlaut construction: its environment condition is met at the 
M-level, it also unifies with the construction of syncope, which deletes the suffixal u, thus we have 
the surface form böggli; bagg+il+u also meets the conditions of the syncope correlation, the suffixal 
i is deleted. As a consequence, the environmental criteria of u-Umlaut are satisfied at the W-level. 
Finally, dag+r does not correspond to the pattern of either syncope or u-Umlaut at the M and W- 
levels. It matches the construction of u-epenthesis, stated at the W-P levels, yielding a potential 
condition for u-Umlaut, but a P-level u is not among the possible environments of umlaut. The 
need for three levels here is a consequence of Syncope feeding u-Umlaut, and u-Epenthesis and 
u-Umlaut standing in a counterbleeding relation.
Several devices of generative phonology have proved to be redundant. Three-level phonol­
ogy has eliminated rule ordering and cyclic rule application; the need to distinguish lexical and 
postlexical modules in phonology has been replaced by correspondences between three levels.
2.4.3 Iterativity
A final example is to show an attractive natural consequence of three-level phonology: the account 
of iterative rules. Lakoff's examples are Slovak and Gidabal iterative shortening, which were 
described by Kaplan and Kay (1994) as derived by the same generative rule, which being left 
iterative in Slovak, shortens every long vowel except the first in the words of the language. The 
same rule operates iteratively from left-to-right in Gidabal, resulting in an alternating sequence of 
long and short vowels. The generative rule in question was the following:
(20) Iterative shortening
[+syll, +long] -+ [-long] /  [+syll, +long] C0 _
The derivations then would go step by step, sequentially, in the case of a word which underlyingly 
has four long vowels, requiring two intermediate steps in Slovak and one in Gidabal.
Slovak 
V: C V: c V: c V:
Gidabal 
V: C V: C V: C V:
V: C V: c V: c V V: C V C V: c V:
V: c V: c V c V V: C V c V: c V
V: c V c V c V
Two simple constructions without any stipulative iterativeness abolish all intermediate repre­
sentations. The constructions for the shortening in the two languages are very similar, the only 
difference being the level at which the environment of the rule is stated. Notice that in Slovak, the 
rule counterbleeds, in Gidabal it bleeds itself.
(22) Slovak
M: [+syll, +long] C [+syll, +long]
W: [—long]
Resulting in a representation for the above example
(23) M: V: C V: c V: C V:
W: V: C V c V C V
(24) Gidabal
M: [+syll, +long] 
I
W: [+syll, +long] c 1[-long]
bagg+il+u dag+r
I I
bögglu dagr
And the proper representation is
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(25) M: V: C V: C V: C V:
W: V: C V C V: C V
According to Lakoff one advantage of using constructions instead of iterative rules besides not 
having to stipulate their iterativeness (since not being ordered, constructions apply as long as 
they are matched) is that we do not have to declare the direction of their application, both can 
proceed from left to right, the representation matching the real time process. Attractive though 
this characteristic of the theory may seem, difficulties may arise. Direction-neutral constructions 
for iterative rules only work for rules in which the environment of the rule is left of the target. 
In any phenomenon where the environment is on the right side, and the iterative rule is feeding 
or bleeding (and thus has a second level environment), as in an iterative regressive assimilation 
process, where it is the last segment which determines the features of a sequence of segments, the 
construction has to be applied from right to left. Hungarian voice assimilation is a case in point.
2.4.4 Hungarian voicing assimilation
In Hungarian, voicing assimilation is regressive, and affects only obstruents. Adjacent obstru­
ents always agree in voicing determined by the laryngeal specification of the last consonant. The 
process is left-iterative (see the example lisztből below)
(26) liszt+ből 'of flour'
/s t /+ /b /-> /sd b /—>/zdb/
The generative rule given in Siptár (1994, p. 204) is (the details and exceptions are beyond the 
scope of this paper):
(27) obstr —>■ [a voiced] / _obstr, [a voiced]
The following construction will give the correct results:
(28) M: obstr
W: [a voiced] obstr, [a voiced]
The iterative matching of the representation with the construction goes right-to-left. In this specific 
example the problem can be easily solved if the construction is not a two-level correspondence, but 
a one-level well-formedness condition, stating that a row of obstruents has to agree in voicing, and 
it is the last one which determines the value of this feature, the other obstruents get their voicing 
specification by autosegmental spreading.
2.5 Conclusions
All above analyses proved to have the advantage of eliminating the need for rule ordering. Fur­
thermore, they are formulated in a restricted framework which apparently has greater psycholog­
ical plausibility than any generative theory of phonology. Reanalyses of phenomena that do not 
need ordering of rules even in a generative analyses is fairly straightforward, and in these cases a 
cognitive phonology account might seem nothing more than a simple reformulation of rules in a 
new but isomorphic language, yet this reformulation, as we have shown in the introductory para­
graphs, has serious theoretical and empirical consequences. Of course several questions arise: Do 
the levels of analysis have any content behind their name? If so, each analysis in this framework 
should proceed so that representations are only assigned to levels where they are legal, i. e. only 
segments that are part of the phonemic inventory of the language should appear on the word 
level, phonetic differences should be assigned to the P-level, and the M-W constructions should 
only stand for what previously had been called lexical rules, while the postlexical rules should 
only be reanalysed as W-P constructions. On the other hand, we have also seen that in some 
specific ordering relations, the pure number of levels is important: if we have three rules ordered 
strictly so that the first feeds or bleeds the second and the second counterfeeds or counterbleeds
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the third, three levels are inevitably needed, even if all the three rules belong to the lexical module. 
These are questions of theoretical kind and can only be resolved by empirical investigation.
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Chapter 3
HPSG Phonology
3.1 Introduction
In contrast to classical generative phonology, which is derivational and is based on the ordered 
operation of rules, much recent work has tended towards a new model that can be described 
in terms of constraints on well-formedness1. Though this work has an increasingly declarative 
flavour, most versions retain procedural devices for repairing representations that fail to meet 
certain constraints or allow constraints to override each other. This is in contrast with the inter­
pretation of constraints in grammar formalisms like LFG, GPSG and HPSG. In these approaches 
all constraints must be observed (i.e. no ill-formed intermediate representations can be created). 
There is a recent school of phonology called Declarative Phonology (DP) that adopts this interpre­
tation of constraints. HPSG has a grammar formalism and an implemented constraint unification 
mechanism that seems to be suitable for the implementation of declarative phonological models.
On the other hand, HPSG, as it is defined in Pollard and Sag (1987) and Pollard and Sag (1994), 
deals only with syntax and semantics. The phonological content of words is limited to ortho­
graphic strings, supplemented with the concatenation operation. Doing phonology in HPSG is 
thus motivated by the facts that HPSG lacks phonology and that it seems to be a suitable platform 
to implement DP descriptions.
How could phonological representations in HPSG be enriched so that a more elaborate treat­
ment of phonology can be accommodated? Many of the current phonological accounts moved 
closer to a constraint-based perspective, but there are several problems with these accounts. First, 
they are often too informal, incoherent, inconsistent or indeterminate. Second, when a clear theo­
retical statement is found, it is usually expressed in procedural terms. Finally, even when explicit 
and non-procedural generalisations are found, they are stated in a non-linear model. The objec­
tive is thus to adopt a formal, non-procedural, non-linear model of phonology and integrate it into 
HPSG.
The distinctive features of such a model are as follows:
• Phonological representations describe a class of utterances (i.e. linguistic types).
• Lexical representations are partial, and phonological constraints are cast as generalisations 
in a lexical or prosodic inheritance hierarchy.
• Derivation consists in the gradual refinement of descriptions further constraining the de­
noted objects (lexical representations are unified with all relevant phonological constraints 
during the composition of prosodic structure). This is in contrast with the generative tradi­
tion, where derivation is not a process of refinement but one of alteration. *
'This chapter is based on Bird and Klein (1994) and Walther (1993).
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3.2 The theoretical framework of HPSG
HPSG is a constraint-based grammar formalism that employs typed feature structures. Every 
object that can be the value of an attribute has a type2. The type system is defined using two kinds 
of type declarations:
• a subsumption (type-subtype) ordering over types that defines a type hierarchy (termed parti­
tions in the Appendix of Pollard and Sag (1994))
• an appropriateness condition (termed feature declaration in Pollard and Sag (1994)): what at­
tributes must be defined for an object of a certain type, and of what type the values of the 
attributes must be
An example of subsumption ordering is in (1).
(1) sign => morph V stem V word V phrase
As another example, (2) could be the appropriateness condition for objects of type sign3.
( 2)
PHON
SYNSEM
sign1-
phon
synsem
The feature structure in (2) expresses that objects of type sign have a feature PHON (phonology), 
the value of which is of type phon, and a feature SYNSEM (syntax and semantics), of type synsem4 
Appropriateness conditions are inherited by subtypes. For example, since morph is a subtype of 
sign according to (1), it inherits all the constraints obeyed by sign. Later, we will see more examples 
of how types are declared and constrained.
3.3 Two Varieties of String-Based Phonology
As we declared in the Introduction, the objective is to adopt a formal, non-procedural, non-linear 
model of phonology to HPSG. Such a model is Autosegmental Phonology (Goldsmith (1990)). 
There are at least two ways autosegmental phonological accounts can be formulated in a declar­
ative way. One approach is based on finite-state automata (FSAs) and the other is based on the 
HPSG list notation.
3.3.1 Finite-State Phonology
Bird and Ellison (1994) describe an algorithm for converting autosegmental representations to 
FSAs. For a description of their algorithm see Section 1.5 in Chapter 1. Attempts had been made 
to apply finite-state transducers (FSTs) to nonlinear models (Kay (1987); Komái (1991)). FSAs have 
the advantage over FSTs that they form a Boolean lattice under intersection, union and comple­
ment i.e. the intersection, union and complement of any two FSAs is an FSA, which is not the case 
with any two FSTs. Closedness under intersection is crucial, because the intersection operation on 
FSAs corresponds to the unification of feature structures, which is the only structure building op­
eration in formalisms using feature structures, such as HPSG. Intersection is used in the algorithm 
of Bird and Ellison to represent links between autosegmental tiers.
An unquestionable benefit of using the FSA encoding and the algorithm of Bird and Ellison 
is that any autosegmental representation and rule-system can be mechanically translated into a 
declarative (and thus potentially HPSG-compatible) represenation. This is not the case when the
2In the terminology of HPSG the term sort is used instead of type, which is used in the sense that is conventional in 
linguistics (i.e. to denote linguistic types, as opposed to tokens). In this chapter, however we are going to use the word type 
instead of sort.
3We adopt the usual convention of writing feature names in (small) CAPITALS and types in italics. Structure sharing is 
denoted by numbers in boxes, as usual in HPSG.
4In Pollard and Sag (1994), objects of type (or sort) sign also have features like QSTORE and retrieved, which are used 
to account for quantifier scopes.
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list notation is used. Bird and Klein (1990) also claim that using the FSA encoding may also have 
a computational benefit over other notations (such as using HPSG lists). This claim is rather ques­
tionable, since the intersection of FSAs is a very time-consuming complex operation, that also 
involves the minimization of the resulting FSA (see Chapter 1 or Bird and Ellison (1994)). There 
is no finite-state transducer that could form the intersection of two regular expressions. The time- 
complexity of a system featuring Bird and Ellison's One-Level Phonology is thus much higher than 
that of a real finite-state system, since the on-line application of the intersection operation cannot 
be avoided because the unification of any two feature structures containing a phon substructure 
(i.e. the unification of any two signs) involves taking the intersection of the two FSAs that repre­
sent those phon substructures. Moreover, if there are any computational benefits of FS encoding, in 
order to exploit them, the interpretation of regular expressions must be delegated to a specialized 
engine instead of using HPSG's general constraint solver.
3.3.2 List Notations
Using finie state phonology is thus a possible but not necessaryly feasible extension to HPSG 
phonology. A more conservative technique is to use HPSG's list notation to represent phono­
logical structure. This approach, however, has the disadvantage that no mechanical procedure 
is defined to turn autosegmental analyses into a description with list notation. Its applicability 
seems to be limited to the description of morphological operations (including those in templatic 
languages) and prosodic structure building operations. In contrast, it is not at all obvious, how an 
autosegmental analysis featuring e.g. spreading could be represented using the list notation.
In order to be able to use lists to represent phonological structure, the type system must allow 
parametrised types of the form list(a ) where a  is an atomic type (3).
(3) a. list(a) => e-list(a) V ne-list(a)
b.
FIRST
REST
ne-list(a)'-
a
list (a)
e-list stands for empty list and is an atomic type, while ne-lists (non-empty lists) are represented by 
an embedded structure of lists as in (3-b). The elements of a list are the values of the FIRST attributes 
of the embedded structures5. We can now treat the usual Kleene plus and Kleene star notations 
(a+ and a*) for non-empty and possibly empty sequences of objects of type a as abbreviations for 
list(a) and ne-list(a), respectively.
Another useful notation is parenthesised (optional) elements in a list. We could represent 
(■a(b)) L (i.e. the concatenation ("-') of the list containing a and an optional b with a list L)
as
(4)
list
’f ir s t  a
REST
list
FIRST
REST §
 ^
C/l
'
rt.
1__
__
__
_1
V 0
Finally, it is useful to define another notation that recursively assigns a type r  to each position 
(sublist) in a list. The definition is recursive, as given in (5).
(5) map(r)= REST map(r)J v()
If a list (abc) has the type map(seg-list), it will appear as follows:
5There is an abbreviated notation for lists in HPSG, in which the elements are listed in a pair of angle brackets(e.g. 
(xyz)). () is a shorthand for e-list.
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FIRST a
( 6)
FIRST b
REST
REST
seg-list L seg-listL
FIRST
REST
seg-list 0
3.3.3 A prosodic type hierarchy
As we have seen, the type system must be declared by defining a subsumption (type-subtype) 
ordering over types and appropriateness conditions for them. The types involved in phonology 
thus form a prosodic type hierarchy. The type p h o n  can, for example, be defined to have the 
following immediate subtypes:
(7) phon  ==> u t te r a n c e  V p h ra se  V p w o r d  V /oof V s y l  V s e g m e n t
Each of these types may have further structure. The appropriateness condition for type se g m e n t  
could be defined as in (8 ) assuming a skeletal structure following e.g. Clements (1985, 248). Note 
that the skeletal structure of segments can be straightforwardly expressed using the feature struc­
ture representation.
(8 )
segment
LARYNGEAL
SPREAD b oo lean
CONSTRICTED b oo lean
SUPRALARYNGEAL
VOICED b oo lean
' NASAL boolean
M ANNER CONTINUANT boolean
STRIDENT boolean
CORONAL boolean
PLACE ANTERIOR boolean
DISTRIBUTED boolean
Using this definition for the type s e g m e n t,  a constraint like English homorganic nasal assimilation 
(h n a ) can be straightforwardly defined. This phenomenon does not occur across phrase boundaries 
and so the constraint will be part of the appropriateness conditions of type p h ra se . Let us assume 
that p h ra se  is a list of s e g m e n ts .  Using the list notation, SC as an abbreviation for SUPRALARYNGEAL 
and CONT for C O N TINU AN T, hna  can be defined as a negative filter like in (9).
(9)
M ANNER | NASAL + M ANNER | CONT -
SL
PLACE m
SL
PLACE -CD
segment segment -
This constraint can also be expressed using the m a p  type introduced in (5) and HPSG's FIRST/REST  
encoding for lists. This makes the constraint look less suspicious.
( 10) a.
b.
h n a  =  m a p (h o m -n a s )
FIRST I SL
h o m -n a s =  ->
REST I FIRST | SL
MANNER NASAL +
PLACE m
MANNER CONT -
PLACE - m
Standard techniques can now be used to move the negation in (10) inwards.6
6The following (De Morgan and generalized De Morgan) equivalences can be employed to normalize expressions with 
disjunction and negation:
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3.3.4 Prosodic Constituency
Prosodic constituency could be represented like phrase structure using a non-empty DAUGHTERS
list. The DAUGHTERS of a phrase would b e  of type foot, while afoot would have a non-empty list 
of DAUGHTERS of type syl (syllable). However, there appears to be no linguistic motivation for 
building such a structure.
An alternative is to define a phrase to contain a list of feet, a list of syllables and a list of segments 
at the same time, properly co-indexed (in HPSG, the term structure sharing is used for this), and 
each list must obey a number of constraints, stating e.g. that the periphery of phrases is exempt 
from certain sandhi (e.g. assimilation) phenomena, that feet have no more than three syllables, 
and only certain combinations of heavy and light syllables are permissible etc. The latter two con­
straints constrain objects of type foot while the lack of assimilation between segments in different 
phrases is the result of making the segments of a phrase the domain of assimilation constraints.
3.4 Morphology and the Lexicon
3.4.1 Linguistic Hierarchy
In HPSG, the subsumption ordering over types underlies the organisation of the lexicon as well. 
The nodes of the inheritance network thus defined contain generalisations about lexical types.
Along the phonological dimension of signs, lexical entries will have to observe any morpheme 
or word level constraints that apply to the language in question. When words combine as syntactic 
phrases, they will also have to satisfy all constraints on well-formed phonological phrases.
In some languages there may be a special interaction between the prosodic and the lexical hi­
erarchy. The tongue root harmony in Yoruba is for example restricted to the lexical class of nouns. 
If atr is the type expressing the constraint on harmonic utterances, we can limit this constraint to 
nouns by defining the following constraint on nouns:
( 11)
PHON phonAatr
noun L
SYNSEM I LOCAL|CAT
HEAD noun 
LEX +
3.4.2 Morphological Complexity
There are at least two alternative ways of representing morphologically complex (e.g. affixed) 
word forms. One alternative is handling morphological complexity in an analogous manner to 
syntactic complexity, where heads (e.g. affixes in our case) subcategorise for arguments, and mor­
phemes combine in a Word-Grammar Scheme. Such an approach would analyse the English 3rd 
person singular prefix -s in the manner shown in (1 2 ).
PHON S
HEAD I VFORM fin 
SUBJ NP[nOm][gr(i ising]
SUBCAT verb-stem
By applying appropriately modified versions of the Head Feature Principle, Subcategorisation 
Principle and linear order statements, this would yield a tree-structured sign when combining 
with a verb stem, such as walk.
->
1--
---
---
--
1
CD
 
>
=  -  [ a  0 ] v-> [ b t/-]
- A </>J=  [ 'A t ] v [a  i 4>]
-iA T means that the feature A is not appropriate for this feature structure. 
This technique eventually yields the disjunctive normal form of expressions.
( 12)
SYNSEM LOCAL CAT
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(13)
PHON
DTRS
verb
m—öi]
/  | p HON
\  verb-stemL
[D(w3:k)j [p h o n
^affix'-
Another alternative is representing affixes as p a r t ia lly  in s ta n t ia te d  w o r d  fo r m s .  This can be done by 
adding a new feature MORPH to the definition of s ig n  with a value m o rp h . The type m o rp h  has two 
subtypes, affix -m orph  and b a sic -m o rp h . The latter is the type of unaffixed stems, the former is that 
of affixed ones.
(14) a.
b.
c.
d.
The suffix
m orph = >  a ff ix -m o rp h  V b a s ic -m o rp h
STEM s t e m
morph}-
[
affix-morphL
affix-
AFFIX affix]
p r e f ix  V su ffix  
-s can thus be defined as given in (15).
(15)
3ps
p h o n  a
MORPH
affix-morph *-
STEM [PHON
verb-stem'-
AFFIX [PHON  
suffix'-
4
ms)]
This description of the suffix -s would have to be enriched to allow for the allomorphic alternation 
-s~-z~-iz. The first pair of allomorphs can be handled by underspecifying the suffix for voicing, 
and defining a voicing assimilation constraint similar to the homorganic nasal assimilation in (1 0 ). 
Moreover, the thus remaining two alternants would have to be properly constrained regarding 
(complementary) environments in which they can occur.
3.5 Examples
In this section, two examples will be given to illustrate the application of the HPSG list notation to 
give a declarative description of phonological processes. The first example features nonconcate- 
native morphology, which was a major empirical motivation for autosegmental phonology. The 
second example is a declarative analysis of French schwa, which exhibits an alternation that is 
both prosodically and lexically conditioned.
3.5.1 Sierra Miwok Templatic Morphology
Sierra Miwok has a nonconcatenative templatic morphology that features an intercalation of vow­
els with consonantal verb roots. This intercalation is similar to the one classical Arabic has, but the 
data is simpler.
Descriptive Overview
In Sierra Miwok, there are three types of verb stem that differ in the syllable structure of the basic 
form, which is the form used for present tense. As shown in (16), each type also has three other 
forms, depending on the morphological and syntactical context (Goldsmith (1990)).
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(16) Gloss Basic stem Second stem Third stem Fourth stem
Type I
bleed kicaaw kicaww kiccaw kicwa
jump tuyaag tuyagg tuyyag tuyga
take patiit patitt pattit patti
roll huteel hutell huttel hutle
Type II
quit celku celukk celluk celku
go home wo?lu wo?ull wo??ul wo?lu
catch up with nakpa nakapp nakkap nakpa
spear wimki wimikk wimmik wimki
Type III
bury hamme hame?? hamme? ham?e
dive ?uppi ?upi?? ?uppi? ?up?i
speak liwwa liwa?? liwwa? liw?a
sing mi lli mili?? milli? • mil?i
Note that the stem type distinction is only relevant to the Basic stem forms. Note also that the 2nd 
to 4th stems of Type III verbs feature a default glottal stop as the third consonant of the stem.
Analysis
The association between a segment on the consonantal or the vowel melody tier and a slot on 
the timing tier (skeleton) can be straightforwardly represented by structure sharing. The PHON 
attribute of the basic form of the verb kicaaw can be defined as given in (17).
CON (HJk GDc DEJw)
(17) vow (CDi Ea)
sk e l  (CD CD E  0  E  (D)
phott*- -*
Coindexing adequately encodes association in this case, since it has a slot-filling (rather than the 
more general temporal) interpretation.7
The basic templates themselves can be defined as given in (18).
(18)
CON ( m a n j )
a. VOW (BE)
basic-I
SKEL (CD El CD g  0  00)
CON (EGDE)
b. VOW (El 0)
basic-ll
SKEL {[Q [S [I] GD GO)
CON ( 0 0 )
c. VOW (EE)
basic-IIi
SKEL (CD CU El El E)
The PHON attribute of the lexical entries of verbs do not have to contain these templates. Lexical 
entries contain only unpredictable information like the segmental contents of the consonantal and 
vowel tiers. The value of the PHON attribute of the verb kicaaw, for example, could be defined as 
(19):
7An autosegmental analysis featuring e.g. autosegment spreading would not be so straightforward to represent using 
the list notation.
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(19) CON
VOW
phon
(k c w) 
(i a)
Lexical entries also have to be inserted into the type hierarchy; e.g. the lexical entry of any verb 
would be the subtype of one of three verbal root types. We also have to specify how each verbal 
root type determines the appropriate basic stem form. To do this, we first define basic as a subtype 
of stem.
(20) stem = >  affixed V basic
Additionally, stems are defined to inherit their SYNSEM value from their ROOT.
SYNSEM [T]
MORPH I ROOT I SYNSEM □
(20) ensures that basic inherits this constraint from stem. Now we define the three verbal root types 
to be a subtype of v-root, which is the type of every verbal root, and to have a phonology that 
contains the template of the basic stem of the appropriate verbal root type.
a. v-root = >  v--root-l V v-root-U V v-root-III
b. [pHON
v-root-It
basic-Ij
c. [PHON
v-root-U'-
basic-II^
d. [PHON
v-root-III^-
basic-illj
We then impose the following constraint on basic:
(21)
(23)
PHON a
MORPH|ROOT [p h o n  a]
basic v-rootL
This ensures that the basic stems assume the form determined by the template that belongs to 
their root type. The second, third and fourth stem types, on the other hand, themselves define the 
template that determines the skeletal structure of the 2nd to 4th stem of any verb without regard 
to the verb's own lexical specification. These issues are discussed in Klein (1993).
3.5.2 French Schwa
This section gives a declarative analysis of the French schwa-zero alternation, which is restricted 
to lexically specified words and exhibits free variation in prosodic contexts where both alternants 
result in well-formed syllabic structure, while only one variant can appear in contexts where the 
other variant would result in ill-formed prosodic structure.
Descriptive Overview
French schwa (unlike English schwa) is a full vowel, which is usually realised as the low-mid 
front rounded vowel / ce/ (and sometimes as the high-mid front rounded vowel /a /  in certain 
predictable environments). Its distinctive characteristics is that in certain environments it may fail 
to be realised phonetically.8 The alternation is manifested in forms like (24), where dots indicate 
syllable boundaries.
(24) a. six melons [si.moe.lo] /  [sim.lo]
b. sept melons [set.moe.l5], *[setml5]
8We shall not be concerned with another oe~ 0 alternation known as elision, which is a phonologically conditioned 
allomorphy involving alternations such as le/Y. Elision, in contrast to the schwa alternation, does not allow free variation 
in any case.
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Note that sept melons requires the schwa to break up the tml cluster that would be unsyllabifi- 
able. But prosodic constraints do not alone determine the alternation. Instead, they interplay with 
lexical constraints.
The following data indicates that schwa alternation cannot be treated as a general epenthesis 
process as (24) would suggest.
Cluster Schwa Possible/Obligatory Schwa Impossible
rdr bordereau [bor.doe.ro] perdrix [pEr.dri]
rf derechef [doe.roe.Jef] torchon [tor. Jo]
ski squelette [skoe.let] sclerose [skle.roz]
ps dépecer [de.poe.se] éclipser [ek.lip.se]
Consequently, we shall assume that schwa must be encoded in lexical representations. The data in 
(25) may suggest that there is a lexical schwa whenever there is an orthographic e. However, the 
data in (26) indicates that there is no such correspondence.
Orthography With Schwa Without Schwa
bordereau [bor.doe.ro] —
fais-le [fe.lo] —
six melons [si.moe.lö] [sim.lö]
pelleterie — [pel. tri]
Analysis
The declarative analysis we shall give is based on the background assumptions that the alternating 
schwa is
i. prosodically conditioned,
ii. lexically conditioned,
iii. not in direct correspondence with orthographic e.
Since prosodic structure plays an important role in conditioning the alternation, we shall first 
define a type for syllable structure.
ONS onset
(27) NUC nucleus
CODA coda 
sy/L J
Syllable structure will be represented by an independent tier encoded as a sequence of such syl­
lables, where segmental constituents of the syllable are coindexed with a separate segmental tier, 
as defined in (28). The type phrase denotes phonological phrase in (28), since that is the domain of 
syllabification in French. Note that the indices in (28) 9 range over lists of segments that may be 
empty in the case of onsets and codas.
(28) a.
SYLS
b.
SEGS
phrase
SYLS
SEGS
phrase'-
syl
C D  ^  d ]  OEI ^  E l
ONS m \
NUC a L a SYLS s '
CODA a /
->
phrase
SEGS a
0
0
9The —> in (28-a) stands for material implication. Note that since <f> —» ip is equivalrnt to -icf> V ip, the implication this 
expression can be turned into a disjunction, which can be further normalized using the De Morgan technique given in 
footnote (10).
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(28) states that the segments of any well-formed phrase must be parsed into syllables.
We have seen that the schwa-zero alternation is also lexically conditioned. We shall represent 
lexical entries that exhibit the alternating behaviour (with free variation under favourable prosodic 
conditions) using the optional list element notation defined in (4). The PHON attribute of the
lexical entry of m elo n s  could thus be defined as SEGS (m (oe) 1 3) . In contrast to this, lexical
phorp- J
entries of words featuring non-alternating schwa contain non-optional schwa segments in their 
representation.
The syllabification process is constrained by phonotactics, for which a preliminary definition 
can be given as follows:
(29) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
onset = >  w o r d - in te m a l- o n s e t  V w o r d - in i t ia l -o n s e t  
w o r d - in te m a l- o n s e t  ==> ((co n s) (g l id e ) )  V (o b s tr  l iq u id )
w o r d - in i t ia l -o n s e t  = >  w o r d - in te m a l-o n s e t  V (o b s tr  so n o ra n t)  V (s s to p  l iq u id )  V (p  n )  
coda =$> w o r d - in te m a l-c o d a  V w o rd -f in a l-c o d a  
w o r d - in te m a l-c o d a  = >  ((co n s))
w o rd -f in a l-c o d a  = >  w o r d - in te m a l-c o d a  V ((s )  s to p  ( l iq u id ) )
In addition, some more constraints must be given that express the Onset Maximization Principle. 
The constraint in (30) excludes syllabifications where an empty onset follows a non-empty coda, 
while (31) prohibits the syllabification of obstruents into the coda if there is no obstruent in the 
onset (o b s t r  liqu id  sequences are thus syllabified into the onset).
(30) o n se t-m a x -1  = -  (■... [c o d a
p h ra se  ' sy/1
(31) o n se t-m a x -2  = -  (• [c o d a
p h ra se  ' syl'-
n e - l is t
-*nha-syl'
o n s  e - l is t
( . . .o f o . . . ) l
- * inha-syl
ONS
The second syllable in the above constraints is defined to be of type n h a -sy l  (i.e. n o n -h a c h e -a sp iré -  
sy lla b le ) , because these constraints do not hold for the lexical class of so called hache aspiré words. 
The phrase se p t haches, for example, is syllabified as [seta/] and not as *[se.ta/], and similarly, 
the only correct syllabification for qu a tre  h a ch es  is [katr.aj], while *[kat.ra/] and *[ka.tra/] are ill- 
formed. The type s y l  thus has two subtypes, and syllables of subtype h a -s y l  (h a c h e -a sp iré -sy lla b le ) 
are defined to have and empty onset.
(32) a.
b.
s y l
ha-syl ■
= >  h a -s y l  V n h a -sy l  
ONSET e - l i s t ]
Now, hache aspiré words will be lexically specified as having an initial h a -s y lw . The value of the 
PHON attribute of the word h a u t  would be:
(33)
SYLS
SEGS
phon  L
3.6 German Declarative Syllabification
Markus Walther gives a declarative account of syllabification that substantially differs from the 
account given in the previous section (Walther, 1993). His segmental representations, the repre­
sentation of syllabic structure and of phonotactic constraints, and the way the Onset Maximization 
Principle is realised in his account is different from the way these issues have been handled above. 
Walther's approach is modular:
• There is a basic sonority-driven syllabification algorithm, which is constrained by 10
10Hache aspiré words could also be stipulated to start a new syllabification domain, but that would mean that they start 
a new phonological phrase and w e have no reason to think that.
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• language-particular instantiations of syllable length-restricting constraints and formal phono- 
tactics.
« Phonotactic constraints are part of segmental representations.
The syllabification algorithm:
• avoids extrinsic ordering and structure-changing operations (i.e. it is declarative),
• is based on partially specified subsyllabic functions modelled as types which are assigned 
on the basis of elementary sonority differences,
• incorporates ambisyllabicity and the domain-bounded nature of syllabification.
For German Final Devoicing, which is a syllable-dependent phonological process, a novel non­
feature-changing analysis is proposed. Arithmetic constraints are used to model phonetic inter­
pretation of phonological structure in parallel with the building of phonological representations.
3.6.1 Descriptive Overview
The monomorphemic monosyllables in (34) illustrate the possible complexity of syllables in Ger­
man:
(34) a. Aal eel, oh oh!, Maus m o u se , Luft a ir , grau g re y , Flug f l ig h t ,  Stroh s t r a w ,  Sprung ju m p ( n .)
b. Schnee s n o w , blau b lu e , Ball ba ll, rot red , Wurm w o r m ,  Milch m ilk , Faust f i s t ,  Pielm h e lm e t,
Worms ( to w n  n a m e ), Mumps (d isea se  n a m e), Herbst a u tu m n ,  Dienst se rv ic e
The data above shows that obstruents precede sonorants in the onset, with matters being reversed 
in the coda. The extra peripheral consonants may only be coronal obstruents. Onsets allow one 
( / / /) ,  codas up to two extra segments (e.g. /st/).
The following list contains monomorphemic forms, which are maximal in the sense that only 
coronal obstruents may follow, e.g. in the form of inflections11:
(35) a. viel [fill] m u c h , doof [do:f] s tu p id ,  schön [Jom] b e a u tifu l, Stab [/ta:p] p o le
b. fein [fain] f in e ,  drauf [dKaufj on  i t ,  neun [noyn] n in e , Raub [tfaup] ro b b ery
c. Film [film] f i lm ,  darf [daiff] m a y ,  gem [germ]] w ith  p le a s u re ,  gelb [gelp] y e l lo w
Short vowels tolerate two coda consonants (35-c), long vowels (35-a) and diphthongs (35-b) only 
allow one coda consonant. No more than two vowel positions are allowed in a syllable:
(36) Theater [tei.ai.te] th e a tre , Oase [oi.ai.za] oasis
As a descriptive statement, the following syllable template can be given:
(37) (C)(C)(C) V X (C)(C)(C)
(37) entails that final full vowels must be p h o n o lo g ic a lly 12 long:
Zoo [tso:] *[tso]
Schwa and syllabic sonorants, which usually result from schwa-zero alternations, do appear 
in final position. The deviant behaviour of schwa can be attributed to its functioning as a default 
vowel. Its distribution is predictable, and no schwa-initial words exist in German.
The following monomorphemic polysyllables show that 0-4 medial consonants are possible. * 123
(38) a. Aorta [ai.otf.ta:] a o r ta , Eosin [ei.oi.ziin] eosin  ( C 2o H % O s B r i)
b. Aroma [ai.HW.ma:] a ro m a , Kabine [kai.bii.na] cabin
c. Alkohol [al.koi.hoil] alkoh o l, Tablett [tai.blet] tra y
"The bracketed transcriptions in the examples below represent the output of phonology before phonetic interpretation. 
The phonetic interpretation of unstressed long vowels usually yields a short vowel contrary to what the bracketed forms 
listed here imply.
12This does not mean that syllable-final vowels must also be phonetically long. Phonetical length is also influenced by 
stress. Unstressed vowels in open syllables are short phonetically. For a description of Phonetic Interpretation see the 
section on arithmetic constraints below.
13With regard to the syllabification of medial obstruent clusters only one prominent pattern is shown.
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d. Ernte [etfn.ta] harvest, Elster [els.te] magpie
e. extra [eks.tKa:] extra, extrem [eks.ttfeim] extreme, *[eBks.ttre:m]
Syllabification in German is a domain-sensitive process; derivational prefixes (39-a), compound 
members (39-b) and C-initial derivational suffixes (39-c) all form separate syllabification domains. 
In contrast to this, inflectional and V-initial derivational suffixes (39-d) amalgamate with their 
respective stems to form larger domains of syllabification:
(39) a. Ur.ur.oma {Ur-}{Ur-}{Oma}grand-grandmother,be.vor.mun.den {be-}{vor-}{mund+n}
b. Va.ter.un.ser {Vater}{unser} Lord's prayer, Klapp.fahr.rad {Klapp} {fahr} {rad} foldable 
bike, Herbstanfang {Herbst} {anfang} beginning of autumn
c. fraglos {frag}{-los} unquestionably, gelb.lich {gelb}{-lieh} yellowish, Tau.chen {[tau.^an]} 
{Tau}{-chen} little rope
d. Atmung {Atm+-ung} breath (n.), far.big {farb+-ig} coloured, For.ma.lis.ten {form+-al+- 
ist+-n} formalists
A  minimal pair is Tauchen [taö.^an] (little rope) versus tauchen [tau.xon] (to dive (inf.)). The palatal 
fricative in -chen fails to assimilate in backness to the preceding vowel, as predicted by the German 
ich/ach alternation.
The following examples show clear cases of ambisyllabicity:
(40) a. Mitte [mita] middle, lachen [laxan] to laugh, Hammer [hamv] hammer
b. trockener [tKokanv] dry (comp.)
c. Dinge [diga] thing (pi.), schwanger [JVarjv] pregnant
Single medial consonants are ambisyllabic after short stressed vowels (40-a) and unstressable 
schwa (40-b). Segment / g /  is not found in strict onset position, but can be ambisyllabic (40-c).
3.6.2 Declarative Syllabification
Segmental Representation and Sonority
The segmental representations Walther (1993) assumes are based on articulatory gestures which 
are temporally extended entities as defined by Articulatory Phonology (Browman and Goldstein, 
1989). Segments are represented as feature bundles consisting of exactly two feature slots, each 
bearing a gesture. There is a HEAD gesture slot (for primary articulation — the main oral gestures) 
and a COMP gesture slot (for secondary articulation properties — voicing, nasality, laterality and 
lip rounding). Gestures have a constriction degree, a constriction location and a constriction shape 
(for some gesture types). Every constriction occupies a temporal interval. A gesture can be active 
or inactive. Segments that contain inactive gestures are e.g. /h /:  HEAD: inactive and / a / :  HEAD: 
inactive, COMP: inactive. All this can be represented assuming the types given in (41).
(41) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g-
h.
i.
j-
k.
scalar => temporal -interval V constriction 
constriction = >  degree V location V shape 
HEAD gesture 
COMP gesture
segment L
gesture active V inactive
gesture
active
active
| ti temporal-interval  ^
CD degree j
CL
=> oral V velum V glottis 
location
oral
oral
body
lips V tongue 
tongue = >  tip V body
CS sfiapej
3.6. GERMAN DECLARATIVE SYLLA BIFICATION 4 5
The representation in (41) assumes that some types (such as temporalJnterual, and constriction de­
gree, location and shape) are scalar types. Using scalar types along with arithmetic constraints to en­
code phonology-to-phonetics mappings could open up the possibility of such exciting applications 
as phonetic implementation within HPSG. See tire section on phonetic implementation and arith­
metic constraints.
Walther's declarative syllabification is sonority-driven. Sonority can be thought of as a seg­
ment's 'overall loudness'. It defines a partial ordering that partitions the set of segments into 
equivalence classes. It is usefulness as an abstraction device for defining syllable contours. Syl­
lables can be defined as instances of a hat-shaped sonority pattern, which has come to be known 
under the term sonority sequencing generalization (Selkirk, 1984). However no satisfactory defini­
tion in terms of identifiable phonetic properties has been established so far. This is not surprising, 
because the sonority scale varies from language to language. On the other hand, language partic­
ular sonority scales seem to be leamable. This is demonstrated by Ellison, who gives an algorithm 
for learning the scale in Ellison (1992). Starting from a random initial sonority scale Ellison's pro­
gram finds its way to the optimal language-particular scale. For German, the scale in (42) can be 
assumed:
(42) obstruents nasals / l /  / h/  high vowels other vowels
—> increasing sonority — >
For the purpose of defining syllable structure it is sufficient to think of sonority as a partial relation 
moresonorous(Segmentl, Segment!).
Sonority-driven declarative syllabification
Walther's syllabification algorithm assigns one of four subsyllabic functions to each segment in a 
string. The subsyllabic function symbols are: Nucleus, Onset, Coda and CO for the ambisyllabic 
case. A segment can be defined to have one of these subsyllabic functions if it satisfies the conjunc­
tion of two basic constraints. There are four such constraints, which we can label Q , C2, C3 and 
C4 , respectively. A pair of constraints holds for a segment depending on the sonority differences 
between the segment and its neighbouring segments. The constraints are defined as given in (43). 
A more expressive name than Cx is also given for each constraint.
constraint direction change alias
Ci next segment is more sonorous in.onset
c2 previous segment is less sonorous not.in.coda
C3 next segment is less sonorous in.rhyme
c4 previous segment is more sonorous in.coda
The definition of subsyllabic functions then is as follows:
(44) O = in.onset A not.in.coda 
N  = notJn.coda A in.rhyme 
C = in.rhyme A in.coda 
CO = in.onset A in.coda
The boundary conditions for the left- and rightmost elements are C2 (not.in.coda) and C3 (in.rhyme), 
respectively. These represent zero sonority at the boundaries of syllabification domains. Note that 
we do not need a formal equivalent of the Maximize Onset Principle.
But note also that the constraints Ci to C4 are only defined for segments which are adjacent 
to segments which are either more or less sonorous than they are. This is not so in the case of 
sonority plateaus. These can be handled by employing virtual sonority difference markers up and 
down. In the case of real sonority difference they correspond to that difference. In the case of 
consonantal plateaus, however, virtual sonority continues to rise after an uprise and fall after 
a downfall, because such plateaus are either in a coda or in an onset. Vocalic plateaus, on the 
other hand, display an alternating behaviour in virtual sonority (up, down), which results in the 
syllabification of a sequence of long vowels into different syllables.
An application of the revised syllabification algorithm is shown in (45).
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N C C CO O N C O N CO N C
e k s t tf a »4 t e ?4 o *4
up down down down up up down up up down up down
Long vowels and diphthongs receive the labelling N-C in final position and N-CO in nonfinal po­
sition. The distinction between light and heavy syllables is captured by referring to the absence or 
presence of a Coda element. In languages where this does not suffice, a more specific instantiation 
of this criterion would have to state that in order for a syllable to count as heavy, the coda segment 
must exist and be of type consonantal. The CO label that is assigned to the second element of long 
vowels by virtue of the syllabification algorithm corresponds to glide formation Theo [teijo:] or 
glottal stop insertion Theater [te:?a:te].
It is incorrect that the algorithm uniformly assigns ambisyllabic function CO to all (virtual) 
sonority minima. After twofold sonority downfall (down down virtual sonority pattern) no ambi- 
syllabicity is possible. Also in other potentially ambisyllabic circumstances (up down up pattern) 
postvocalic consonants only appear ambisyllabic in certain configurations (46-b). The solution is 
that the segment occupying a sonority minimum is of type in.onset (= O v  CO) iff it can form a 
well-formed onset with its right-hand neighbour according to phonotactics. Formally, we employ 
a disjunction for inuonset vs. in.rhyme constraint placement.
(46) a. Verfilmung, Ord.nung, Sau.na, Verfeu.rung, Sah.ne, Atmung
filming, order, sauna, burning, cream, breathing
b. Schmu[g]ler, ho[p]la, E[g]e, Samm.lung, Wid.mung, Schaff.ner 
smuggler, oops, restriction, collection, dedication, conductor
We can implement the distinction between potentially ambisyllabic configurations and those which 
are never ambisyllabic by a small finite state automaton with 4 states, which tracks the virtual 
sonority differences. The basic syllabification algorithm is altered so that the partial subsyllabic 
function assigned depends on the state of the automaton at a given position.
Length restrictions
The syllable length restrictions that were given as a template in (37) can be defined as a constraint 
on syllables as given in (47) in the form of regular expressions.
(47) lengthsestriction => (ConsClust M inSyll)+ConsClustr\ Schwa AnySeg*
ConsClust =>■ e\Cons\Cons Cons\Cons Cons Cons
MinSyll => FullVowel AnySeg\SchwaOrConsNucleus
Phonotactics
Walther (1993) uses implicational constraints and cross-subcategorisation between adjacent seg­
ments to describe phonotactics. These implications are stored in the segment descriptions them­
selves. An implicational constraint for labial obstruents for example, is like the following:
(48) If the segment (a labial obstruent) is in.onset and the next segment is also in.onset then the 
second one must be non.nasal.
Morphological and lexical concatenation must connect the right and left contexts of individual 
segments. Lexicalised exceptions can be handled by type-marking the offending onset segments of 
items like Smog, Smoking, Snob etc. as lexically specified, while normal occurrences of segments 
would be marked lexically.unmarked. The implicational phonotactics is conditioned to constrain 
only the lexically.unmarked segments.
Domain-sensitivity
Syllabification domains in German are identified with the prosodic category phonological word. 
A distinguished feature WORD (a subtype of interval) is used to indicate which phonological word 
a segment belongs to. Two prosodic words are identical if their temporal intervals are co-indexed. 
Morphemes like -lieh which open up a new syllabification domain of their own lexically impose
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a precedence constraint between their own phonological word and the left-adjacent one. Mor­
phemes like -ig specify that the value of their phonological WORD is coindexed with the word to
their left.
Arithmetic constraints and phonetic interpretation
Arithmetic constraints can be used to express a precedence relation between temporal intervals 
(such as gestures) which can also be phonetically interpreted. An interval (spi, epi)14 precedes an 
interval (sp2, eP'i) if and only if ep\ < spi- We might complement the computation of the relative 
temporal arrangement of individual gestures with an approach to the computation of the phonetic 
length of these gestural intervals, which recognizes length-determining coefficients throughout 
the whole prosodic hierarchy. The overall impact of prosodic structure on gestural length can 
be defined as, say, the product (or some other suitable function) of level-wise length coefficents 
kj along a projection line. The phonetic length of phonologically long vowels, for example, is 
influenced by the stress pattern on the foot level of prosodic structure ( k s t r es sed  vs. k u n s t r e s s e d ) as 
well as be the speech rate at the utterance level (kspeechrate) - 15
3.6.3 Syllable-dependent phonological processes
Final Devoicing has long been thought of as one of the prime candidates for a feature-changing 
rule (there is absolute neutralization of voicing contrast for obstruents in final position).
(49) a. Lo[p]-Lo[b]es, Ra[t]-Ra[d]es, Sar[k]-Sar[g]es, akti[f ]-akti[v]es, Gra[s]-Gra[z]es
praise-(gen), wheel-(gen), coffin-(gen), active-(neut), grass-(gen)
b. orange (adj.) [oifaijJ'j-Orange (n.) [oKai^o]
c. Ra[t]-Ra[t]es, Bioto[p]-Bioto[p]e, star[k]-star[k]en
council-(gen), biotope-(pl), strong-(weakform)
d. kin[t]lich kind-lich childlike, kin[d]isch kind+-isch childish
e. Ja[kt] hunt (n. sg.) -  jafgjen to hunt (inf.) -  Ja[kd]en hunt (n. pi.)
f. Ebbe [eba] low tide, Bagger [bage], Kladde [Klada] vs. Ebbstrom [ep][JtKo:m] stream of 
low tide
Final Devoicing also applies to non-native voiced obstruents in loanwords (49-b). There is a multi­
ple final devoicing (49-e). The domain is the coda (absolute syllable-final position -  not morpheme- 
final as is indicated by (49-d)), and (49-f) shows that ambisyllabic consonants are not devoiced.
A declarative (not feature-changing) account can be given by defining initial entries for alter­
nating voiced and non-alternating voiceless obstruents as exemplified for the labial stops in (50).
(50) a. /b /  : 3S.lip-closure(S) A (in-onset(S) => voiced(S))
b. / p /  : 3S.lipclosure(S) =$> voiceless(S)
It predicts languages without Final Devoicing, e.g. English, to have different segmental descrip­
tions.
The Final Devoicing constraint:
(51) VS.obstruent(S) A C(S) => voiceless(S)
(51) is a lexical constraint imposed on the segmental lexicon, it must be conjunctively added to 
all segment descriptions, following the quantor's prescription. This yields a representation for 
alternating voiced obstruents like the one in (52).
(52) /b /  : 3S.Slip-closure(S) A (in.onset(S) => voiced(S)) A (C(S) voiceless(S))
14i.e. of starting point sp\ and of endpoint epi
15Walther also proposes to treat all geminates as single segments having the subsyllabic function CO and thus achieve 
geminate inalterability without the need to define any constraints stating it. To cover the length distinction of geminates 
as compared to 'normal' segments he proposes to interpret CO structures in phonetic implementation. This could even 
be achieved in a compositional fashion by distinguishing kin_on3et and kln co^a length coefficients respectively, whose 
subsyllabic function counterparts are both contained in CO. Unfortunately, such a treatment can not be trivially carried 
over to languages like Hungarian, where the distribution of (true) geminates is not as predictable as that of ambisyllabic 
consonants in German or in Italian.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed some of the possible ways to represent phonology that make it 
possible to integrate it into HPSG. We have seen that very different solutions to the same problems 
are possible, yet they all have the common property that only structure building operations are 
allowed, which are expressed in the form of constraints that are all unified to yield a representa­
tion of possible surface strings. We have seen how alternations that were traditionally handled by 
structure changing rules can be dealt with by underspecifying lexical representations and adding 
a constraint to the prosodic type where the rule operates. It may depend on the particular repre­
sentation that we choose what this type is.
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Chapter 4
Lexicon in Transformational 
Grammar
4.1 The Principles and Parameters Approach (Government and 
Binding Theory)
4.1.1 Meaning and Sound: A Minimalist Flashback To the Principles and Pa­
rameters Approach
Before taking a closer look at how a most influential transformational grammatical theory in the 
1980s and 1990s gives an account of the lexicon and linguistic description in general, a termino­
logical remark is in order here.
"The Principles and Parameters Approach is sometimes called Government-Binding 
(GB) Theory. (....) True, early efforts to synthesize current thinking in these terms hap­
pened to concentrate on the theories of government and binding (Chomsky, 1988), but 
these modules of language stand alongside many others: case theory, thematic theory, 
and so on. (....) Furthermore, insofar as the theories of government and binding deal 
with real phenomena, they will appear in some form in every approach to language; 
this approach has no special claim on them." (Chomsky and Lasnik, 1995, p29)
To achieve descriptive adequacy, it seems necessary to enrich the format of permissible sys­
tems, but in doing so the grammar loses the property of feasibility so that the problem of the 
way of language acquisition is still uncracked. This issue is inherent in the kinds of rule systems 
that were being mused on in the 60s and partly 70s and it made the theory shift in another direc­
tion, namely, assigning overall principles which underlie rule application generally to universal 
grammar (UG), which is a system of all principles which are common to all human languages and 
are on hand to each individual prior to experience, that is to say, a biologically given system in a 
child's brain. It embodies a set of absolute universals, notions, and principles which do not vary 
from one language to the next. There are language-specific properties that vary cross-linguistically 
and for these a range of choices is made available by UG.
The actual rules of grammar can then be given in the simplest form, with these principles guar­
anteeing that they will operate in such a way as to yield the observed phenomena in their full 
complexity. This grammar can reach a limit when rules are blotted out altogether and the outward 
rules are deduced from overall principles of UG, in the sense that the interaction of the principles 
would yield the phenomena which the rules had been thought up to describe. Language variation 
is restricted to some options [=parameters] as to how the principles apply. The Principles and 
Parameters approach held that languages have no rules in the familiar sense, and no theoretically 
significant grammatical constructions except as taxonomic artifacts. There are universal princi­
ples and a finite array of options as to how they apply, but no language-particular rules and no 
grammatical constructions of the traditional kind within or across languages.
The Principles and Parameters research has discovered such principles of grammar which 
cross-cut the traditional division of syntax into constructions named by their key morpheme or
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semantic content, e.g. passive, A-binding, or wh-question. Some properties of passive are held 
in common with properties of reflexive anaphora, while others with wh-questions. Syntactic dif­
ference among languages are put down to the role of experience in choosing values for certain 
open parameters in the theory. Since the articulations of the theory largely cross-cut traditional 
construction boundaries, the setting of a parameter for any articulation can be reckoned to have 
consequences that cross-cut constructions. The same property of Principles and Parameters re­
search that predicts amazing linkages in cross-linguistic variation yields surprising linkages for 
the linguist attempting to explain language. A slight change in theory can be expected to have 
surprising consequences over a range of linguistic constructions.
" ...Inquiry into generative grammar (....) has pursued the working hypothesis that 
UG is a simple and elegant theory, with fundamental principles that have an intuitive 
character and broad generality. By dissolving the notion of construction and moving 
toward "rule-free" systems, the Principles and Parameters Approach carries this ten­
dency considerably forward. A related assumption is that UG is "nonredundant," in 
the sense that phenomena are explained by interaction of priciples in one particular 
way. (....) In its basic structure, the language faculty has properties of simplicity and el­
egance that are not characteristic of complex organic systems, just as its infinite digital 
character seems biologically rather isolated." (Chomsky and Lasnik, 1995, p29)
In sum, the Principles and Parameters approach strives to reduce descriptive statements to 
language-invariant and language-particular ones. The language-invariant statements are princi­
ples (including parameters), while the language-particular statements specify particular values of 
parameters. That is why the notion of construction, in the traditional sense, effectively disappears. 
For instance, there are no such constructions as verb phrase, or interrogative or relative clauses, or 
raising constructions. These descriptive objects (which have no theoretical status) are formed by 
the interaction of overall principles. The parametric options are restricted to properties of the lexi­
con and the point in derivation from deep structure (D-structure) at which structures are mapped 
to the phonetic form (see in the next paragraph).
UG specifies some linguistic levels (i.e. representational systems). Each linguistic level pro­
vides systematic information about structural descriptions, and the structural descriptions are 
the linguistic expressions, and each linguistic expression is a sequence of representations, one 
at each linguistic level. The structural description may be regarded as a complex of instructions 
for performance systems, providing relevant information to their functions. The performance 
systems fall into two types, (a) articulatory-perceptual, and (ß ) conceptual-intentional. The two 
linguistic interface levels providing the instruction for the above two performance systems are 
usually called the phonetic form for (a), and the logical form for (ß) in the Government and Bind­
ing theory of the 80s. Each language will determine a set of pairs drawn from these performance 
systems as its formal representation of sound and meaning.
Before examining the lexicon in the Principles and Parameters approach we might want to 
show some more concepts of the theory, with special attention to the fact that the lexicon is a 
module in this framework.
4.1.2 Modular System
By a standard assumption language in the 80s grammar roughly consists of a lexicon and a com­
putational system, the two major components, or "subcomponents of the rule system" (Chomsky, 
1988, p5). The lexicon characterizes the lexical items which come up in structural descriptions, 
whereas the latter uses the lexical items to generate the form of structural descriptions. Deriving a 
particular linguistic expression involves a choice of items from the lexicon and a computation that 
constructs the pair of interface representations.
Generative grammars have assumed that there is a system of representation at which lexical 
items are inserted. This level expresses lexical properties in a form accessible to the computational 
system. From another aspect, principles at this level specify the way lexical properties are pro­
jected in a grammatical structure from the lexicon. Even if a level (the deep structure (DS) in the 
transformational generative tradition) is not at all indispensable, its role to link up the computa­
tional system and a set of lexical items (i.e. the lexicon) must be universally incorporated in any 
grammar (see the minimalist program).
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The principles can be naturally grouped into modules of language. A characteristic feature of 
generative grammars is that their model of language is modular, i.e. made up of subsystems.
Why are batches of principles taken to be a subsystem?
Firstly, the subsystems are complete in that they include all the essential rules and principles of 
their area and they are reckoned to cover the range of data of a particular aspect of grammar. Sec­
ondly, the subsystems are coherent in that they shape one particular aspect of grammar. Thirdly, 
the subsystems are autonomous in that the setup and workings of the principles cannot interfere 
with anything from outside the subsystem. Of course, an output of each subsystem may serve 
as an input for another and these intermodular interface levels are potential levels of linguistic 
representation, that is, representational levels.
The modular grammatical concept, with the exception of the latest minimalist theory, simply 
took the following hypotheses for granted.
i. There must be a level that serves as input for semantic interpretation
ii. There must be an interface level where the primal structure of a sentence builds up (the­
matic structure, X-bar tree graphs)
iii. There must be an interface level where lexical insertion takes place and idiosyncratic prop­
erties of lexical elements enter the grammatical structure
iv. There must be a level representing the primal structure which is transformed by some 
kind of movement, deletion, or other transformational operation into a surface structure
(we do not think of the surface structure of Chomsky (1965) or Chomsky (1988) but any 
representational level which functions in that way. In other words, there are transformations 
which take the primal structure of a sentence as their input.
We would like to point out that the above four hypotheses or the theoretical objects which 
they refer to are not closely related, let alone, depend on one another by some linguistic neces­
sity, and, therefore, they may have been split into different subsystems of a syntactic theory,
although in fact they were conflated at deep structure, for example, in Chomsky (1965). Also, in 
the Extended Standard Theory and the Government and Binding Theory out of the above four 
assumptions (ii), (iii), and (iv) remained inseparable from their conditions or requirements being 
met at deep structure.
Returning to our starting point, UG consists of interacting subsystems, from one point of view 
these are the various subcomponents of the rule system of grammar:
a the base: the lexicon and the categorial component
ß the transformational component (Isyntax = categorial component and transformational com­
ponent)
7  Phonetic Form component
6 Logical Form component
From another point of view, we can isolate subsystems of principles (bounding theory, govern­
ment theory, theta-theory, case theory, control theory, binding theory in Chomsky (1988).
Base rules generate deep structure through insertion of lexical items into structures generated 
by the categorial component in accordance with their feature structure. The categorial component 
rules meet the conditions of the X-bar theory.
Besides the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, among restrictions on lexicon properties there 
are options as to how functional elements are realized, also, variations in global properties of the 
heads, for instance, verb-complement ordering, specifier-head ordering, etc.), and some limited 
choice of substantive elements. (The categorial component specifies such parameters). Thus, by 
choosing an item from the lexicon the deep structure phrase markers will be fully determined for 
a language with parameters fixed.
How the lexicon is built is largely determined by the overall model of grammar. One takes a set 
of building blocks from the lexicon and puts them together in a tree in keeping with the principles 
of the grammar, moving elements from their original position to their final resting place in the 
course of derivation as needed. As a consequence, the lexicon always serves as the outset for such 
a derivation.
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4.1.3 Lexical Specifications Determine Syntactic Distribution: Semantic and 
Categorial Selection
An item in the lexicon is either functional or lexical. The latter has substantive content while the 
former does not. A lexical item has
• categorial features (N,V,Adj,....)
• grammatical features (gender, number, tense, mood,....)
• inherent semantic features that determine semantic selection (strict subcategorization (Chom­
sky, 1965) and thematic roles) and syntactic features that determine categorial selection.
• phonological matrix
It has been an open issue since 1965 whether categorial selection can be reduced to semantic 
selection. Clearly, what complements a lexical head takes is related to its meaning, in other words, 
lexical specifications determine syntactic distribution, but it is unpredictable from semantic con­
siderations what complements appear in fact (see later in this subsection).
The four basic lexical categories are determined by the following features : +N, -N, +V, -V
We can characterize the basic categories in the following way: adjectives are +V,+N, verbs 
are +V, -N, norms are +N, -V, prepositions are -V,-N. The categories with +V features are purely 
predicative (V and A). The -N categories are potential case-assigners (P and V).
Subcategorizational phenomena are typical examples of syntactic distributions determined by 
lexical specifications:
(1) a. *Peter saw.
b. Peter saw a dog.
c. *Peter saw in the garden
d. Peter put the man out onto the street.
e. Peter spoke.
f. Peter spoke about history.
g. Peter was on the roof.
h. *Peter was on.
i. The TV was on.
Lexical entries include subcategorization frames, the formal realizations of selectional restrictions. 
For instance, run, V (.... ); drive, V, (.... NP); fond, A (....PP).
Adjuncts, or adverbial phrases, are non-subcategorized constituents and thus they can be 
left out without affecting grammaticality and thus they are never included in subcategorization 
frames. But complements, or internal arguments (see 12.1.4), which are subcategorized argu­
ments, affect grammaticality when left out. Implicit arguments are indicated in the subcatego­
rization frames in parentheses: eat, V (.....(NP)). All representatives of all lexical categories have
subcategorization frames.
On the subject of categorial (c-) selection linked with semantic (s-) selection, the generative 
tradition has often presupposed more content than the mere pairing of sound and meaning. For 
one thing, lexical items impose various requirements on the syntactic structures in which they 
find themselves. These requirements shape up part of the speaker's knowledge of those lexical 
items. For argument-taking items (verbs, adjectives, nominalizations, (e.g. keenness, amazement)), 
these include semantic (s-) selection, selection for syntactic categories (c-selection) and assignment 
of arguments to syntactic positions: linking (Pesetsky, 1995). S-selection is simply the conse­
quence of a predicate's lexical semantics for argument structure. This includes selection for rela­
tional categories like agent or patient (see 12.1.4) as well as independent categories like proposi­
tion or thing. The fact that we utter but do not eat propositions entails that a verb like tell allows a 
propositional argument while a verb like drink does not. The semantics of belief and wonderment 
will entail that wonder does take an interrogative argument whereas believe does not. Likewise 
the semantics of all these verbs tells us the semantic relations (agent, experiencer, etc.) borne by 
their arguments. C-selection in addition to s-selection tells us that say but not drink c-selects a 
CP complement, or that wonder and believe differ in whether the subordinate complementizer trig­
gers zu/i-movement. Furthermore, c-selection tells us that ask may take an interrogative argument
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DP, while the interrogative argument of wonder may not, or, for instance, determines the fact that 
the semantically close verbs like enjoy and like differ in their ability to take a gerund or infinitive 
argument in
(2) a. She liked hearing /  to hear the concert.
b. She enjoyed hearing /  *to hear the concert.
Linking involves relations between the semantic categories of a predicate's arguments and their 
syntactic positions. It tells us that the propositional argument of believe is its object and not its 
subject, that the agent of throw is a subject and not an object, and that like and please differ in their 
placement of their experiencer in examples (3) and (4):
(3) a. MARY liked the play.
b. *The play liked Mary.
(4) a. *Mary pleased the play.
b. The play pleased MARY.
Since s-selection is so rooted in the irreducible pairing of sound and meaning, there have been 
speculations that the lexical entries of predicates need not specify their c-selection and linking 
properties directly. Pursuing these speculations, the lexical entries of a predicate will not contain 
explicit information concerning c-selection and linking, instead, most instances of either must be 
explained as consequences of s-selection aided by UG principles that map semantic categories 
onto syntactic categories and syntactic positions. Since s-selection itself is simply an aspect of 
lexical semantics, we will have a theory of the lexicon in which children learn pairings of meaning 
and sound, and it is UG that does the rest.
Thus, for example, the fact that drink selects things and not propositions along with the fact 
that UG determines that CPs do not denote things is sufficient (i.e. no particular c-selectional facts 
need to be learned) to explain the following:
(5) a. Sue said that the Earth is flat, 
b. *Sue drank that the Earth is flat.
The verb believe selects a declarative propositional complement but never an interrogative one:
(6) a. Jane believes that Eve is single.
b. *Jane believes whether Eve is single.
Likewise, if UG requires agents to be linked to subject position, then the linking facts in ((7)) follow 
from the s-selectional properties of the main verbs and the linking principles supplied by UG:
(7) a. Bill threw the ball, 
b. The ball threw Bill.
This reasoning should have the consequence that the facts in ((5)), ((6)) and ((7)) have cross- 
linguistic validity because the agent of throw cannot be linked to object positions or we would 
not expect a verb meaning 'drink' to select a proposition, nor would we expect a verb meaning 
'believe' to select an interrogative complement in any language.
Furthermore, the same reasoning can apply to morphologically complex items, once UG is pro­
vided with the ability to project the argument structure of complex words from their component 
parts. Thus, an agent-patient verb (see 12.1.4) like destroy will pass on its s-selectional properties 
to the process reading of destruction in accordance with mechanisms of morphological inheritance 
given by UG plus language-specific facts about the suffix -ion, and for any nominalized verb a 
similar procedure to obtain is expected.
Once we leave c-selection, linking and morphological inheritance, it is clear that language ac­
quisition involves facts that can only be the consequence of a child's experience. Linguistic expe­
rience, combined with the properties of the innate linguistic system, yields the native language 
that the child comes to know and use. Hypotheses about language should put as great a burden 
as possible on the biologically given system (which has been called UG) and as small a burden as 
possible on the child's linguistic experience. As a bare minimum, lexical entries consist of arbi­
trary pairs of meaning and sound and knowledge of these pairings is obviously an outcome of the
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child's linguistic experience. Of course, no one believes that these pairings exhaust the content of 
the lexicon. Thus, a child learns agreement-class and conjugation-class membership for nouns and 
verbs, availability for affixation and quirky case assignment facts.
Our model of the lexicon (cf. Pesetsky (1995)) should allow such facts as what aspects of lexical 
semantics coupled with what principle of UG could predict ((2)), ((3)) and ((4)) or the fact that the 
past tense of go is went, or that -ion suffixed to destroy yields destruction, or that the Russian verb 
vladet' 'command' governs the instrumental case.
On the whole, if we discover some pattern of c-selection, linking or morphological inheritance 
which neither looks like declensional class or quirky case nor is derivable from lexical semantics 
and current views of UG, one may make a number of responses. We might abandon the view that 
the lexicon is maximally simple to accommodate the case at hand, positing some new mechanism 
employed by the child in acquiring the pattern under discussion. Alternatively, we might identify 
our characterization of the problem in such a way that the problem disappears and we do this by 
changing our view of UG.
4.1.4 Semantic Dependencies Split Up Into Linguistically Significant Classes
The roles of the participants of an eventuality are assigned by the predicate. An event is thought 
of as a stage play, the thematic roles or theta-roles are the stage roles, and the arguments bearing 
the theta-roles (marked as 0-role in the literature) are the actors on the stage. 0-roles are listed in 
the lexicon, for each predicative head, in the thematic grid of the head.
Some widely acknowledged 0-roles and their contents are listed below:
AGENT PETER called his dog.
THEME PETER is in the garden.
PATIENT Peter stroked HIS DOG.
(8) EXPERIENCER PETER felt warm. The computer pleases PETER.
GOAL Peter gave the fish to THE DOG.
SOURCE Peter got the fish from A FISHERMAN.
LOCATION Peter is in THE PARK.
The thematic/theta-grid of a verb is as follows:
(9) send (1, 2, 3 )
The thematic roles listed in a thematic grid will be assigned to arguments in a syntactic structure:
(10) PETER (Ol) sent TWO LETTERS (02) to HIS BROTHER (03).
There is an important difference between subcategorization frames and thematic grids, namely, 
subcategorization frames deal with the selection of complements only, and external arguments, 
such as PETER in the earlier examples, are not represented in subcategorization frames, but are 
listed in thematic grids. Ultimately any variety of theta theory splits up possible semantic depen­
dencies into linguistically significant classes called 0-roles, and characterizes how each of them 
is represented in linguistic structure. Thematic roles may be assigned by a lexical head to a com­
plement of that head as defined by X-bar theory, or they may be assigned compositionally by the 
head and its complements to a subject position; the former are called internal arguments, while 
the latter are called external arguments. Several authors claim that all languages canonically as­
sign the agent role to an external argument, and the patient or theme role to an internal argument 
(Baker, 1988, p48).
The fundamental principle concerning the biuniqueness condition on theta role assignment 
is the thematic criterion, informally, every term of LF that requires a 0-role, that is each argument, 
must be associated with one and only one position to which 0-roles are assigned, and each 0-role 
determined by the lexical properties of the head is uniquely associated with one and only one 
argument. Chomsky (1988) states the criterion about chains [taken together, a moved category 
and its trace makes up a chain] of surface structure and LF:
0-criterion: Given the structure S, there is a set K of chains, K  = {Ci}, where C, =
(aj, .....ajj, such that:
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(i) if a  is an argument of S, then there is a Cj G K  such that a = a* and a 0-role is 
assigned to C( by exactly one position P.
(ii) if P is a position of S marked with a 0-role R, then there is a Ct e K  to which P 
assigns R , and exactly one a “ in Ct is an argument. In case (i) a has the 0-role 
assigned by P. (Chomsky, 1988, p335))
(Each argument is in a chain which bears exactly one 0-role and each ©-position [a syntactic posi­
tion where a 0-role must be assigned] is in a chain which contains exactly one argument.)
By this time it is clear to the reader that at D-structure all the phrases must show up in the 
position to which the theta role which they receive is assigned. As Chomsky (1988) puts it, the 
D-structure is a pure representation of thematically relevant Grammatical Functions, for exam­
ple, subject-of, object-of, complement-of, or head-of. Grammatical Functions that are relevant to 
theta-role [called GF thetas, op.cit.] have an argument that bears a theta-role. Each argument 
slot determined obligatorily at D-structure must be filled by some argument with the appropri­
ate grammatical function, and each argument must fill exactly one theta role as determined by its 
grammatical function. As an example, whose luggage and Tom's luggage must both show up in the 
position marked by t (trace) at the D-structures:
(11) The airline lost Tom's luggage.
(12) Whose luggage did the airline lose t?
(13) Tom's luggage was lost t by the airline.
Baker (1988) proposes a strengthening of the notion of D-structure such that it directly represents 
GF-theta, and in general, it is a direct representation of thematic structure:
The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH): Identical thematic rela­
tionships between items are represented by identical structural relationships between 
those items at the level of D-structure.
UTAH supports grammatical function changing processes, or the unaccusative hypothesis, ac­
cording to which certain intransitive verbs with nonagentive subject NPs have that NP as a struc­
tural object at D-structure (in details see the next subsection). This NP then becomes the subject at 
S-structure via move-alpha [=move any constituent]. For instance, the S-structure of the ransitive 
sentence
(14) Eve melted the ice cream into mush 
according to UTAH will imply the following D-structure:
(15) [S Eve [VP melted [the ice cream] into mush]]
The related intransitive structure will imply the S-structure of
(16) The ice melted into mush
according to UTAH will imply the following D-structure:
(17) [S e [VP melted [the ice cream] into mush]]
The same thematic relationship holds between the ice cream and the melting action in both sen­
tences above, which is represented by having the same structural relationship hold between them 
at D-structure. It is time to turn to an elaborated view of how D-structure is tied up with potential 
lexicon-internal construction of lexical items.
4.1.5 Argument Structures and Syntactic Structures
In the following we condense a possible approach by Hale and Keyser (1993) that seeks to deter­
mine the extent to which one can understand some observed limitations on argument structure in 
terms of the essential nature of pregrounded principles and elements. The proper representation
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of predicate argument structure is itself a syntax. That is to say, each lexical head projects its cat­
egory to a phrasal level and determines within that projection an unambiguous system of struc­
tural relations holding between the head, its categorial projections, and its arguments (specifier 
[=a maximal projections's first branching constituent which is not an X'], of present, and comple­
ment). The authors refer to these projections as lexical argument structures or lexical relational 
structures, LRS and call on the conventional tree diagrams and labels V, N, V-bar, or VP, and so 
forth to represent them.
The following ususal definitions of X-bar relations are relevant to further discussion: 
m-command: a governs ß if and only if
i a does not dominate ß and
ii every XP [=maximal projection] that dominates a also dominates ß.
government: a governs ß if and only if
i a is a governor (governors are heads),
ii a m-commands ß,
iii no barrier intervenes between a and ß. (Maximal projections are barriers to government).
There are two relevant constraints on argument structure. Firstly, the variety of relations be­
tween arguments and the head and its projections is highly restricted, a circumstance that is 
thrown back in the matchingly restricted range of semantic (thematic) roles, acknowledged in a 
broad and well-informed linguistic literature, and, secondly, the depth of embedding in lexical 
structures is uniformly slight, on the whole, permitting one complement VP for a given lexical 
entry, shunning full use of the recursive capacity inherent in complementation.
Hale and Keyser (1993) are lead to their syntactic view of LRS through investigating denominál 
verbs, which are derived by a lexical process. Denominál verbs (e.g. sneeze, shelve, thin) are derived 
through the operation of the head movement variant of move alpha, called incorporation, studied 
by Baker (1988). If denominál verb formation takes place by incorporation it is reckoned to be 
bound to syntactic principles that govern the application of incorporation.
The first class of denominál verbs, unergative verbs (or true intransitive verbs), for example, 
laugh, calve, sneeze, dance, sleep), has an initial lexical projection of a verb and its nominal comple­
ment:
(18) The cow calved.
(19) Peter sneezed.
(20) v '
N  i V Ni
The lexical structure representation (LRS) of an unergative verb involves incorporation of the 
nominal head of an abstract verb's NP complement into the abstract V. The Head Movement 
Constraint, which states that an X head may only move to the Y head that properly governs it, 
must be respected. The resulting compound, of which only the N component is phonologically 
realized, corresponds to the denominál verb. Unergatives, thus, have an initial lexical structure of 
a simple transitive type. Of course, the verbs make, do, have, take at first glance project the same 
structure but they do not involve incorporation. Moreover, unergatives of one language often 
match a simple transitive VP structure without incorporation in another language (e.g. sleep is 
unergative in English but transitive in Basque), or a transitive VP modified by visible incorporation 
(e.g. Jemez -zaae-'a 'song-do' ='sing'). The relation between the simple transitive structure and 
the incorporation structure belongs to the class of phenomena known as lexical alternation. A 
transitive verb that takes an expletive subject (e.g. It cowed a calf meaning 'A cow had a calf') is
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nonexistent in English and several other languages. This hypothetical verb would incorporate its 
subject and not its complement and it is well-known that a subject that originates as an external 
argument cannot incorporate into the verb that heads its predicate, and incorporation from the 
subject position would violate tire Empty Category Principle stating that an empty category must 
be properly governed.
Similarly to the unergative class, another N-projected complement is in the LRS of light verbs 
(e.g. make, have, take in make an agreement, have a look, take a bath and cognate verbs (e.g. live a life.
A second, more complex further verb class includes verbs that have the P-projected comple­
ment in the LRS. As a first subtype within these, the location (e.g. shelve, corral, box and locatum 
(e.g. hobble, saddle) verbs (as a shorthand, referred to as location verbs), with the same surface 
representation as the true transitives, share the following LRS:
(21) Peter shelved all the books.
(22) Peter saddled his horse.
(23) VP
V VP
NP V'
V PP
P NP
The prepostion P is supposed to be a hidden P, a nonovert variant of the category, the same as 
in put a lamp ON the table or provide a house WITH paint. There are two further P-projected subtypes, 
the put/smear type (e.g. smear, daub, rub) and the get/splash type (e.g. splash, drip, pour).
(24) She smeared/put butter on the bread.
(25) He splashed/got mud on the wall.
Without going into the depth, the surface form of these verbs is derived by three applications of 
head movement, the first of which incorporates the lower N (e.g shelf, saddle) into the preposition 
which governs it. The compound so formed is then moved into the verb that governs it, there 
forming a compound that makes the final hop to incorporate into the matrix verb. Let us recall 
that the initial LRS representation of location verbs shares the essential relational structure with 
the smear class, with the exception that the phonologically overt morpheme realized in the matrix 
verb position is not a verb but a noun, originally heading the complement of the PP in LRS.
Minimality, a syntactic principle, is at issue in explaining why English and many other lan­
guages lack hypothetical verbs like shelve, bush in the structures He shelved the books on or She bushed 
a trim meaning 'He gave the bush a trim'. Although the trace in NP is coindexed with the verb 
to which its antecedent N is adjoined, this verb cannot govern the trace, the (abstract) preposition 
being tire closest governor, defining PP as the minimal governing domain for the trace, and the PP 
being a barrier to government from the distant verb outside (Chomsky, 1986).
After the underlyingly N-projected and P-projected classes a final third verb type includes 
verbs with an underlyingly A-projected complement, the ergative verbs, e.g. thin, narrow, tighten, 
loosen, clear in the structure
(26) The cook thinned the gravy, 
with the LRS:
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Verbs of this type, like the others we have looked through, are derived by head movement, in this 
case the incorporated elements are adjectival. The lower verb projects a structure that is parallel 
to the P-projected verb class, but with the PP of the latter is replaced by AP. It is a fundamental 
property of an AP that it be attributed of an entity. Thus, just with the PP complements, a subject 
necessarily shows up in the [Spec,VP] (the NP the gravy in the above example). The upper V 
projects the LRS associated with the clausal relationship.
An interesting contrast between this A-projected group and the P-projected group can shed 
light on the nature of the LRS. An ergative transitive verb exhibits an unconditional transitivity 
alternation along the ergative pattern, that is, with the object of the transitive verb and the subject 
of the intransitive verb. Inchoative use in Hale and Keyser (1993) is when an otherwise transitive 
ergative verb used intransitively, i.e. non-causatively. The middle construction is well-formed 
with all non-N-projected verb classes. In the following contrastive examples those marked with a 
are transitive sentences, b sentences are middle constructions and c sentences are inchoatives.
a) Underlyingly P-projected verbs:
(28) a. Peter shelved the books.
b. These books shelve easily.
c. These books shelve.
(29) a. We smeared mud on the wall.
b. Mud smeared on the wall easily.
c. The butter smeared on the wall.
(30) a. The pigs splashed mud on the wall.
b. Mud splashed on the wall easily.
c. Mud splashed on the wall.
ß) Underlyingly A-projected verbs
(31) a. Peter cleared the screen.
b. The screen cleared easily.
c. The screen cleared.
Like the inchoative, the middle construction involves s-syntactic movement of an argument bear­
ing the internal subject relations, in the case of the middle, this is an object in s-syntax. Transitive 
verbs that can undergo middle formation are those whose s-syntactic object is an affected argu­
ment, that is, those whose s-syntactic object corresponds to an internal subject in LRS.
Within the underlyingly P-projected class only the subtype splash/get shows the same free alter­
nation, the other subtypes, however, show only the middle construction (allowed for all ergative 
verbs), which is an intransitive alternative (in the transitivity alternation) that is compromised by
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requirements to be met, such as the use of the generic, a modal, or an adverb like easily.
This contrast between the types splash and smear is explained by supposing internally oriented 
manner modifier for the former, while externally oriented manner modifiers for the latter. The 
manner component modifiers of splash type verbs are adverbial modifications to the VP and in 
particular to the event depicted by the verb and its most prominent direct argument. In contrast, 
transitive verbs of the smear type involve a manner component that relates, not internally to the 
LRS, but to the external argument. Their LRS representations are the following, where the manner 
component of a verb is marked as a bracketed tag on an appropriate V node, and the internal 
licensing relation is marked by coindexing the manner component with the internal subject:
(32) splash:
VP
(mud) V[splash]j pp
(get) on wall
(33) other subtypes: smear, shelve:
VP
V[ smear]
/ \  /
V; V NP
(get) (mud)
on wall
Only at D-structure is the manner component [smear] properly licensed, since it is only at D- 
structure that the required external argument is visible to the manner tag associated with the verb. 
The inchoative is impossible for put and location verbs as well, because raising the object to the 
specifier of the inflection phrase (with the conventional notation: [Spec,IP]) blocks licensing of 
the externally oriented manner modifier. By contrast, a splash/get type verb although structurally 
identical to location verbs in lexical syntax, is devoid of all means or manner modification; and, as 
expected since no licensing is required, the inchoative is possible for splash/get.
Why is the middle construction grammatical for denominál location verbs shelve/box if the in­
choative blocks licensing of externally oriented manner modifiers and location verbs with regard 
to middle formation do not differ from ergative verbs? The middle construction is likely to be 
formed from a (causative) transitive structure, rather than the intransitive structure in which the 
internal subject is immediately dominated by the uppermost VP node, that is, the structure asso­
ciated with the inchoative. Let us suppose that internally oriented manner components are associ­
ated with the inner verb, whereas externally oriented manner components are associated with the 
upper (causative verb). Licensing of a manner component, then, is association with a particular 
verbal element in the LRS representation. Verbs that cannot appear in the inchoative construc­
tion (e.g. smear, or shelve) have their externally oriented manner modifiers associated with the 
causative verb: they must be transitive. On the other hand, if the middle construction is formed 
from the transitive, that construction will not interfere with the licensing of externally oriented 
manner modifiers, since their required locus, the causative verb, is present in the transitive LRS
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representation.
In sum, certain gaps in the lexicon can be made to follow if the formation of the lexical
items in question is subject to principles known to be operative in syntax, and, consequently, 
the structures over which lexical derivations are defined are true syntactic objects, over which 
syntactic relations and principles are defined. If incorporation involves head movement, it has 
clear implications, namely, that an argument structure itself is a syntactic object, since it is to be 
identified with the syntactic structure projected by the lexical heads. Head movement is a process 
constrained by syntactic principles and is reckoned therefore to limit the range of theoretically 
possible incorporations. Since lexical processes under examination affect the argument structures 
of lexical items, we are justified that argument structures themselves are syntactic objects. To put 
this another way, if denominál verb derivations were not constrained by syntactic processes but 
they were simple lexical processes of category change, the range of possible denominál verb types 
would include transitive verbs with an incorporated external argument like cow in It cowed a calf 
'A  cow had a calf' (see at the unergative verbs). Hale and Keyser (1993) asserts that the notion of 
argument structure is to be identified with the notion LRS.
Let us turn to the fact that unergatives (the laugh/sleep/calve type verbs) have no subject at all 
in their LRS representation and ergatives (the thin,/tighten,/clear type verbs) have a intransitive- 
transitive alternation. In the LRS of change-of-state verbs (equated with ergatives for the present 
purpose) and location/locatum verbs {shelf/box) the appearance of the subject in the inner VP is 
forced, being required by the complement within that VP. Since the complement in the inner VP 
is a predicate in the LRS representation of these verbs, full interpretation [a principle which re­
quires that no elements can remain uninterpreted at LF or PF] of the inner verb requires that a 
subject appear, internal to VP, so that predication can be realized locally, thereby correctly linking 
the complement of the inner VP to the subject of that VP. The [Spec,VP] position of VP in LRS 
representation of a lexical verb is filled only when it is forced by some principle. In the case of 
ergative/change-of-state verbs (thin/tighten) and location/locatum verbs (shelve/box) just consid­
ered, the appearance of subject is forced by predication, whereas for the unergative (laugh/calve) 
class nothing forces a subject since the LRS complement of these verbs is a [VP [ V, NP] ], which is 
not a predicate. In short, VP complements in LRS representations are not predicates. In truth, the 
subject is excluded from the LRS representations of unergatives. Full Interpretation will guarantee 
that ergatives and location verbs have a subject in the inner VP and unergative verbs lack one. For 
the former group absence of subject would leave the complement of the inner VP uninterpreted, 
whereas for the latter group a subject present in LRS would be uninterpreted for lack of predicate 
in the complement position. No stipulation is needed to make this system work.
As far as subject appearance is concerned, firstly, an LRS specifier position can be occupied 
only if the appearance of an argument there is internally motivated by predication, such argu­
ments are the subjects of VP-intemal predicates (the subjects of a PP or AP complement of a head). 
Predication requirement forces the appearance of a subject for those verbs whose complement is 
inherently predicational, namely, for PP or AP complements.
(34) a. shelve:
V
I VP
NP V'
PP
P NP
in shelf
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b. clear:
r
i VP
/ \
NP V'
AP
clear
Secondly, there is VP-extemal motivation for forcing subject; externally forced subjects are prod-
example, the transitive features of a causative verb or affix, or case/agreement features of inflec­
tion:
(35) H u n g a r ia n  f u t ta t  m a k e  (sb )  ru n
At D-structure, of course, these subjects are identical structurally and both raise to [Spec, IP] but 
they have distinct interpretation.
As a last issue of this subsection, unergatives lack causative forms in English, while in many 
languages overt causative morphology has properties that force the appearance of a subject in 
its immediate complement VP, the English causative does not force a subject and that is why the 
following unergative construction is ungrammatical: Sneeze the child 'make the child sneeze'. Suppose 
that the English causative is devoid of properties, in particular properties that could force the 
appearance of an NP in the specifier position of its complement. But the causative could acquire 
properties through incorporation of an overt head of its complement. This would block lexical 
insertion of a subject into the lower specifier position, with the result that English causative of 
the unergative is ungrammatical. On the other hand, this happens exactly in the case of ergatives 
{clear, lengthen), where this incorporation yields the transitive variant. This transitivity conversion 
simply hinges on whether head movement (incorporation) applies or not. The point is that this 
unconditional alternation for these ergative verbs is thus not stipulated, since it follows directly 
from their essential nature, namely, a non-overt causative verb (in English) has no properties of its 
own and acquires properties through incorporation.
To conclude, lexical categories project unambiguous syntactic structures. Crucially, such an 
unambiguous projection forbids n-ary branching, where n is greater than two, and it prohibits the 
projection of a phrasal category through more than one intermediate level, for instance, V projects 
at most V-bar and VP. This accounts for the first constraint (see at the beginning of this subsection) 
that the variety of relations between arguments and the head is restricted by restricting arguments 
to the complement and specifier positions in lexical relational structure representations. These 
positions match the grammatical relations an argument may bear in lexical relational structures,
ucts of the construction itself. The appearance of a subject is forced by properties of the matrix, for
V'
CAUS_AFFIX:taf VP
NP V'
V
NP fut
6 4 LEXICAL SYNTAX: TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR
specifier of VP or complement to V, complement to P, and so forth. And there are no lexically 
determined roles beyond these. Argument structure representations are also subject to Full In­
terpretation [a principle in the Minimalist approach: no elements can remain uninterpreted at LF 
or PF]. This is relevant primarily in connection with the specifier position, which can be occupied 
only if the appearance of an argument there is internally motivated by predication. Since comple­
ment APs and PPs but not VPs in the LRS sense are predicates in lexical representation structures, 
VP recursion is excluded, which accounts, in part at least, for the observed second constraint (at 
the beginning of this subsection) that embedding permits one (and no more than one) complement 
VP for a given lexical entry.
Talking of syntactic representations and selectional properties, another crucial principle of gov­
ernment and binding theory until Minimalist Theory had been what is known as the Projection 
Principle, which states that representations at each syntactic level (D-, S-structure, and LF) are 
projected from the lexicon in that they observe (or, in other words, represent) the lexical selection 
(i.e. subcategorization) properties of lexical items categorially Chomsky (1988, p29). This princi­
ple presupposes the existence of a lexicon listing the idiosyncratic properties, in particular, what 
thematic relations lexical items may have with other phrases, to wit, what phrases they subcat­
egorize and assign thematic role to. The consequence is that categories moved by move alpha 
[=move any constituent] will leave phonetically null copies [= traces] behind them to preserve the 
representation of these selectional properties.
4.2 Lexicon In the 1995 Version Of the Minimalist Program
4.2.1 The Minimalist Theory On the Whole
The Categories and Transformations (Chomsky, 1995) came up with a radical version of the transformational- 
generative grammar in which the semantic and phonetic interface of language are directly linked, 
and the selected elements build into a structure at once. This yielded derivation branches off to a 
potential semantic interpretation on the one hand, and a potential phonetic interpretation on the 
other. The Minimalist model of grammar is a derivational system as its predecessors, but it differs 
in that the mechanism creating the basic representation and the one performing transformations 
are the same: the generalized transformations (GT). The model is also unlike previous ones in the 
assumptions it makes with regard to, firstly, the formal licensing mechanism which the grammar 
makes available, namely, limited to feature checking in specifier-head and head-adjunction con­
figurations, and, secondly, the nature of the constraints on derivations (economy conditions). As 
early as the 1993 minimalist approach, the conceptual foundation to be explored (even later, in the 
1995 theory) was already conspicous:
"[in the Principles and Parameters approach] One crucial assumption has to do with 
the way in which the computational system presents lexical items for further computa­
tion. (....) All items that function at LF are drawn from the lexicon before computation 
proceeds and are represented in the X-bar format. (....) This picture requires conditions 
to ensure that D-structure has basic properties of LF. (....) If they [the conditions] are 
not met [at LF], the expression receives some deviant interpretation at the interface and 
there is nothing else more to say. The Projection Principle and the Theta Criterion have 
no independent significance at LF. But at D-structure the two principles are needed to 
make the picture coherent; if the picture is abandoned, they will lose their primary role.
These principles are therefore dubious on conceptual grounds, though it remains to ac­
count for their empirical consequences, such as the constraint against substitution into 
a thematic position. If the empirical consequences can be explained some other way 
and D-structure eliminated, then the Projection Principle and the thematic criterion can 
be dispensed with." (Chomsky, 1993, p20)
The Minimalist Program pledges itself to back up the hypothesis that there are no conditions 
linking lexical properties to interface levels, such as a projection principle. Along the lines of 
section 4.2 of the Minimalist Categories and Transformations (Chomsky, 1995) the following two sub­
sections will display the skimpy picture which we can gain of how the lexicon is set out and how 
lexical items build into structures.
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4.2.2 The Content Of the Lexicon
Exceptions are linguistic elements: whatever that does not follow from general principles. The 
lexicon is exactly the list of these unique elements. The above general principles break down into 
two subcategories:
a the principles of UG
ß specific linguistic principles, i.e. the phonological, morphological bits of information, choice 
of parametric options, and whatever may enter into language variation. We further call 
for an optimal coding for idiosyncratic properties (the exceptions) in the unified (see later) 
lexical entry.
On the simplest assumptions, the lexical entry provides the information needed for further 
computation. Therefore, a lexical entry will comprise
a the relation of sound and meaning
ß the subcategorization of the lexical entry which are sufficient for the logical form and the 
phonetic form to interpret the incoming derivation.
The lexical entry, however, will not contain the phi-features [=information about number, gen­
der, person, tense, or mood] because all these do follow from the lexical categories (N,V,ADJ,.... )
by the principles of UG. Furthermore, the entry should not specify phonetic or semantic proper­
ties which are universal or specific to that language: the predictable interactions of phonemes, or 
potential concrete versus abstract usages of nouns, for instance, the fact that the noun hook can 
be used to refer to something which is simultaneously abstract and concrete as in the following 
sentence:
(36) The BOOK that I am writing will weigh five pounds.
The optimal coding includes the list of semantic and phonetic specific features and unpredictable 
formal features, for example, for the invariant noun forms (scissors).
One can choose a noun (or any lexical item) in two steps:
i. we form a numeration (N, I) [Numeration (a term of the 1995 Minimalist Program): a set 
of (lexical item, i ) pairs, where i is the index of the lexical item, i.e. the number of times 
we choose that lexical item from the lexicon. We will thus have a batch of lexical items 
with indices to further connecting them by generalized transformations (operations to build 
phrases).]
ii. an operation SELECT introduces the N in question into the derivation by adding it to the set 
of the syntactic derivations and reduces its index by one.
Specific features (plural, nominative) are added to it in the course of these two steps.
As an illustration, let us take the following example. Suppose that book is chosen as part of 
the array from which a derivation proceeds to form PF and LF representations. In the first step 
we form a numeration which includes (book,i), with the index i and in the second we introduce 
book into the derivation by the operation Select, which adds book to the set of syntactic objects 
generated and reduces its index by 1. The optional features of a particular occurrence of book (say, 
accusative and plural) are added by either step 1 or step 2 , presumably in the first step, a decision 
that reduces reference sets and hence computability problems. Then the numeration N will include
(37) (book, /accusative/, /plural/, 2)
UG prescribes that such features must exist but UG does not prescribe which features must be cho­
sen concretely. It may well be that a noun is selected together with a greater nominal configuration 
by SELECT. Such features, as case or thematic features could belong to it.
In this section of the minimalist program you can find the null hypothesis which is essential in 
some other areas of the minimalist framework. The null hypothesis states that case and thematic 
features are added arbitrarily as a noun is selected for the numeration. In the numeration case
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and pfii-features are specified, whether by the lexical entry (intrinsic features) or by the operation 
that forms the numeration (optional features). Greater structures are relevant only for checking of 
features of the noun which are already present in the numeration.
Speaking of categories, a lexical entry of a verb also represents the instructions for the phono­
logical component and for the interpretation of the logical form representation: a phonological 
matrix and some array of semantic properties. The lexical entry must suffice to determine that 
the particular lexical item has the categorial property V, perhaps by explicit fisting. Selectional 
properties, insofar as they are determined by semantic properties, whether by UG or by specific 
language-particular rules, will not be fisted in the lexicon. In the same way, an individual speci­
fication of tense and pfn-features will not be indicated in the entry because that is determined by 
its category V (by UG). The case-assigning property of a verb is intrinsic, either determined by the 
semantic features of the lexical items or fisted as idiosyncratic. Further features associsated with 
the verb which are unpredictable from the lexical entry, for instance, tense or phi-features, may 
stem from
a choosing them arbitrarily and assigning them to the verb as it enters the numeration, or
ß operations of the overt syntax or the phonological component (including morphology) that 
form complex words by association with other elements (e.g. adjunction to the functional 
head T through overt V raising).
Thus in this ß case, if overt syntactic operations are involved, the categories involved will be 
marked in the lexicon or the transition to numeration) as allowing or requiring affixation. The 
word might reach the phonological component uninflected, the PF form resulting from interac­
tion with functional elements within the phonological component. (The ways can vary across 
languages or even within one language.)
4.2.3 The Means of Coding
In which form is the information coded in the lexical entry? In the case of a noun (book) the optimal 
representation should include the standard phonological matrix, or some arbitrary coding (say, 
23), interpreted within the phonological component as a phonological matrix. Similarly, for PAST 
TENSE, a phonological matrix DENTAL, or an arbitrary coding, interpreted in the phonological 
matrix as DENTAL. (Recall that English verbs regularly form their past tense form by [d] or [t].)
In the case of an unpredictable form of a lexical entry, e.g. the English copula be, the lexical 
coding will provide whatever information the phonological rules need to assign a form to the 
structure [copula, F ], where F is some set of formal features (tense, person, etc.). We may present 
the information as a fist of alternants (am, is, were, ...), each with its formal features, or by some 
coding that allows the phonological component to pick the alternant. It would be a methodological 
mistake to generalize this worst case to all cases, to infer from the existence of the worst case that 
it holds for all lexical items.
The lexicon contains substantive elements (V,N,ADV,.„.) with their idiosyncratic properties 
and some functional elements, among which the lexical representation of agreement or tense may 
bring about special problems. Postulation of functional categories needs justification, either by 
phonetic or semantic interpretation or theory-internal arguments. Tense, complementizer, and 
determiner have semantic properties, while agreement does not. T is finite or nonfinite, with 
further subdivisions, D is the locus of referentiality, while C is the indicator of mood or force in 
the Fregean sense, i.e. declarative, interrogative, etc. The choice among the options of a given type 
is arbitrary, part of the process of forming a numeration from the lexicon, as in the case of phi- 
features of verbs, or case and some phi-features of nouns. Functional features have phonological 
properties, of course. For instance, declarative C is invariantly THAT (with a null option).
The lexicon provides optimal coding for the exceptions. Suppose that specific morphological 
properties of a language constrain the phonetic correlate of formal features, e.g. verbs indicate 
persons with prefixes, while numbers with suffixes. Then the lexical entry will abstract from these 
properties, including only the information that they do not determine.
For each lexical item in a given language the idiosyncratic codings are given in a unified lexical 
entry. One might propose that instructions for phonological rules, instructions for logical form 
interpretation, and formal features appear in distinct sublexicons, which are accessible at different
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points in the computational process. Such elaborations might involve new levels and relations 
among various parts of the derivation.
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Chapter 5
Argument Structure and grammatical 
relations in HPSG
This chapter is a survey of the HPSG treatment of argument structure and grammatical relations.
The first section gives an introduction to feature structures as used in HPSG and also explains 
some of the principles responsible for driving complementation procedures by constraining phrase 
structure. It also explains in what ways a conception of argument structure is realized in standard 
HPSG.
The second section survey recent trends in (extended) HPSG and discusses the treatment of 
subcategorization through valence features.
The third section is an investigation into the constraint-based account of certain complementa­
tion patterns, among others, raising, control and passive constructions.
Throughout this chapter we assume a working familiarity with feature structures and the 
attribute-value matrix representation entertained by HPSG. In the feature structures we only indi­
cate the relevant substructures and, for reasons of easier readability, often abbreviate long feature 
paths.
5.1 Standard HPSG treatment of argument structure and gram­
matical relations
This section explores in what ways complementation and subcategorization is treated in stan­
dard HPSG (Pollard and Sag, 1994). The evolution of the ideas presented here can be traced 
through earlier works, especially Pollard and Sag (1987), Sag and Pollard (1989) and Hinrichs and 
Nakazawa (1989b). These earlier conceptions are not crucially different from the one described in 
this section though they are outdated in some aspects, therefore we omit their detailed exposition.
5.1.1 Introduction to HPSG features
HPSG uses a typed attribute value structure formalism to state constraints about feature structure 
that model linguistic objects. One of the most important types that really stand for linguistic signs 
in a traditional sense are shown in the partial hierarchy below:
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(1) HPSG types o f linguistic signs 
T
word phrase
For a quick start, we present a typical AVM feature structure for a non-phrasal sign with values 
of a rather generic type and explain briefly their intended import.
(2 ) a typical feature structure of a word
word P H O N  p h o n  
sy n se m
loc
cat
C A T  H E A D  su b s ta n tiv e  
S U B C A T  lis t 
C O N T E N T  co n ten t 
C O N T E X T  context 
N O N - L O C  non-loc
SYNSEM L O C
The SYNSEM basically encodes all sorts of categorial, syntactic, semantic and contextual infor­
mation. Besides this, a sign has the PHON attribute, the value of which is sometimes indicated 
above the AVS for easier readability. Phrasal signs also have the DAUGHTERS substructure encod­
ing constituent structure information (see section 5.1.3). The division between local and non-local 
features, appearing in the distinct LOC and NON-LOCAL substructures within the s y n s e m  domain, 
is relevant only in the context of the lexical treatment of extraction (unbounded dependency con­
structions).
Within the local structure we find syntactic, semantic and contextual information featuring in 
the CAT, CONTENT and CONTEXT values, respectively.
The CAT substructure contains specifications that is traditionally treated under the rubric of 
categorial, subcategorization and selectional information. This is the substructure that mainly 
concerns us in relation to the treatment of subcategorization and argument structure.
The CAT value has two attributes, namely HEAD and SUBCAT. The substructure defined by the 
value of the former is basically the residence of features that are universally assumed to percolate 
up to the phrasal projections of the word in question. The sort of the HEAD value is more or 
less the equivalent of the X'-theory category information without the projection level or of other 
traditional notions of part-of-speech information. In the general case it carries not much more 
information than syntactic category, but in the case of lexical categories, it may specify formal 
features that are specific to the category in question and that do not have a semantic impact, e.g., 
case of nouns. The partial hierarchy below shows the HPSG conception about parts-of-speech.
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(3) T y p e -h ie r a r c h y  f r a g m e n  t fo r  ca te g o r ia l  in fo rm a  tio n
head
m ark er d e te rm in e r
Let us conclude our brief introduction to features with an example that illustrates a partial repre­
sentation of the syntactic substructure of the English personal pronoun him:
(4) oartia l r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o/him
SY N SH M  I L O C
nou n
CAT
HEAD C A SE acc 
M O D I
SUBCAT ()
CONTENT I INDEX
P E R S O N  3rd 
N U M B E R  sing
The substructure taken as the value of the SUBCAT attribute — the other feature of the CAT 
structure — encodes the subcategorization requirements of the word including all sorts of catego- 
rial and semantic selectional information. We devote the next section to the detailed discussion of 
this feature.
5.1.2 Subcategorization
The SUBCAT value of a sign is in fact its valence, it specifies what sort of other signs the item should 
be combined with in order to be saturated. This is also referred to as the sign's grammatical 
arguments. Formally speaking, the value of SUBCAT is a list (ordered set, indicated with angle 
brackets) of partially specified synsem objects restricting the range of signs that combine with the 
item. In HPSG the term grammatical argument is much broader than in other syntactic theories 
in as much as they also include dependent elements usually classified as subjects or specifiers. It 
is important then that subjects in HPSG are not selected via the intercession of an INFL like in GB 
theory in clauses containing simple finite verbs.
Note that the list of synsem objects corresponding to the complements (in the broad sense) does 
not constitute an unstructured set, but is strictly ordered. Its order, however, does not reflect the 
surface order of the constituents corresponding to synsem objects, rather a sort of obliqueness 
hierarchy1. The example below shows the subcategorization frame of the English verb give, the 
symbols serve only explanatory purposes for the time being, the labels of the items in the subcat 
list are meant to encode categorial restrictions with the semantic contribution indicated in brackets.
(5) s u b c a te g o r iz a t io n  o f  th e  v e r b  give
SUBCAT ^ N P i  (AGENT),NP2(THEME),PP3(GOAL)^
In HPSG, there is no separate theory for case, case of nominal arguments is treated as part of the 
subcategorization information included in entries that select them (see a discussion in 5.3.1). In 
particular finite verb forms assign nominative case to their subjects (initial elements on the subcat 
list), while other verb forms or predicative non-verbal categories do not contain case specifica­
tion for their arguments. It is apparent then that the distinction between inherent (lexical) and 
structural case in HPSG is not stated explicitly. *
'This notion is very closely related to the obliqueness hierarchies familiar from other theories, e.g., the SU BJ-O BJ-O BJ2 
hierarchy of Functional Control in Lexical-Functional Grammar.
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In the following, we present the substructure of the lexical representation of an English verb, 
containing local syntactic (subcategorizational and categorial) and semantic features of the ele­
ment.
(6) SYNSEM| LOC s u b s t r u c tu r e  o f  w a lk s  
loc
CAT
HEAD
verb  
FIN +
SUBCAT LOC
CAT HEAD
n o u n
C A S E  n o m
C O N T E N T  I IN D E X  □
P E R S O N  3rd 
N U M B E R  sing
CONTENT
R E L N  w a lk  
W A L K E R S
Note that the meaning of this word represented in the same formalism of attribute value matrices 
as the other features. Nothing really hinges on the type of semantic representation above, therefore 
we choose not to go into details about this. The main point is that the semantic substructures of the 
arguments on the SUBCAT list are linked into the representation of the item's CONTENT structure. 
Therefore, in standard HPSG, linking of semantic arguments to syntactic arguments (elements on 
the subcat list) is expressed via simple structure sharing. As this is thought to be part of a word's 
lexical representation, any kind of generalisations about linking can only be stated in the form of 
lexical (redundancy) rules2.
5.1.3 Principles constraining phrase structure
As HPSG is not a derivational but a constraint based theory, any generalisation on phrase-structure 
or phrasal projections should be driven by constraints. A necessary consequence of such an ap­
proach is that phrase structure should be encoded in the phrases' representation and any restric­
tions on phrase structure is a constraint on (a substructure of) phrasal sorts. The constituent (im­
mediate dominance) structure of the item is encoded in the DAUGHTERS substructure of phrases, 
the value of this feature is of sort varying according to the type of construction in question, i.e. 
the type of the immediate dominance construction, e.g., head-complement construction or head- 
adjunct construction. Below, we indicate the constituent structure types in standard HPSG.
(7) Constituent structure types in standard HPSG
c o n sti tu en t-s tru c tu re  (con-struc)
coord ina te-struc tu re h ead -struc
C O N J -D T R  (sign* ) H E A D -D T R  sign
C O N J U N C T IO N -D T R  w o rd C O M P -D T R S  (p h ra se * )
For reasons of perspicuity, however, in the examples, we indicate constituency information 
in a usual tree structure representation format, while keeping to the feature structure encoding
2Thematic roles and any generalisation on the linking of particular types of arguments to particular types of subcatego­
rized elements can hardly be expressed in this framework.
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when stating the constraints. The edges in the tree stand for attribute paths, the labels on these 
edges disambiguate the type of the constituent, i.e. adjunct, head, etc., corresponding to the ADJ- 
DAUGHTERS HEAD-DAUGHTER, etc. attributes in the DAUGHTERS substructure (these are declared 
in the hierarchy fragment (7)). The following two representations then are equivalent. 3
(8 ) equivalent representations of constituent structure
a. AVS encoding of constituent structure
head-com p-struc
D A U G H T E R S
H E A D -D A U G H T E R [T ^  . . .
C O M P -D A U G H T E R S  .
■ M - D .
b. tree-structure encoding of constituent structure
According to the ontology, then, phrases have the following general characterization:
(9) phrases
phrase
P H O N  p h o n s trin g  
synsem
S Y N SE M C A T
H E A D  head  
S U B C A T  (sy n sem * ) 
C O N T E N T  con ten t
D TR S con-struc
HPSG's most important universal principles comprise the four principles constraining phrase 
structure. These are discussed in detail in the rest of this section.
The first of these four principles is a constraint that specifies which are the possible phrasal 
constructions available in a language. The Immediate Dominance Principle (IDP) says that each 
and every phrase must satisfy one of the Immediate Dominance Schemata. The relevant three 
schemata driving the projection of lexical categories are explicitly stated below:
(10) Immediate Dominance Schemata
a. Head-Subject Schema
The SYNSEMl LOC| CAT| SUBCAT value is (), and the DAUGHTERS value is of sort head- 
com p-struc whose HEAD-DAUGHTER value is a phrase whose COMP-DAUGHTERS value 
is a list of length one.
b. Head-Complement Schema
The SYNSEMl LOC | CAT| SUBCAT value is a list of length one and the DAUGHTERS value 
is an object of sort head-com p-struc whose HEAD-DAUGHTER value is of type w ord .
c. Head-Adjunct Schema
The phrase's DTRS value is of type head-adj-struc and the HEAD-DTR value is token-identical 
to the ADJ-DTR|SYNSEM|LOC|CAT|HEAD|MOD value.
As the first item on the subcategorization list corresponds to the subject while the others are the 
complements of the item, the principle says that a headed phrase is such that it has an almost satu­
rated (a list containing one item) or a totally saturated (i.e. empty) subcategorization list. The main 
prediction of this restriction is that any syntactic operation that refers to an item with a different ex-
3Note that the sort of the daughters value can be recovered from the labels of the edges.
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tent of saturation is bound to failure. A phrase satisfying the HEAD-COMPLEMENT SCHEMA is the 
analogue of a bar-level projection in GB, while one satisfying the HEAD-SUBJECT SCHEMA is a the 
analogue of a maximal phrasal projection. Note that when embedded as complements, items are 
not necessarily subcategorized for with respect to their phrasal status — whether the sign is of type 
phrase is unrecoverable from its SYNSEM substructure —> but rather with respect to their extent 
of saturation. As a consequence, a word having no complements qualifies as a totally saturated 
sign just as a maximal phrasal projection, which entails that there is no need to postulate vacuous 
phrasal projections for these words unlike in X'-bar theory. Analogously, words having a subcat 
list of length one are free to get involved in subject-head or adjunct-head constructions without 
turning into a phrase beforehand. Unfortunately, this advantage is not realised in standard HPSG, 
where the requirement that complements should be phrases are already stated in the feature dec­
laration of immediate constituent types (cf. (7)), and therefore one needs another ID schema to 
allow for (among others) vacuous phrasal projections. Note that in any case a complement is in 
principle allowed to be not or partially saturated, unlike in GB theory.
Now we can introduce some useful abbreviations for substructures often referred to. Note also 
that, from now on, in the examples we will indicate only the relevant substructure of the AVSs.
(11) so m e  a b b r e v ia t io n s
sy n se m
NP,m
b. V P S
ss
LOC
CAT
H E A D  n o u n  
SU B C A T  ()
c o n t e n t I i n d e x S
sy n se m
CA T
LOC
H E A D  verb  
S U B C A T  (sy n sem )
C O N T E N T S
s y n s e m
C A T
LOC
H E A D  verb  
SU B C A T  ()  
C O N T E N T 0
The ID schemata basically encode in what ways lexical items are allowed to project phrases. In 
the first phase (Schema 2) a lexical item is combined with a collection of other phrases yielding a 
phrase that has only one missing argument. In the next step the phrase can project further into 
a maximal projection, i.e., a category with an empty subcategorization list. Obviously one needs 
other principles to guarantee that arguments are saturated not only in fixed steps but also under 
the right conditions, that is satisfying the subcategorization requirements of th elexical heads. This 
is guaranteed by the Subcategorization Principle (SP):
(12) T he Subca t e g o r i z a  t io n  P r in c ip le
In a headed phrase, the list value of the DAUGHTERS| HEAD-DAUGHTER| SYNSEM| LOC |CAT 
I SUBCAT (a list) is the concatenation of the list value of the SYNSEM| LOC| CAT| SUBCAT 
with the respectively ordered list of the SYNSEM values of the elements in the DAUGHTERS| 
COMPLEMENT-DAUGHTERS list.
On the one hand this principle ensures that the non-head immediate constituents of the phrase (i.e. 
complements) have properties complying with the subcategorization requirements of the head 
daughter. On the other hand, it also declares that the phrase inherits only the unsaturated part of 
the subcat list from the head. In other words, the complements present in the phrase are cleared 
off from the subcat list of the head (get saturated) and only the unsaturated part is inherited by the 
mother from the head. The figure below illustrates this effect:
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(13) Constraints of the SP
sign
The following example shows how the interaction of the IDP and the SP results in a unique syn­
tactic structure for the maximal phrasal projection of give.
(14) Phrasal projection of give
Pam gave Sam jam 
VP^SUBCAT ()j
C /  \  H
Pam
NPjsYNSEM □ ] VP
gave Sam jam 
. . .  I SUBCAT ^ 0
V
It is apparent that the constructions combining the subject and the intermediate phrasal projection, 
on the one hand, and the complements with the head, on the other, are generalized under the same 
construction type namely a DAUGHTERS value of sort head-comp-struc.
As the saturated complements of a head are not present on the subcat list of the phrase, and 
as subcategorization is necessarily strictly local, it is ensured that no item subcategorizing for a 
phrase can "look into its phrase structure", i.e., no subcategorization can depend on any feature of 
the already saturated complements of a subcategorized head. The projection level of the phrase, 
that is encoded in the length of the SUBCAT value, can in fact be subcategorized for as discussed 
below in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3 in connection with raising predicates.
Note also that, since, as we mentioned earlier, subcategorization is restricted to the SYNSEM 
substructure of arguments, a head cannot subcategorize for phonetic or constituent-structure prop­
erties.4
The phonetic form of phrases is controlled by the so-called LP Principles. Linear precedence 
relations (at least in English in the general case) are thought to mirror the order of members on 
the list value of the DAUGHTERS| COMPLEMENT-DAUGHTER attribute of the phrase, that, in turn, 
mirrors the order of the elements specified in the SUBCAT list of the head . 5 For the discussion of 
the linear order of constituents and word order variation as well as of problems concerning dis­
continuous constituency, we refer the reader to Uszkoreit (1987),Pollard (1991) and Reape (1994).
We noted earlier that the other feature within the categorial information is the collection of 
features that gets inherited by the phrasal projections. The universal principle ensuring HEAD 
feature percolation is referred to as the Head Feature Principle:
4This also entails that the linear order of the constituents of a phrase cannot in any way be altered or disrupted by the 
selecting head when it is embedded as its complement.
sNote the rather bizarre situation that the substructure encoding immediate dominance relations and not intended to 
encode linear precedence information still does exploit a list structure representation.
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(15) H e a d  F e a tu re  P r in c ip le
In a headed phrase the values of s y n s e m | l o c | CAT| h e a d  and d a u g h t e r s | h e a d - d a u g h t e r | 
SYNSEMl LOC| CAT| HEAD are token-identical.
We mention here that there are other ID schemata — not discussed in this introductory survey — 
including, among others, one that is responsible for generating inverted structures such as English 
interrogative sentences. Finally we present the fourth universal principle that controls the way 
semantics of phrases are composed.
(16) S e m a n tic s  P r in c ip le
The SYNSEMl LOC| CONTENT value is token-identical with that of DAUGHTERS| ADJ-DAUGHTER| 
LOC I CONTENT if the DAUGHTERS value is head-adj-struc and with that of DAUGHTERS| 
HEAD-DAUGHTER] LOC| CONTENT Otherwise.
This principle basically ensures that the CONTENT value of phrases is inherited from the semantic 
head of the phrase (the semantically active functor), i.e., the adjunct-daughter in the case of an 
adjunct-head construction and the head-daughter otherwise.
(17) s e m a n t ic  c o m p o s i t io n  o f  a d ju n c t  s tr u c tu r e s
g o o d  book
[sYNSEM| L O C  I C A T  I CONTENT \U'gOod(JD'book)]
S Y N S E M  L O C
(18) s e m a n t ic  c o m p o s i t io n  o f  h e a d - c o m p le m e n t  s tr u c tu r e s
John ru n s
[ c o n t e n t □  'runsdU 'John)]
S Y N S E M l
C O N T E N T m]
As noted earlier, subject/head and complement/head relations are treated under the same DAUGH­
TERS value. Since the Semantics Principle is only sensitive to this value, one consequence of this 
is that the subject has a semantic contribution that is by no means more than its contribution to 
the semantics of the verb phrase. This, in general, means a shared value between the arguments 
CONTENT attribute and some feature of the verb's CONTENT.
Pollard and Sag (1994, pp342-43) gives a brief indication of what an HPSG linking theory would 
look like. For a more comprehensive attempt, we refer the interested reader to Wechsler (1991).
5.2 Subcategorization and valence in Modern HPSG
5.2.1 Valence Features and argument structure
Pollard and Sag (1994, chapter 9) argues for an extended version of HPSG, in which subcategoriza­
tion features are treated differently from the "standard" approach characterized in the first section.
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The essence of the new idea (coming from R. Borsley (1987; 1989a) is to split subcategorization fea­
tures into three separate features called the valence features.
The separation of the subcat list into distinct SUBJ and COMPS lists is motivated by the clumsy 
treatment of non-predicative prepositions in standard HPSG. These prepositions, if they subcate­
gorize for a complement, always realize it after the head. If, however, there is only one list contain­
ing all arguments of a head, then this complement is basically indistinguishable from the subject 
like in other categories. In order to disallow the wrong order of constituents, prepositions were 
lexically specified as inverting and formed phrases with the help of the ID schema for inverted 
subject constructions. With a separate feature for subjects, it is possible to lexically specify non­
predicative prepositions with an empty SUBJ list, and hence ensure a true complement status for 
their arguments.
With the distinction of subjects and complements, it is possible to realize the apparent diversi­
ties in the behavior of complements and specifiers. This prompts Pollard and Sag to introduce a 
third valence feature called SPR for specifiers. Note that, though formally the SUBJ and SPR values 
are of type list the theory constrains them to be lists containing at most one element.
Obviously, for these new features to work, it is necessary to introduce new ID schemas as well 
as new construction types (i.e., new types of DAUGHTERS values, namely head-subj-struc and head- 
spec-struc). The Subcategorization Principle also has to be replaced with the Valence Principle.
(19) Valence Principle
In a headed phrase, for each valence feature F, the F value of the head daughter is the 
concatenation of the phrase's F value with the list of SYNSEM values of the F-DAUGHTERS 
value.
The above analysis is also motivated by the fact that Welsh (cf. Borsley (1989b)) finite clauses 
exhibiting a systematic VSO pattern are argued to be best analyzed with ID Schema 2 (or actually 
the new version requiring the phrase to have an empty COMPS list). This requires, however, the 
"subject" (least oblique argument) to be specified as the first element on the COMPS list as well as 
the SUBJ value to be the empty list in the lexical representation of finite verb forms.
This split view on valence has been taken over in Modem HPSG and much recent work. 
Counter to Borsley's original intention, however, the valence features did not replace the old SUB­
CAT list but came as additional features of signs. It is only the valence features that get saturated 
in the course of the projection of the phrase, the subcat list remains the same (actually due to 
structure sharing its members get specified). Thereby the meaning of subcat list is much closer to 
conventional conceptions of argument structure, which is reflected by its new name ARG-S.
5.2.2 Mapping argument lists to valence values
Although in Pollard and Sag (1994, chapter 9.) valence features an the subcat list are present 
in a lexical representation, there, subcat lists are always thought to be the concatenation of the 
list values of the valence features. Despite apparent redundancy, the presence of both valence 
and argument-structure specification can be defended on grounds of the existence of alternative 
mappings from ARG-S (SUBCAT) to valence features (cf. Bouma (1997?) for possible generalizations 
on these mappings). One such alternative, in fact incomplete, mapping can be the case of pro-drop 
as argued in Manning and Sag (1995). The main argument in favor of the duplicate representation, 
however, is that the Binding Theory (cf. Pollard and Sag (1994, chapter 6 )) is defined with the help 
of the obliqueness hierarchy, i.e. the order of elements on the ARG-S list. Manning and Sag (1995) 
argues that binding relations remain constant as defined by ARG-S irrespective of the different 
mappings to valence values and surface order. They also argue that assuming different structures 
makes it possible to state parametric variation of causatives across languages.
5.3 Complementation Patterns
5.3.1 Unsaturated complements
In the first section we saw that subcategorization can refer to the level of saturation of the selected 
complement. The full power of this possibility is seen in the HPSG treatment of raising and control
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predicates. In GB theory usual Subject-to-subject raising predicates (SSRPs) are thought to select 
for an infinitival IP (a clause) the subject of which moves out of the embedded clause (e.g., to ma­
trix subject position) to receive case. The analogue of this movement is the structure sharing of 
the first elements on the subcat list of the predicate and its selected VP complement. The range, 
however, of raising in HPSG is broader than in GB in as much as it includes predicates enabling ex­
ceptional case marking constructions, i.e., allow the subject of their infinitival clause complement 
to be assigned accusative case. Pollard and Sag (1994, chapter 3.) lists a great deal of arguments in 
favor of a Subject-to-object raising analysis of these predicates (SORPs).
(20) R a is in g  p r e d ic a te s
a. L e x ic a l r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  a S u b je c t- to - s u b je c t  r a is in g  p r e d ic a te  
seem
H E A D  verb
SUBCAT (lUVPfSUBCAT (HUMP)]:[H>
C A T
C O N T E N T
R E L N  seem  
A R G l tH
b. L e x ic a l r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  a S u b je c t- to -o b je c t  r a is in g  p r e d ic a te
believe
C A T
H E A D  verb
SUBCAT (NP[Y],[IIVP[SUBCAT (E N P ) ] :[!)
C O N T E N T
R E L N  be lieve  
A R G l E  
A R G 2C D
Note that subject and object control (or equi) predicates only differ from SSRPs and SORPs, 
respectively in that, unlike the latter, they assign a semantic role to their own arguments.
(21) R e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  c o n tr o l  p r e d ic a te s  
a. A s u b je c t - c o n tr o l  p r e d ic a te
try
H E A D  verb
SUBCAT (N P a ,VP[SUBCAT (N P^j)] : E )
C O N T E N T
R E L N  try 
A R G l 0  
A R G 2 E
b. An o b je c t-c o n  tro l p r e d ic a  te
persuade
H E A D  verb
SUBCAT (N P a ,NP[2],VP[SUBCAT (N P a )] :[H)
C O N T E N T
R E L N  p e rsu ad e  
A R G l □  
A R G 2 E  
A R G 3 E
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Raising and control do not only differ with respect to whether the embedded subject's index 
is reentrant with a matrix thematic role, but also in that there is a different kind of structure shar­
ing in the two cases. In particular, raising predicates exhibit strong connectivity, i.e. the whole 
SYNSEM substructure is shared, while in the case of SORPs, only the indices are shared between 
the arguments (weak connectivity). Note that in the case of weak connectivity information out­
side the referential index of the NP need not be the same or should be duplicated in the lexical 
representation by pure stipulation. Such a distinction could be motivation if sharing of the whole 
synsem structure would result in a type mismatch. And indeed, object control cases with strong 
connectivity would yield a case mismatch between the matrix object and the embedded subject, 
since case is represented as a feature within the synsem substructure (in particular as the value 
of SYNSEM|LOC|CAT|HEAD|CASE) . This is a consequence of the lack of distinction between in­
herent and structural case, i.e. the structural case of Noun phrases is not determined relative to 
their constituent structure position but assigned lexically. (See Heinz and Matiasek (1994) for a 
comprehensive discussion of case assignment in HPSG.)
A more serious problem is the fact that based on the above considerations the weak and strong 
connectivity representation of shared arguments would motivate a parallel treatment of subject 
to subject raising and subjects control (the case when there can be no case mismatch) on the one 
hand, and subject to object raising and object control on the; other, as opposed to the above.
Control predicates selecting infinitival complements typically include many that allow for to 
infinitive clauses as well as subjectless infinitives. Unlike GB theory, it is not true that one has to 
assume a null subject in the subjectless case in order to regard these as a natural class. Pollard 
and Sag (1994, ppl25-127) stipulates that these predicates subcategorize for a marked infinitival VP 
or S, and that for marks saturated complements while a zero marker marks VPs. The problem is 
that one does not gain much from this stipulation given that a disjunctive specification is needed 
for these entries, anyway. Firstly, the categories VP and S cannot be generalized over, secondly 
the semantics in the two cases is different in terms of the sentential complement does not trigger 
structure sharing of indices, we refer the reader to Pollard and Sag (1994, chapter 8 ) for a detailed 
discussion and a different treatment of complement control.
The former problem is immediately solved in extended HPSG, where one can easily charac­
terize S and VP as a natural class with the feature specification [COMPS ()]. The advantage of this 
seems to be rather tiny in the light of the fact that the VFORM value is idiosyncratically constrained 
in all instances of VP selection, and will hardly form a natural class with the finite VFORM value.
It is also important to emphasize that HPSG, following Gazdar, K.Pullum, and Sag (1982), 
treats auxiliaries as verbs. In particular they are typical instances of subject raising predicates. The 
infinitival marker to is also treated the same way, only it totally inherits the CONTENT value of 
the subcategorized VP. In this respect, it parallels non-predicative prepositions that are treated to 
denote only an index that they inherit from their NP complements.
(22) a. Infinitive particle as an underspecified auxiliary
to
b.
H E A D
V F O R M  inf 
CAT AUX +
SUBCAT ( 0 , VP[base,SUBCAT([0) ] :[H) 
CONTENT GO 
Non-predicative preposition to 
to
CAT I HEAD prep
SUBCAT (N P[acc,C O N T E N T q-|])
CONTENT 0
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5.3.2 Passive
Passive as a Lexical Rule
Following Pollard and Sag (1987), HPSG treats passive as relational. Given the main principles of 
subcategorization explained above, one can easily characterize the subcategorization patterns of 
some English verbs and their passive counterparts.
(23) Subcategorization of some verbs and their passive counterparts 
verb active passive
read SUBCAT (NPi ,NP2) 
give SUBCAT (N P i,N P 2,P P [to]3) 
give SUBCAT (N P 1,N P 2,N P 3) 
promise SUB C A T (N Pi,N P2,V P [in f])
SUBCAT (NP2 ,PP[by]i)
SUBCAT (NP2 ,PP[to]3 ,PP[by]i) 
SUBCAT (NP2 ,NP3 ,PP[by]!) 
s u b c a t  (NP2 ,VP[inf]3 ,PP[by]i)
The parallel between the two can be captured with a lexical rule, which is still the standard HPSG 
treatment of voice alternation.
(24) The Passive Lexical Rule
word
SY N SEM  L O C
H E A D
verb
C A T  V F O R M  active
s u b c a t  (N P [ Y ] ,N P [2 ] )  ®  DD
C O N T E N T  [U
4
word
H E A D
C A T
SY N SEM  | L O C
SU B C A T
C O N T E N T 0
Surprisingly enough, though alternative mapping strategies between argument structure and va­
lence can be expressed in current HPSG, passive is not treated this way. Keeping to the unchanged 
idea of the relational passive, in modem HPSG, a passive verb receives the standard representa­
tion of a derived entry (cf. Meurers (1995)). The nested complex representation and the presence 
of the old argument structure is thought of as a virtue rather than a vice. As reported by Manning 
and Sag (1995), in a lot of languages, such as Russian, binding relations are different in a passive 
and active sentence, in as much as in the passive an oblique complement can be bound by either 
the surface or the logical subject. This is treated with a disjunctive interpretation of the binding 
theory, i.e. its conditions can apply to either the derived or the embedded argument structure. 
Here STEM represents the stem of a derived word (complex predicate).
(2 5 ) Manning and Sag's Universal characterization of passive with "nested" ARG-S 
H E A D  I V F O R M  passive 
A R C -S  (HD ®  0  (®  ( [ % ] ) )
. . . C O N T E N T  HI
STEM
H E A D  I V F O R M  active 
A R G - S  (H jj] ,[ I ] )  ffi B  
C O N T E N T  E
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Auxiliary Passive as Raising
An alternative treatment of passive is found in Kathol (1994), where auxiliary passives are treated 
on a par with other raising constructions. There, it is assumed that the passive auxiliary subcatego­
rizes for an unsaturated verb, whose arguments are raised and rearranged in the auxiliary entry's 
argument structure. Note that German dative or impersonal passives can be treated similarly (for 
an alternative unified treatment of German passives see Pollard (1994)).
(26) Kathol's representation of the German passive auxiliary
w erden
SUBJ (NP[nom]|y]) 
C O M P S  HI ®  (  V
V F O R M  part ii 
SU B J ( N P )
C O M P S  (NPjacc]^) © HI
In fact, binding conditions in English and German seem to question the universal treatment of 
passive as in (24), given that there is no alternative for the passive agent to bind an oblique com­
plement. If, however, one adopts Kathol's treatment of the passive in terms of inheriting valence 
features but still keep the ARG-S feature, one is forced to say that it mirrors the surface relations, 
i.e., it is the concatenation of the valence lists.
Note that, just like in the original treatment of Subject-to-Object raising and control predicates, 
there is only weak connectivity between the inherited NPs (see section 5.2.2).
5.3.3 Subcategorization Inheritance
Except for the above treatment of passive, so far, the discussion of unsaturated complements was 
restricted to intermediate projections, i.e., phrases with a subcat list of length one. The possibility 
of generalizing over raising is explored in recent work on subcategorization inheritance. Gerde- 
man (1994) examines the idea of function composition in categorial grammar (cf. Moortgat (1985)) 
and shows in what ways an HPSG treatment of subcat list inheritance can accommodate better to 
the requirements of morphology and syntax.
The idea of subcategorization inheritance originates from Hinrichs and Nakazawa (1989a) and 
Hinrichs and Nakazawa (1994), who apply it to German auxiliaries. In morphology a similar 
problem arises with the subcategorization of derived words (for this treatment, see Krieger and 
Nerbonne (1991)). It is seemingly a conflict with HPSG principles, that, while one would choose to 
treat the affix as the head of a derived entry, subcategorization information clearly parallels that of 
the stem. Here it would be rather problematic to say that the affix subcategorizes for a saturated 
phrase because of apparent case mismatches (i.e., English nominalized verbs, for instance, typi­
cally realize their argument in genitive case). With general subcategorization inheritance, however, 
the affix can without problem be treated as the head (morphological and semantic) that subcate­
gorizes for an unsaturated complement and the rest of its subcat list is reentrant with that of the 
complement.
(27) Parallel representations for affix and auxiliary
a. representation of German the modal auxiliary kann
kann
H E A D  verb
S U B C A T  (V P [S U B C A T [D ] ,[ l] )
b. representation of the English productive affix -ness
-n ess
H E A D  no u n
SU B C A T  (A P [S U B C A T [D ] ,I I I )
This is rather problematic if we persue the old conception of subcat list here. As, in the course of 
phrasal projection the subcat list gets saturated and as there is no way to select for a word not a
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phrase, one can never guarantee that all the complements are inherited. This is only possible if 
one has a feature that preserves lexical arguments throughout the projection. But this is still not 
sufficient, one also needs another feature that gets saturated (valence) and the structure sharing 
of which with the SUBCAT or ARG-S can guarantee that all complements are there. If, however, 
we want to enable alternative mappings between argument structure and valence, the checking of 
word status — besides being rather complicated if not impossible — requires that the inheriting 
lexical item knows about all available mappings of the word subcategorized for. Thus we must 
see that enabling checking for exhaustive subcat lists of subcategorized elements has serious con­
sequences in as much as we loose the nice restrictedness of subcategorization explained above.6
A straightforward solution to this problem is to introduce distinct rules combining words and 
phrases — though we remark that the obvious generalization of the two type of rules is not easily 
expressible in the current framework of HPSG.
5.4 Further reading
An alternative version of HPSG theory is developped to handle complex predicates in the treat­
ment of verbal constructions, such as causatives, passive, verbal particles, tense and aspect con­
structions, in Ackerman and Webelhuth (1998).
Throughout our survey, we concentrated only on local features of items though we argued 
that subcategorization is stated for synsem objects, which include non-local features. For a justi­
fication of lexicalised non-local feature selection see the treatment of easy/tough constructions in 
(Flickinger and Nerbonne, 1992) and (Pollard and Sag, 1994, chapter 4.,pp. 166-171).
On the phenomenon of complement extraposition, we refer the reader to (van Eynde, 1996; 
Bouma, 1996; Keller, 1995)
Krenn and Erbach (1994) develops an HPSG account of idioms and some support verb con­
structions.
Problems with the treatment of adjuncts and complements in HPSG are discussed in (van 
Noord and Bouma, 1994; Verspoor, 1996; Kasper, 1994)
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Chapter 6
Argument Structure in Construction 
Grammar
6.1 Introduction
Construction Grammars — reviving ideas implicit in traditional linguistics — were born as a reac­
tion to the work of linguists following the Chomskian tradition. The main point of divergence is 
the fact that people working in the former framework do not except the clearcut division between 
lexical, syntactical and (suprasegmental) phonological information that is of central importance in 
the latter theories. Their main claim is that all these types of information have the same structure 
and therefor any division is an unwarranted theoretical construct. In what follows we will outline 
the consequences of this approach for the treatment of the argument structure of verbs.
Section 6.2 is a brief introduction to Construction Grammars in general and it will present some 
of the arguments brought in favour of this approach. Then in section 6.3 we turn to the problem 
of the argument structure of verbs within these theories. We conclude this paper with an example 
from English in section 6.4.
6.2 Constructions
To highlight the problems that led to the birth of Construction Grammars (usually associated 
with (Fillmore and Kay, 1993)) let us first consider the case of the lexicon as it was conceived of in 
post-Chomskian linguistics. It was assumed that the lexicon consists of a list of words associated 
with all the information necessary, i.e., syntactic, semantic and phonological information which 
was considered relevant for the working of the latter components of grammar. One such type of 
information was the argument structure especially in the case of verbs.
But it was further generally assumed that the lexicon is also the depository of idiomatic in­
formation. But since the lexicon consisted of a list of words and the Lexical Integrity Hypothesis 
determined what it means to be a word, namely something that enters syntax as a unit, there was 
a problem. Under these assumptions idiomatic constructions such as kick the bucket — which 
consists clearly of several words —had to be introduced into the lexicon as a special case of the 
lexeme kick (say kicky) which has all the properties of its base verb except that its argument is 
fixed (namely it must be the bucket and its meaning is a one place predicate (to die) rather than a 
relation. Along similar lines we can describe the construction bite to dust which has the further 
peculiarity that even the argument structure of the hypothetical lexeme that is responsible for the 
construction is different from the argument structure of the verb of which it is supposed to be a 
special case, i.e., there is very little they have in common.
But this does not only apply to real idioms. Consider the case of a semi-idiomatic construction 
like the one in the following sentence:
(1) I have been to London before.
It would be very difficult to find the word that is to "blame" for this sentence, although the pro­
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ductive rules of the grammar would produce the sentence with the preposition in which is clearly 
ungrammatical. To account for this phenomenon of blocking we must assume that the relevant 
information is present somewhere in the grammar. We will return to further such phenomena as 
we describe to problem of argument structure later on.
It is only natural that these kinds of phenomena lead to the assumption that the lexicon contains 
not only words but also (semi-)idiomatic constructions, i.e., entities that consist of possibly several 
words but their meaning is idiomatic. But what is special about idioms? The fact that either their 
form or their meaning is unpredictable from the form or the meaning of their component parts. But 
we can take this argument further and we can say that the same applies to syntactic rules: they put 
certain formal requirements on their arguments and the resulting structure and they are associated 
with a semantics of their own, i.e., they are also only a case of a form-meaning pair, and so they 
are not different from lexical constructions. The same applies to suprasegmental phonological 
patterns which are of the same kind: a form associated with a meaning.
This reasoning lead to the following definition of constructions ( (Goldberg, 1995, p4)):
(2) Constructions
C is a CONSTRUCTION iffdef C is a form-meaning pair < Fi, Si > such that some aspect of
F; or some aspect of S* is not strictly predictable from C's component parts or some other
previously established constructions.
This helps to solve — or rather to dissolve — problems that pose a serious challenge to component 
grammarians, such as the problem of preverbs in Hungarian . The problem is the following: how 
can we treat verb-preverb combinations in Hungarian when the preverb can move quite freely in 
syntax yet semantically it forms often a unit with its verb. They often behave like an adverbial: 
be(in) + megy(go) = go -in ; but very often they form an idiomatic unit with the verb: be + 
rúg(kick) = g e t  drunk. Although the preverbs show a peculiar behaviour that seems to point 
to the fact that they are not mere adverbials (e.g., they cannot act as topics in neutral sentences), 
these properties are shared by certain adverbials that were traditionally classified with preverbs 
in traditional accounts. But now these problems can readily be solved if we accept that preverbs 
are syntactically in a special class of adverbials, and idiomatic verb-preverb constructions are 
construction that consist of two words. This is in accordance with the nature of constructions, 
namely that everything not compositional on its parts forms a construction. The question whether 
they are lexical does simply make no sense in this framework.
As a consequence we loose the clearcut division between different components of the grammar 
on the one hand, and on the other hand generation and parsing become similar tasks, namely iden­
tifying the constructions that play a role in the input representation and finding the structure(s) 
that satisfy the constraints imposed by the other component of the relevant construction(s).
A further advantage is the fact that the same element can now be part of several different 
constructions. To see the importance of this fact consider the following Hungarian examples:
(3) a. 'Mari 'látta 'Jánost.
M ary sa w  John-ACC
'Mary saw John'
b. 'Látta Jánost Mari.
'Látta Mari Jánost.
Mary did see John.
c. 'Mari látta Jánost.
It was Mary who saw John.
d. 'Jánost látta Mari.
It was John who Mary saw.
e. 'Jánost 'Mari látta.
As for John, it was Mary who saw him.
f. 'Jánost 'látta Mari.
As for John, Mary did see him.
All the above sentences describe the same situation, namely the fact that John saw Mary. But they 
differ in their topic-focus articulation, i.e., in the distribution of old and new information in the
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sentence with respect to the discourse. Instead of postulating movements of elements into hy­
pothesized Topic and Focus positions which are supposed to take care of the word order vari­
ation we can say that there arc two types of constructions at work in these Hungarian exam­
ples, namely the Subject-Predicate- and the Transitive-VP-Constructions, which take care of the 
predicate-argument relations in the sentence, and the Topic- and Focus-Constructions, which 
take care of word order in Hungarian. Since constructions express constraints on syntactic and 
semantic components, it is no wonder that a word can act in several constructions.
The above example shows two further features of Construction Grammars to which we want 
to call attention. First, as shown by examples c. and d., certain sentences have two forms with 
the same meaning. This is due to the fact that the constraints posed by the relevant constructions 
may not fully determine the word order, they can result in underspecification. The relevant con­
structions only require that the sentence be headed by the verb and thus they do not constrain the 
order of the subject and the object. This fact is responsible for the free variation rather than some 
"stylistic movement" or "scrambling".
Comparing the two examples there is one more thing to note, namely the fact that the two sets 
of sentences are the same except for their intonation pattern. This shows that the suprasegmental 
phonology, i.e., intonation pattern are parts of construction or even constructions on their own 
thus blurring a further distinction that is unnecessary in Construction Grammar. It is not a special 
phonological component that is responsible for those pattern, they are just identified as any other 
construction in generation and parsing.
A further important methodological principle of Construction Grammar is the Principle of No 
Synonymy. This principle states that there can be no to constructions in the language that are com­
pletely synonymous. I.e., no two construction can carry the same syntactic and semantic informa­
tion (constraints) about their constituents; as we will see later, even in the case of constructions 
that result from the application of "transformations" of argument structures of different construc­
tions, and which thus may end up being F(ormally)-synonymous and S(emantically)-synonymous, 
there must be at least a difference in their pragmatics — technically speaking, they must not be 
P(ragmatically)-synonymous.
6.3 Argument Structure
6.3.1 Problems
The following section is an introduction to the treatment of the argument structure of verbs in the 
framework of Construction Grammar. Before we turn to the actual problem we must make one 
important remark. As we said in the preceding chapter, Construction Grammar formalisms are 
non-transformational and it makes not really sense to speak of components of the grammar. But 
as in the preceding section we used the pretheoretical notion of syntactic positions, similarly in 
what follows we will use the terms lexicon and lexical in some intuitive sense which has however 
no theoretical significance. The phenomena described below are more thoroughly discussed in 
(Goldberg, 1995).
Whatever is the representation of verbs in any grammar formalism, it certainly must make 
reference to the argument structure of the verb. But what and how should be represented? Should 
we represent both the syntactic and the semantic argument structure of the verb or is it enough to 
specify the latter since it determines the former in accordance with universal mapping rules? And 
is it enough to represent the cases of the arguments — in the sense of (Fillmore, 1968) — or do we 
need a more alaborate representation? In what follows we will present the answers Construction 
Grammars gave to the above questions.
First let us start with some observations. Let us take a look at the following pair of sentences:
(4) a. John eats.
b. *John devours.
The fact that verbs with roughly the same semantics come with a different syntactic argument 
structure seems to indicate that we must also explicitly specify the syntactic argument structure.
On the other hand there are verbs which can occur with several argument structures such as 
the following pairs of sentences:
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(5) a. I brought Pat a glass of water.
b. I brought a glass of water to Pat.
But the two argument structures differ in their semantics in that the first requires its object to be 
animate whereas the second doesn't as shown by the following pair of sentences1:
(6 ) a. *1 brought the table a glass of water.
b. I brought a glass of water to the table.
This is a very common phenomenon with verbs that have several but related argument struc­
tures. To give just one further example let us take a look at the following pair of sentences:
(7) a. I loaded the truck with hay. 
b. I loaded hay onto the truck.
The first sentence suggests that the truck is full of hay as an effect of my action whereas the second 
means only that there is some hay on the truck.
Now the question arises whether we should list all argument structures for a verb in the lexicon 
and how we should capture the fact that they are related. In traditional approaches all forms had 
to be listed and people introduced productive lexical rules to produce one form from another, i.e., 
one form was considered to be basic and the others were considered to be derivative on it. Or they 
just introduced Lexical Redundancy Rules which specified the relations among lexical items.
This seems to be quite a natural way to cope with the above problems but there are certain 
arguments that seem to show that they sought the solution in the wrong direction. Let us take a 
look at the following list of sentences:
(8 ) a. Pat kicked the wall.
b. Pat kicked Bob black and blue.
c. Pat kicked the football into the stadium.
d. Pat kicked at the football.
e. Pat kicked his foot against the chair.
f. Pat kicked Bob the football.
g. The horse kicks.
h. Pat kicked his way out of the operating room.
In the above case people accepting the lexical solution are compelled to list all the argument struc­
tures — syntactic and semantic — as separate lexical entries for the verb kick and they must pos­
sibly postulate several lexical rules to account for their relation. But since they are postulated on 
exactly the basis of the fact that the verb can show up in these types of sentences they constitute 
no explanation of the facts.
A more serious threat to this approach is posed by the following sentences:
(9) a. John sneezed the napkin off the table, 
b. John talked himself blue in the face.
The problem is the following: we cannot really claim that these types of verbs come with these 
argument structures since the two cases — not unlike in the case of sentence h. in example (8 ) — 
have something idiomatic about them.
But these examples show us the way to the solution of all the above mentioned problems. At 
least in the above cases it is natural to assume that what we have here are not separate lexical 
entries for the verbs in question but we have certain — more or less idiomatic — constructions *
'The examples (5) and (6) are taken from (Goldberg, 1995) but there is a remark to be made about them. The constituent 
to Pat in (5).b. is ambiguous between a locative and a benefactive interpretation and it is the second interpretation that 
(5).a. is a paraphrase of. The example in (6).a. is ungrammatical exactly because the Ditransitive Construction requires its 
second argument to be animate, but this applies to the metaphorical interpretation of the Caused-Motion Construction (cf. 
below) — which licences the second sentences in the pairs — as well, as shown by the following pair of sentences:
a. *1 gave the table a glass of water.
b. *1 gave a glass of water to the table.
The second sentence is only grammatical because it has a genuine locative interpretation.
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that can be applied to the verbs due to their semantic peculiarities. Now we can see how the 
representations for the lexical entries and constructions proposed by construction grammarians
solve the above mentionad problems along these lines.
6.3.2 Arguments and Construction Grammar
The lexical constructions for the verbs themselves — traditionally called the lexical entries — must 
at least contain some indication of the semantic argument structure of the verb since this will 
determine the constructions that the verb can participate in. We use a semantics that determines 
the so called participant roles that are associated with a verb. A lexical entry thus looks as follows:
(10) HAND: < hander, handed, handee >
Thus the construction for hand determines that the verb has three semantic arguments, namely 
the agent, i.e., the person who does the handing, the patient, i.e., the object that is handed over 
and the recipient, i.e., the person who receives the object2 In what follows we will claim that this 
information is enough to determine the syntactic possibilities of the verb.
There is one more thing to be said about this representation. Consider the following examples:
(11) a. Jesse robbed the rich (of all their money).
b. *Jesse robbed a million dollars (from the rich).
(1 2 ) a. *Jesse stole the rich (of their money), 
b. Jesse stole money (from the rich).
If you use our heuristics to determine the participant roles for the two verbs, it will be apparent 
that the frames do not differ, yet the two verbs can show up with different syntactic argument 
frames as shown by the examples above. So there must be some difference in their semantics. 
This difference is captured by the notion of lexical profiling of participants. Profiled participants 
are those that normally show up obligatorily in finite clauses. 3 In the lexical representation we 
use boldface to highlight the profiled arguments thus the representations for rob and steal look as 
follows4:
(13) a. ROB: < thief, target, goods > 
b. STEAL: < thief, target, goods >
As we have said above this information is enough to determine which construction a lexeme 
can appear in and the fusion of the lexical entry with specific constructions will will produce the 
traditional argument structures, which as we see is only an epiphenomenon.
Before we can turn to this problem however we first have to show what forms constructions 
take in this framework. Let us look at the following example5 :
2Goldberg gives the following heuristics for determining the basic meaning and the relevant participant roles for a verb: 
interpret the verb in gerundial form in the following frame:
N o __ ing occured.
The number and types of participants understood to be involved in the situation determine the semantics associated with  
the verb.
3There are contexts which can override this obligatoriness and certain constructions — such as the passive or the middle 
constructions — serve explicitly to suppress arguments.
4Goldberg argues that the profiling of arguments can be motivated independently, since the semantic constraints asso­
ciated with the profiled arguments indicate that they play a prominent role in the way the situation is viewed. A similar 
contrast motivates the difference in profiling and thus in syntactic behaviour between eat and devour (cf. example (4)).
5We will present the constructions in what follows in the form given in (Goldberg, 1995) although sometimes the 
thematic roles that she assigns to specific arguments are at least questionable and depend very much on the definition of 
the specific role which in most cases varies from author to author. In the following example it might be argued that the 
third argument should rather be assigned the thematic role THEME — since it is normally not affected by the action, which 
again is sometimes taken to be the definition of a PATIENT.
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(14) Ditransitive Construction
Sem
R : means 
instance
Syn
CAUSE-RECEIVE ( 
! R
PRED
V
agt
I
rec
III
pat
I
Subj Obj Obj-2
The obvious part of the construction specifies the syntax and the semantics of the construction 
(first and third row). The semantics specifies that the basic meaning of the ditransitive construc­
tion is that the agent causes the recepient to receive the patient (X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z) and the 
syntactic argument structure consist of a subject, an object and a secondary object under the appro­
priate mapping indicated by the arrows. The boldface indicates the so called (constructionally) 
profiled arguments which are just by definition the arguments that are linked to direct grammat­
ical relations (i.e., SUBJ, OBJ or OBJ2 ). Now we can turn to the middle row that is the place to be 
filled by a lexical construction. Thus PRED is a variable that will be instantiated by the fusion of 
the two constructions. Similarly, R is a variable for the relation between the basic meaning and the 
verb meaning. The above construction constrains this relation to be either means or instance. The 
type of lines between the first and the second row serves to indicate a relation between the partic­
ipant (lexical) and argument (constructional) roles: solid lines indicate obligatory fusion, whereas 
dashed lines show that these roles can be contributed by the construction. We will see an example 
of the role of this difference later on.
Now we have all that we need to account for the ditransitive use of hand, which results from 
the fusion of the relevant constructions given in examples (14) and (10) above. The resulting con­
struction looks as follows:
(15) Ditransitive HAND
Sem CAUSE-RECEIVE ( agt rec pat )
I R
R . means HAND ( hander handee handed )
instance
Syn V Subj Obj Obj 2
What we end up with is an instantiation of the variables and the empty places of the constructional 
frame with information originating from the lexical construction that contained enough material to 
constrain the way semantic arguments (participant roles) can be linked to syntactic arguments via 
linking with the argument roles of the construction frame. The resulting construction corresponds 
to what is traditionally thought of as a lexical entry of the verb.
To turn back to the role played by the dashed line in the construction let us see how this tool 
helps us to account for an argument structure of the verb kick. Using our test we can establish that 
the basic meaning of the verb and the participant roles look as follows:
(16) KICK: < kicker, kicked >
But this construction meets the requirements of the CAUSE-RECEIVE construction since it con­
tains the obligatory agent and patient and as we said before the dashed line indicates exactly that 
the relevant role can be contributed by the construction itself. Thus the combination of the two 
constructions of examples (16) and (14) will result in the following construction:
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(17) Ditransitive KICK
Sem CAUSE-RECEIVE ( agt rec pat )
I t * I
IR I I I
R: means KICK ( kicker kicked )
Syn V Subj Obj Obj2
This structure will be responsible for the following type of sentence mentioned in example (8 ) 
repeated here for convenience:
f. Pat kicked Bob the football.
The same mechanism accounts for those semi-idiomatic constructions that were mentioned in 
example (9). Since the first example will play a central part in section 6.4 we will only present the 
proposed solution for the second sentence:
b. John talked himself blue in the face.
The construction associated wih the verb will obviously look as follows in our framework:
(18) TALK: < talker >
The above sentence is a case of the English Resultative Construction whose frame looks as follows:
(19) Resultative Construction
Sem
R : means 
instance
Syn
CAUSE-BECOME
I R
PRED
V
( agt pat result-goal )
I I
Subj Obj OblAp/pp
Accordingly, the basic meaning of the construction is identified as X causes Y to become Z and 
shows the appropriate argument roles and the links to the respective surface constituents. Since 
the above construction indicates that it can supply both the patient and the result-goal arguments 
it is not surprising that it can combine with the construction for talk thus resulting in the above 
composite structure:
(20) Resultative TALK_______________________________________________
pat result-goal )
I II II I
)
Obj OblAp/PP
This construction then accounts for the example mentioned above6.
Along similar lines we can account for a form associated with kick mentioned in example (8 ):
6There would be more to say about this construction. While the fact that the lexical entry supplies only one participant 
may explain why the OBJ is preferably pronominal (reflexive), this does not account for cases of fake objects — arguments 
coreferential with the subject — and cases of real objects — , the grammaticality of which is questionable for many speakers 
of English anyway.
Sem
R : means 
instance
CAUSE-BECOME ( agt 
I R
TALK ( talker
Syn V Subj
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b. Pat kicked Bob black and blue.
It is again the construction that is responsible for the extra argument since the lexical construction 
of the verb contains only two arguments — an agent and a patient (cf. (16)).
6.4 The Caused Motion Construction
6.4.1 The base case
We conclude this part with a concrete example, the English Caused Motion construction that will 
serve to highlight some further features charateristic of the constructional approach to grammar. 
The most important property that deserves mention is that constructions come in families whose 
members are related through different kinds of relations (so called links) to a basic construction 
— capturing the basic meaning of the construction.
In the case of the Caused Motion Construction the base case is captured by the following con­
struction:
(21) Caused-Motion Construction
Sem
R : means 
instance
Syn
CAUSE-MOVE ( agt path theme ) 
I | i iR i iI l i i
PRED ( )
V Subj Obi Obj
Thus we have a basic meaning, namely X causes Y to move Z. Let us take a verb that belongs 
naturally into this class, say put with its lexical roles distributed as follows:
(22) PUT: < putter, put.place, puttee >
By fusing the participant roles with the appropriate argument roles we arrive at the representation 
of a basic case in this family:
(23) Caused-Motion Construction 4- put
Sem CAUSE-MOVE ( agt path theme )
R : means
1 R
( putter
1
1
put.place
ii
instance PUT puttee )
Syn V Subj Obi Obj
Why should we assume that this is a construction on its own rather than just an epiphenomenon 
on the basic meaning of put? One good reason is that this construction contains twodashed lines, 
which means that in this construction verbs can show up whose participant role frame is poorer yet 
matches the above construction. A case at hand is again the verb kick whose lexical representation 
combined with the construction (cf. (16) and (2 1 )) results in the following frame:
(24) Caused-Motion Construction + kick
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Sem CAUSE-MOVE ( agt path theme )
I I I imeans i i
KICK ( kicker kicked )
Syn V Subj Obi Obj
This construction again accounts for a further argument frame of the verb given in example (8 ): 
c. Pat kicked the ball into the stadium.
There is one further point that is worth noting in this case, namely that the second participant 
role of the verb (kicked) matched the patient argument role in the Ditransitive Construction (cf. 
example (17)) whereas here it matches the theme role. This on the one hand shows that it is rea­
sonable to assume some underspecified representation for the participant roles, on the other hand, 
it shows that it is the lexeme and the construction that raelises it together that determines the exact 
angle fron which we view a situation. Take the case of the following sentence:
(25) Pat kicked Bob into the bathroom.
Since the construction determines that Bob is the theme of the sentence, the focus is put on the fact 
that he is in the bathroom now, rather than on his being affected by the act of kicking.
Thus the fact that in certain cases it is this construction that furnishes a role for the argument 
structure of the verb seems to show that what we have here is a genuin construction. But it is not 
only this feature that is furnished by the above construction. Compare the above sentences with 
the following sentence (cf. (8 )):
a. Pat kicked the wall.
This indicates that the basic meaning of kick is not causative at all. It is the Caused Motion Con­
struction that is responsible for the causativity of the verb in the sentence in question.
A more clearcut demonstration of what we have shown above is furnished by one of our semi- 
idiomatic cases (cf. example (9)) repeated below:
a. John sneezed the napkin off the table.
This sentence is only possible because the verb sneeze can also show up in this construction due 
to its paticipant role frame:
(26) SNEEZE: < sneezer >
The fusion of the two constructions results in a composite that licences the above sentence:
(27) Caused-Motion Construction + sneeze
Sem CAUSE-MOVE ( agt path theme )
I I 1 1means i i
SNEEZE ( sneezer )
Syn V Subj Obi Obj
In this case it is impossible to claim that it is the meaning of the verb or the latter combined with 
the meaning of the preposition that lets us derive the correct meaning compositionally — whose 
components are almost exceptionlessly furnished by the Caused Motion Construction — as it was 
sometimes claimed for the cases of kick discussed above.
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6.4.2 Links
A further argument for the existence of this construction is the fact that it can serve as the base 
case for a family of constructions that are related to it through iinks that can be attested in the case 
of other constructions as well. We now turn to the discussion of some of these relations.
One of these relations is the so called Subpart Link. This is one of the relations that belong to 
the class that serves to suppress argument places — to this class belong among others the English 
passive and middle constructions. Thus the relation produces the following frame on the Caused 
Motion Construction:
(28) Intransitive Motion Construction
Sem MOVE ( theme goal )
PRED ( ' )
Syn V Subj Obi
We see that in this construction we supressed the agent argument of the Caused Motion Construc­
tion. It is typically this argument that is supressed by the relation and since this argument is usu­
ally associated with the subject position that must be filled by some entity, a relinking mechanism 
causes some other argument to appear as subject of the sentence7. This construction is responsible 
for examples like the following:
(29) The boat floated into the cave.
Another family of links is the family of Polysemy Links. These links usually do not change 
the argument structure (neither the semantic nor the syntactic) but they cause changes in the basic 
meaning of the verb. One typical example is the prevent relation. When applied to the Caused 
Motion Construction it results in the following construction:
(30) Caused-Prevent Construction
Sem
R : means 
instance
Syn
CAUSE-NOT-MOVE
I R
PRED
V
( agt path theme
Subj Obi Obj
The meaning of this construction can be paraphrased as: X prevents Y from moving Comp(Z). 
This construction accounts for the following examples8:
(31) a. Joe locked Mary into the bathroom, 
b. I kept her at arm's length.
This is not the only type of link in this family. To indicate some further examples we specify
7Another instance of this link connects the Resultative Construction (cf. (19)) with its intransitive version relating such 
pairs of sentences as:
a. John hammered the metal flat.
b. The metal became flat.
8The application of this type of link to the Ditransitive Construction ((14)) results in a construction with the meaning X 
CAUSED Y NOT TO receive Z which accounts for the following example:
Joe refused bill a cookie.
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the resulting constructions and give an example for the sentences licensed by them for both the 
Caused Motion (cf. (21)) and the Ditransitive (cf. (14)) Constructions:
(32) a. X ENABLES Y TO_Z
(i) Joe permitted Chris an apple.
(ii) Joe permitted Chris into the room.
b. Conditions of satisfaction imply X CAUSES Y T O_Z
(i) Pat promised Bob a car.
(ii) Pat ordered Bob into the room.
A further important type of link is the so called Metaphorical Extension Links. It is argued by 
Goldberg that the Resultative Construction is metaphorically linked to the Caused Motion Con­
struction under the following mapping:
motion — change 
location —A state
There are certain English expressions that reflect this metaphor directly:
(33) a. The jello goes from solid to liquid in minutes, 
b. She slid into madness.
We regard the fact that a family of constructions is related to a basic meaning through the well 
attested links as a certain indication of the existence of the construction9.
A last indication of the presence of an explicit construction is that there are explicit semantic 
constraints associated with it. These constraints can be attested in the case of the Cause Motion 
Construction. To give just to simple examples: first, the cause argument can only be an agent or a 
natural force but it cannot be an instrument:
(34) a. Chris pushed the piano up the stairs.
b. The wind blew the ring into the gutter.
c. *The hammer broke the vase onto the floor.
Another constraint involves the fact that there can be no mediating cognitive decision by the entity 
denoted by the direct object:
(35) a. Pat lured Bob into the room.
b. *Pat persuaded Bob into the room.
Although lured involves a psychological state it does not imply the existence of a cognitive deci­
sion as shown by the following sentence:
(36) Sam lured the mouse out of its hiding place.
These are constraints that are better associated with the constructions than with the semantics 
of each verb that can appear in them.
6.5 Conclusion
The preceding discussion served to illustrate that all these features are most naturally explained by 
positing a distinct construction that these properties are associated with. We can similarly argue 
for the existence of other constructions in English — of which we have seen but a few — that make 
it evident that in the majority of cases what we held for distinct lexical entries, i.e., the distinct 
argument structures of a verb — are in many cases mere epiphenomena due to the interplay of 
'lexical' and 'syntactical' constructions.
9 A further type of link is the Instance Links which relate constructions to their idiomatic uses as in the following case: 
John drives Mary crazy/nuts/bananas/over the edge.
This is an idiomatic case of the Resultative Construction in as far as it requires both the presence of the verb drive and an 
argument that means crazy.
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Chapter 7
Introduction
This chapter is a summary of some current issues in lexical semantics, a branch of linguistics that is 
gaining ever more importance as grammars become more and more lexicalized (cf. Section 00). The 
aim of lexical semantics is to provide a framework, i.e., a logical language for the representation 
of meanings, which is suitable for characterizing the meanings of lexical entries. Such representa­
tions are successful if the structures that the other components of grammar (in particular, syntax) 
posit and the meaning representations together determine the meanings of complex expressions,
i.e., if they favour the compositional interpretation of linguistic expressions. So lexical semantics 
assumes that the linguistic structures (and the semantic operations associated with them) will take 
care of what meanings have to be combined and how, while it assumes the responsibility of deter­
mining what the meanings that are to be combined are like. As a consequence, lexical semantics 
can hardly be considered a fully autonomous component — neither can the other components, 
especially morphology and syntax, be considered independent from it.
We will try and review the most important problems and their possible solutions in a system­
atic way in what follows. Any systematization of this sort is disputable and reflects the particular 
position the authors take about the issues at hand. Our general approach is the following. We 
believe that the meanings of natural-language predicates are not arbitrary. For example, the de­
notation of a one-place predicate (i.e., a set of individuals or a property) is not just any subset 
of the universe, but its members must have something in common other than having the given 
property. 1 Therefore, extensions can be given in terms of their relations to other extensions. As a 
matter of course, circularity is to be avoided; how the entire system of denotations is grounded is 
a philosophical problem, which should not bother us here. (For example, we can think of the final 
anchors that help us avoid circularity as directly measurable quantities if we take an empiricist's 
stance.) Whatever the philosophically correct approach is, we assume that lexical meanings can be 
decomposed in terms of other extensions that characterize what the members of the extension in 
question have in common. In the case of natural language, the similarities between the members 
of an extension are chosen in a largely arbitrary manner, either because of their relevance for bio­
logical and social reasons, or just owing to historical accidents. At any rate, those similarities have 
a conceptual rather than model theoretic relevance. The system of extensions that arises in this 
way is called a (natural-language) ontology in the literature. They will be the topic of Chapter 2. 
Ontologies play a role in all those mechanisms in which conceptual similarity between extensions 
matters, in particular, in relating meanings metaphorically. Should we consider the operations that 
combine lexical meanings to be purely functional operations (such as application or composition), 
ontologies and decomposition would not be required. But we believe more mechanisms than just 
the functional ones are at play in meaning composition.
The body of this chapter is about problems directly related to the interaction of lexical meanings 
in linguistic structures. The first problem, of a rather general character, is treated in Section 00: if 
a given lexical item seems to behave differently in different constructs, i.e., it apparently carries 
different meanings when combined with different lexical items, when is it legitimate to assume 
that the phenomenon is due to a genuine lexical ambiguity (i.e., the surface coincidence of two 
underlying lexical items)? When do we have to explain the different meanings using one and
'This is related to the philosophical problem of inductive reasoning, cf. Goodman (19??). Induction would not be 
possible at all if we allowed concepts to correspond to arbitrary sets of entities.
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the same underlying lexical meaning? This question is to be answered first, because it arises in 
connection with each of the other problems that we will deal with in the remaining part of the 
chapter. The tests that have been used to decide whether a lexical item is truly ambiguous and the 
phenomena related to ambiguity and vagueness will be treated in Section 00.
The remaining part of this chapter is divided into three sections according to the three main 
types of approach that people have taken towards the problem of systematic polysemy (i.e., pol­
ysemy based on one and the same lexical entry rather than due to ambiguities) in the literature. 
First, we will deal with the decomposition-based approach to metonymical polysemy proposed 
by Pustejovsky (1995b) and various papers in the same spirit. The most important type of ex­
planation in such frameworks is that the types of the expressions that we can combine in natural 
language often do not match exactly, and certain distinguished features within the decomposition 
of the meaning of the lexical entries can help solve the type conflict in such cases. For example, 
consider the expression finish the beer. The verb finish semantically selects an argument denoting 
an activity, yet beer has a different type of meaning. But beer is associated with various types of 
activity, in particular 'drinking', 'brewing' etc., which are accessible to the semantic combination 
operation. The accessible features of a lexical meaning representations are (i) the purpose/goal/ 
typical use of the entity in question (this slot is associated with 'drinking' in the case of beer); (ii) the 
origin/coming into existence of the entity in question (this corresponds to 'brewing' in the case of 
beer); and (iii) the typical parts of the entity or those entities that the given entity is typically part 
of. Various different types of phenomenon are treated in this spirit, which will be presented in 
Section 00.
A slightly different approach, first proposed by Nunberg (1995), is explained in Secion 00. 
This approach relies on the concept of transfers of meaning, which consist in the modification 
of predicate extensions in terms of 'noteworthy' properties of their arguments. For example, in 
I'm parked in the backyard is interpreted as 'my car is parked in the backyard', even though / is 
not polysemous. The explanation of this phenomenon is that the meaning of park can be shifted 
in such a way that it is true when the original predicate 'park' applies to the car of its argument 
rather than its argument itself, provided that which car belongs to a given individual is one of its 
'noteworthy' properties. That this phenomenon is associated with the predicate itself is shown by 
the fact that #/ consume two gallons of petrol cannot be interpreted as 'my car consumes two gallons 
of petrol'.
Finally, the third type of approach that we will examine considers metonymy as an instance 
of ellipsis. This approach is based on the similarity between 'missing links' in discourse (e.g., 
between two consecutive sentences, or between a definite description and its antecedent), on the 
one hand, and meaningful connections to be established between lexical items when combined in 
a particular way (e.g., a verb and one of its arguments). The idea is that, since lexical entries are 
combined in the particular ways that their syntax legitimates, the differences between the 'gap­
ping' processes in discourse and the systematic polysemy of lexical entries are to be attributed 
to the constructions that the lexical entries participate in. This type of approach explains both 
the varying degrees of productivity of the lexical processes in question and the relevance of the 
conceptual dimensions captured by Pustejovsky's (1995b) 'qualia structure'.
Meaning and grammatical category
In principle, a lexical entry consists of a surface form, a meaning representation and a grammatical 
categorization. However, it is a commonplace that much of the grammatical behaviour of a lexical 
item is predictable from its meaning. For example, if the meaning of a lexical item is a two-place 
predicate expressing, say, a process located in time and space, then its grammatical category can 
hardly be anything else than a transitive verb; if its meaning is an abstract concept corresponding 
to the same process without reference to time and space, then its grammatical category is most 
probably an abstract noun; and so on. It is a debated issue just how much of the grammatical be­
haviour of a lexical item is predictable from its meaning. No doubt, there are cases when meaning 
alone is not sufficient for explaining the surface behaviour of a lexical item. For example, if the 
meaning of a lexical item is a sentential connective, it may behave as a conjunction to be placed in 
between clauses or, for example, as a second-position clitic within the second clause. Or a verb de­
noting a process may or may not take an argument expressing an obligatory feature of the process:
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say, a verb meaning 'lose weight' may or may not have an optional or even obligatory argument 
expressing how much weight the subject loses.
On the other hand, the danger of circularity often arises when relating meanings to grammati­
cal behaviour. For example, one could say that a verb meaning 'lose weight' and taking two oblig­
atory arguments (subject and weight lost) denotes a two-place relation, whereas another verb, also 
meaning 'lose weight' but taking just one argument (the subject) denotes a one-place predicate. 
This would correctly predict their different syntactic behaviour but, at the same time, one could 
argue that such an explanation is ad hoc, because their different semantics is motivated uniquely 
by their grammatical behaviour. In addition, if one has a verb meaning 'lose weight' with an op­
tional 'weight lost' argument, one should say that it is ambiguous depending on whether it is used 
transitively or not, which is semantically awkward.
Another type of case can be illustrated with the English preposition on, which expresses a tem­
poral relationship in front of the days of the week (on Monday, on Tuesday etc.), whereas the same 
relationship seems to be expressed by the preoposition in in connection with names of months (in 
January, in February etc.) and by at in connection with periods of the day (at night, at noon etc.). It 
is largely arbitrary whether we say that the grammatical (sub)categories of the prepositions on, in 
and at are responsible for their different behaviours or that their meanings are different in such 
a way that they express the given temporal relation just with the appropriate lexical classes of 
nouns, or else that their meaning is uniform (largely underspecified), and different nouns select 
different special senses for them.
Similar examples are legion, not only in connection with more or less lexicalized combinations 
of lexical items (like the combinations of temporal prepositions and certain types of nouns above), 
but all the phenomena traditionally referred to as collocations or production idioms belong here. 
These are constructs that have compositional meanings, yet their form is impossible to predict on 
the basis of their meanings. Because of this lack of predictability, we must consider them separate 
lexical items, although they often do not figure as such in written dictionaries (if they appear at all 
in them).
Collocations are just one example of partially predictable lexical items. Once we face the fact 
that every (formal or semantic) feature of a lexical item need not be arbitrary, 2 the problem of 
ambiguity versus polysemy gets somewhat easier to solve, because we can account for certain 
cases of productive polysemy by postulating very general collocations (if we can argue that they 
are partially arbitrary).
For example, take the verb bake: this verb is usually taken to have (at least) the following two 
meanings:
(1) a. 'submit something to dry heat' (as in I baked the potato); 
b. 'create something by baking' (as in I baked a cake).
These two meanings are obviously related, so dictionaries do not consider the word bake homony­
mous. This type of productive polysemy can be explained by postulating a collocation correspond­
ing to (1 -b), occurring with verbs that express physical influence on some object, which potentially 
produces a different type of object (especially by transforming the input object), and expresses the 
production of the output using a form that is partially arbitrary (namely, the noun phrase corre­
sponding to the output is expressed as the direct object, and there is no conventionalized way of 
expressing the input object). This generalized concept of collocation is usually referred to as a con­
struction (cf. Fillmore and Kay (1993)). Constructions, i.e., partially arbitrary associations of form 
types with meaning types include every single lexical item as well as collocations and, if we want 
to be absolutely consequent, even syntactic rules.
We want to claim that all systematic polysemies are linked to particular constructions rather 
than just to lexical items. Constructions are partially productive by definition, they may impose 
largely arbitrary limitations on the lexical items that can participate in them, and they can refer to 
conceptual categories that are made explicit by lexical decomposition. For example, the dativus 
eticus that can be embodied by the second object of ditransitive constructions in English is linked 
to a conceptual category that we could call 'making available', which is a rather arbitrary feature
2Note that even idioms some of the semantic and syntactic features of the items that occur in them as a rule. For 
example, an idiom containing an event verb, such as kick the bucket, could hardly refer to a state, although the event it refers 
to has nothing to do with either kick or bucket.
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of certain verbs, but which can stem from the context itself. The verb phrase wash myself a car may 
be appropriate in a context in which washing a car makes it available for some purpose (like taking
it from the garage), whereas in other cases the lexical entry of the verb specifies that the verb has 
the feature 'making available' (e.g., build myself a house, sing myself a song).
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Chapter 8
Cognitive Semantics
8.1 Introduction
In this section we take a look at what kinds of ontological assumptions lie behind the most influ­
ential approaches to the study of meaning. In particular, we examine two concurrent paradigms 
in contemporary semantics: Truth-conditional Semantics and Cognitive Semantics. However, our 
treatment will not be completely balanced. As the main topic of this volume is Lexical Semantics, 
and, as we will see later on, words, rather than sentences, are considered to be the locus of meaning 
according to the cognitive approach (as opposed to the truth-conditional one), the cognitive view 
will be given somewhat more room in our discussion. The linguist we will take a closer look at to 
see the charasteristics of cognitive semantics is Ray Jackendoff and his Conceptual Semantics.
8.2 Two Paradigms of Semantics
8.2.1 Truth-conditional Semantics
A very influential branch of contemporary semantics is truth-conditional (or model-theoretic) seman­
tics. It is rooted in mathematics and can be traced back at least to the works of Gottlob Frege (Frege 
(1972)) and, most prominently, to those of Alfred Tarski (see, for example, Tarski (1983)). Tarski de­
veloped his ideas in order to be able to characterize the concept of truth in formal (that is to say, 
artificial) languages, but his theory have gained great popularity among linguists dealing with 
natural language since then. Although Tarski himself expressed his skepticism about the possibil­
ity of applying his theory of truth to natural language, subsequent philosophers, Richard Montague 
in the first place (Montague (1970a),Montague (1970b), Montague (1972)) have shown that Tarski 
might have been mistaken. "But what does Truth have to do with Meaning?", one might ask. Ac­
cording to this tradition, very much, and this answer can in fact be taken as the hallmark of this 
particular attitude to the question "What is Meaning?" And this is completely understandable if 
we consider the fact that the cardinal motivation behind the enterprise was to create exact means 
to handle logical relations between propositions1. Logic is interested in the valid patterns of infer­
ence, that is, those patterns of inference that preserve truth. What about meaning? To put it tersely, 
meaning is the property by virtue of which a sentence2 can participate in various patterns of in­
ference. In other words, the meaning of a sentence can be characterized by the set of sentences it entails. 
This implies, incidentally, that the basic level of truth-conditional semantics is that of the sentence; 
all other linguistic entities (for example, words) are assigned meaning according to the roles they
‘Frege's ultimate goal was to prove that arithmetics (and thus mathematics itself) was a part of logic, but, in order to 
attain this goal (which was proved unattainable by Russell through discovering paradoxes in naive set theory), he had to 
develop suitable tools to formalize the informal mathematical reasoning that had been used in mathematical proofs.
^Sentences express propositions, and it is propositions that can be said to be truth-bearing entities in the real sense. 
Although the relationship between a sentence and a proposition it expresses is far from being simple, it is usually possible to 
identify the proposition on the basis of the sentence by making explicit all implicit information related to the circumstances 
of the utterance of the sentence in question. That is why it is not always necessary to make a distinction between these 
philosophically very different entities in a painstakingly consistent manner.
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can play in sentences.
We can see that, on this view, semantics is most intimately connected with (and dependent on) 
truth. Put it more precisely, the objective of this kind of semantics is to identify the truth conditions 
of the sentences in an (artificial or natural) language. This is usually accomplished by invoking 
a mathematical construct called a model, which consists of a non-empty set (the universe), and a 
special function (the interpretation function) that maps the signs of the language (that is, individual 
names, predicate names, names of relations, etc.) onto mathematical constructions defined over 
the universe (particular elements of the universe, subsets of the universe, ordered pairs of the ele­
ments of the universe, etc.) These mappings are then combined in such a way ("compositionally") 
that the sentences of the language are mapped onto two abstract values (not included in the uni­
verse), True and False.
Originally, this approach was extensional, which means that it could not handle several phe­
nomena of natural language (such as modality, or belief-contexts, etc.) This situation changed, 
however, when Saul Kripke succeeded in giving exact semantics to modal logic by formalizing 
the concept of "possible worlds''(see Kripke (1959)). His framework was developed by Richard 
Montague into intensional logic, a very powerful instrument for modelling various kinds of natural 
language phenomena. Recent developments in formal semantics can be seen as efforts to over­
come the shortcomings of Montague's system. Two such developments should be mentioned. The 
first is Dynamic Predicate Logic by /. Groenendijk and M. Stokhof (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)). 
This system was made to cope with cross-sentential anaphora, and introduced a new concept of 
meaning as a potential to change the information state of the hearer.
The second important development is the flourishing of various algebraic semantics , which were 
invented to fill the gap concerning plural nouns and mass nouns in Montague's original system 
(Montague himself largely ignored these questions). Systems of algebraic semantics (see for ex­
ample Landman (1991) for a comprehensive textbook, or Link in Link (1983), which was one of 
the earliest developments in the field) widely use constructs from general algebra such as semi­
lattices, lattices, etc. and they seem to be somewhat closer to algebra than to logic. This attitude, if 
successful, can lead semantics further away from classical logic than was thought to be possible at 
the dawning of formal semantics.
Finally, a remark concerning the ontological status of model-theoretic semantics is in order.
It is very important to see that the ontological commitments of model-theoretic semantics are not 
more than those of mathematical set theory, coupled with the commitment to there being two 
abstract (Platonic) truth values. This means, in effect, that model-theoretic semantics is practically 
as neutral from an ontological point of view as mathematics. As in other fields of mathematics, 
real ontological questions emerge when it comes to applying the piece of mathematics in question, 
that is, when the components of the theory become interpreted by the "human user" having a 
concrete domain of possible application in mind. To put it briefly, model-theoretic semantics does 
not involve any realist commitment whatsoever. Such commitments belong to the person applying 
the mathematical means rather than to the means themselves. As Joost Zivarts and Henk Verkuyl 
put it in Zwarts and Verkuyl (1994, p. 2.):
[T]he use of model theory in the analysis of natural language does not imply a real­
ist commitment. The mathematical tools employed in a model-theoretic approach to 
natural language are [ . . .  ] neutral with respect to philosophical or epistemological po­
sitions. It is hard to see why mentalists should refrain from using set theory, Boolean 
algebras, lattices, Tarskian assignment functions, possible worlds and other modern 
tools of analysis ...
8.2.2 Cognitivist Semantics
One of the most significant features of cognitivist semantics is that it postulates an autonomous 
level of mental representations. Expressions of natural language have their interpretation on this 
level. In other words, outside reality does not have to play any role in interpreting the expres­
sions of a language; as far as the linguist is concerned it is sufficent for him or her to be able to
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describe the relationship between the expressions of the language and the corresponding mental 
entities. Truth and falsity then are notions that can be situated not between language and real­
ity but between the level of mental representations and reality. However, this relationship should 
not concern the cognitive semanticist because, to cite a famous slogan, "Meanings are in the head."
8.3 Jackendoff's Conceptual Semantics
Ray Jackendoff is one of the most important authors in the field of cognitive semantics. His works 
include Semantics and Cognition (1983), Conscioussness and the Computational Mind (1987), and Se­
mantic Structures (1990). Since it is his Semantic Structures that deals with language in an exten­
sive fashion, we will mainly draw on that work. However, it is of course not possible to present 
Jackendoff's views (that range from linguistics to cognitive psychology to philosophy) in an all- 
embracing manner (because that would be a task to which a separate volume should be devoted), 
so we can only focus attention on the broad outlines of his work.
8.3.1 Representational Modularity
According to Jackendoff (Jackendoff (1996, pp. 1-5.), Jackendoff (1990, pp. 285ff.)) the mind/brain 
encodes information in a modular fashion. Jackendoff calls this Representational Modularity , be­
cause it is the way of representing information that makes different modules (different representa­
tion modules) differ from each other. There are, for example, a linguistic module, a visual module, 
an acoustic module, etc., that work with information that is encoded in the particular format they 
need each (they are different "languages of the mind"). The modules can contain further sub- 
modules. For example, the linguistic module contains a phonology module, a syntax module, and 
a module interfacing with several other faculties, the module of Conceptual Structure. This module 
is where meanings are to be found in Jackendoff's theory.
Further, there are various interface modules mediating the flow of information between different 
representation modules. The task of these interface modules is to "translate " one "language of 
mind" used by one module into another one used by another module. According to Jackendoff, 
this process is not a simple code-switch, but more like "a partial homomorphism" (Jackendoff 
(1996, p.4.)) between two formats of representation: part of the information present in the source 
representation might have no corresponding piece in the target representation.
According to this picture of grammar, a lexical item is essentially a correspondence between phono­
logical, syntactic and conceptual structures.
8.3.2 Lexical Decomposition
It is a very important component of Jackendoff's theory that he accepts the existence of semantic 
primitives out of which all meanings ("thoughts") are composed, in other words, he believes in 
lexical decomposition3. This ontological commitment can be defended on the grounds of the appar­
ent creativity of natural language (Jackendoff (1990, pp. 8-11., 37—41.)). Presupposing that there 
are strong parallels between syntax and semantics (which, we will see, Jackendoff does presup­
pose), the arguments from productivity in syntax can be applied to semantics as well: just as there 
must be primitives in syntax (because not all syntactic structures can be stored in memory, since 
there are potentially infinitely many of them), there must also be primitives in semantics (because 
not all thoughts can be stored in the finite brain).
8.3.3 The Conceptual Structure
Conceptual Structure (CS) has the following characteristics(Jackendoff (1990, pp.7-43.),
Jackendoff (1996, pp. 5-13)).
3On the topic of lexical decomposition see Wunderlich in Wunderlich (1994) where he compares three different ap­
proaches to lexical decomposition.
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• It is built up out of discrete primitive features and functions.
• Its expressions refer to the world as we conceptualize it.
• It must contain all the nonsensory distinctions of meaning made by natural languages (e.g. 
the type-token distinction).
• It is relational rather than linear.
• It does not have to be entirely digital so that it can permit stereotype and family resemblance 
effects to be formulated.
• It is universal.
• Languages can differ in respect to what elements of CS will surface in their syntax / morphology.
• Syntax only "sees" the argument structure in CS.
• The interface from syntax to CS preserves embedding (i.e. if X  is a constituent of Y , then the 
CS of X  will be contained by the CS of Y).
What kind of "nonsensory distinctions" does CS have to encode? At the very least, the following 
items seem to be necessary:
• CS must contain pointers to all the sensory modalities.
• CS must contain the distinction between tokens and types.
• CS must contain the encoding of quantification and quantification scope.
• CS must be able to abstract actions from the individual actually performing the actions.
• CS must encode taxonomic relations.
• CS must encode some social predicates (such as "is friend of," "is fair," "is obliged to," etc.)
• CS must encode modal predicates (such as the distinction between "is flying," and "can fly," 
etc.)
8.3.4 The Basic Ontology of Conceptual Structure
The essential units of conceptual structure are conceptual constituents, each of which belongs to 
one of a small set of major ontological categories (or "conceptual parts of speech"). These are 
Thing, Event, State, Action, Place, Path, Property and Amount4. Although they pick 
out different entities as referents, Jackendoff lists six points of similarity between them (Jackendoff 
(1990, pp.22-25.)).
(i) Each major syntactic constituent of a sentence maps into a conceptual constituent in the CS 
of the sentence. For example, in John ran toivard the house, John and the house map to Thing- 
constituents, the PP toward the house corresponds to a Path-constituent, while the entire sen­
tence corresponds to an Event-constituent. The matching is by constituents, not by categories: 
the same syntactic category can express many conceptual categories (for example, an NP can 
express a Thing (the dog), or an Event (the war), or a Property (redness)).
(ii) Each conceptual category supports the encoding of units not only on the basis of linguistic 
input but also on the basis of the visual (or other sensory) environment (see also footnote
(4))-
(1) a. That is a robin, 
b. There is your hat.
4 In Jackendoff (1987, pp. 148-152.) Jackendoff argues that pragmatic anaphora (i.e., using a demonstrative pronoun to 
refer back to some entity that is perceptually accessible to the hearer) and the use of phrases such as same and different (as 
in the sentence Bill ate at the same place as jack did) are the basic clues to the implicit ontology in natural language.
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c. Can you do this?
d. The fish was this long.
Accompanied by a suitable gesture, the italicised phrases identify a Thing, a Place, an Action 
and an Amount, respectively.
(iii) Many of the categories (except perhaps Property and Amount) support a type-token dis­
tinction. For example, the Place-type expressed by over your head can express many different 
Place-tokens.
(iv) Many categories support quantification.
(2) a. Every dinosaur had a brain. (Things)
b. Everything you can do, I can do better. (Actions)
c. Anyplace you can go, I can go too. (Places)
(v) Each conceptual category has some realizations in which it is decomposed into a function- 
argument structure; each argument is in turn a conceptual constituent of some major cate­
gory.
(3) a. John is tall.
b. president of the republic
c. from under the table
In (8 ) the arguments are John (Thing) and tall (Property), whereas the whole sentence ex­
presses a State. (9) is an example of a Thing that has another Thing as an argument; and in 
(10) a Path has a Place as its argument.
(vi) The conceptual structure of a lexical item is an entity with zero or more open argument 
places. The meanings of the syntactic complements of the lexical item fill in the values of 
the item's argument places in the meaning of the sentence. For example, be in (8 ) expresses a 
State-function the arguments of which are found in subject and object positions.
The above observations lead to the basic formation rules of X-Bar Semantics. X-semantics paral­
lels X-syntax in capturing basic structural symmetries in the field of meanings.
Here are the basic formation rules of X-semantics (Jackendoff (1990, pp.22-32)).
( R l )
(R2)
(R3)
[Entity] —»
Event/Thing/Place/ ■ ■ • 
Token/Type
F((Entity1, (Entity2, (Entity3))))
XP corresponds to [Entity].
X°
.(YP(ZP)) corresponds to
Entity
F((El l (E2 ! (E3))))
where YP corresponds to E2, ZP corresponds to E3, and the subject (if there is one) corre­
sponds to Ei.
8.3.5 Further Ontological Refinements
A very attractive feature of Jackendoff's theory is that various cross-categorial generalizations can 
be stated in it in a relatively simple way. For example, verbs and prepositions related to the spatial 
semantic domain can very often be transferred to non-spatial domains as well (Jackendoff (1990, 
pp. 25-27.), Jackendoff (1987, pp. 152-158)). 4
(4) a. The bird went from the ground to the tree.
b. The inheritance went to Philip.
c. Harry went form elated to depressed.
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These sentences are intuitively related in the sense that their common structure can be described 
as follows.
(5)
[Event GO([ FROM([ ]) ’ Pa,h TO([ ]) )]
The difference in the meanings of sentences (11-13) is accounted by introducing different GO- 
functions for each semantic field (ontological domain); for example, in (1 1 ) the conceptual struc­
ture of the sentence will contain GOSpa,iai (physical space), in (12) it will contain GOPoss ("space of 
possession"), and in (13) it will contain GO,dem ("space of identification").
A further interesting point concerns inference patterns. The following sentences can be inferred 
from the sentences (6 )a-c, respectively:
(6 ) a. The bird is in the tree.
b. The money is Philip's.
c. Harry is depressed.
It is possible to account for the above inferences by the following schema:
(7) At the termination of [Eve„, GO([X], [Path TO([Y])])], 
it is the case that [State BE([X], [Place AT([Y])])j.
8.3.6 Elaborating Function-A rgum ent Structure
The basic function-argument structure introduced in (R3) can be further elaborated depending on 
which particular category is being specified. For example, the ontological categories EVENT and 
STATE have the following specialized formation rules (Jackendoff (1990, pp. 33, 87-99.)).
[Even, GO([THING], [PATH])]
;ven, STAY([THING], [PLACE])](R3a) [EVENT] -> |
(R3b) [EVENT] ->
(R3c) [STATE] —> <j
CAUSE THINGEVENT , [EVENT]
state BE ([THING], [PLACE])]
, ORIENT([THING], [PATH])] 
EXTEND([THING], [PATH])]
Further conceptual functions introduced by Jackendoff include:
(R3d) [EVENT] -> [Event MOVE«™* ])]
Instances of this function can be found in sentences such as
(8 ) Debbie danced.
and (in the non-spatial domain)
(9) Lila laughed.
(R3e) [STATE] -> [Slate CONF(U„g ])]
"CONF" stands for configuration, and is related to the internal spatial configuration of its Theme. 
As an example, consider
(10) Sally stood/sat for hours on end.
(11) (R3f) [EVENT] —> [Evw, INCH([Sla,e ])]
This function is responsible for the inchoative reading of the following sentence:
(12) Bill stood on the table.
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8.3.7 The Architecture o f Lexical Entries
Lexical entries contain the following pieces of information:
• phonological form
• syntactic category
• subcategorization frame
• conceptual structure
As an example, let us consider an item having a fairly complicated lexical entry, the verb drink 
(Jackendoff (1990, p. 53)).
(13)
DRINK
V
_  (NP j )
[event CAUSE([Thinc ]i, [event GO([th,nc LIQUID]j, 
_[path TO([place IN([Thinc MOUTH OF([Thinc ],)])])])])]
Here angle brackets denote the fact that the complement N P  is not obligatory but optional. Index­
ing conventions ensure that the CS of the Subject is substituted into the argument place indexed 
with i; coindexing between other syntactic and conceptual constituents is always made explicit in 
the lexical entry (see the coindexing of the direct object N P  and the argument of GO in the above 
lexical entry). CAUSE is a primitive function that takes a THING and an EVENT as an argument, 
and combines them into an EVENT. GO is also a primitive function mapping a TH IN G  and a PATH 
onto an EVENT, while TO maps a PLACE onto a PATH. Finally, IN takes a THING and yields a 
PLACE (intuitively, the place occupied by the thing), and MOUTH OF takes a THING and yields 
"the mouth of" that thing (presumably, a living thing). LIQUID in [-n,ing LIQUID] is the selectional 
restriction that one can only drink liquids. This information is already encoded in the lexical con­
ceptual structure (LCS) of the item drink, and it constraints the possible substitution of arguments 
into the argument place coindexed with the direct object. Jackendoff calls this kind of argument 
substitution fusing or merging5.
To sum up, here is the rule for Argument Fusion (Jackendoff (1990, p. 53ff.)).
(R4) To form the conceptual structure for a syntactic phrase XP headed by a lexical item H:
(a) Into each indexed constituent in H's LCS, fuse the conceptual structure of that phrase 
YP that satisfies the coindexed position in H's subcategorization feature.
(b) If H is a verb, fuse the conceptual structure of the Subject into the constituent indexed i 
in H's LCS.
The treatment of selectional restrictions parallels that of totally incorporated arguments, such as 
the Goal in the following sentence,
(14) Joe pocketed the money.
The verb pocket has the following conceptual structure:
(15) [EveMCAUSE([™ng h.U .GCKU^ ]j, [Palh TO([Place IN([-n,lng POCKET])])])])]
Here the Path bears no index and thus receives its interpretation "into a pocket" entirely from the 
verb.
Besides those conceptual structures that involve function-argument organization, Jackendoff 
considers restrictive modification. In this case one constituent is the modifier of another. Jackendoff's 
rule for Restrictive Modification is as follows(Jackendoff (1990, p. 56ff.)):
5Fusion of conceptual structures is in effect a kind of unification, in that fusion is only possible if no contradiction arises 
because of feature-clash.
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(R5) If YP is a daughter of X in XP,
and the conceptual structure of YP is [Cy], 
then the conceptual structure of XP is of the form
. [C,] . '
An Example
As an example of the above principles in work, Jackendoff provides the derivation of the concep­
tual structure of the sentence
(16) John went home at 6:00.
as follows (Jackendoff (1990, p. 57)).
The head of the phrase is go, the lexical entry of which is
(17)
GO
V
PP j
INVENT GO [^T i  J [Path
John and home have the following (obviously, simplified) respective entries.
(1) Urn, JOHN] 
and
(2) [Path TO([Place HOME])].
By Argument Fusion, the entries for John and home become fused into the entry of the head go, 
yielding
(3) [Event GO ([TOng JOHN], [Path TO([Place HOME])])]
The conceptual structure of the PP at 6:00 is also constructed by Argument Fusion:
(4) [ Place ^^ -^Vemp ( ["Time 6:00])]
If we assume that the PP is a daughter of V, then the Restrictive Modifier Rule will apply, and 
specify the frame of the CS of the entire sentence as
(5) [na® ATTemp([r,me6:00])]
The CS of the entire sentence is the fusion of (3) and (5):
(6 )
GO ( U ng JO H N ], [Palh TO([piaceHOME])]) 
Eve"' [puce ATTemp([Time6:00])]
8.3.8 Thematic R oles
According to Jackendoff, thematic roles (ö-roles) are part of the level of conceptual structure, not of 
syntax. Thematic roles are nothing but particular structural configurations in conceptual structure. 
The following list summarizes these configurations (Jackendoff (1990, pp. 46-50)).
• Theme = the first argument of GO, STAY, BE, ORIENT or EXTEND
• Source = the argument of the Path-function FROM
• Goal = the argument of the Path-function TO
• Agent = the first argument of the Event-function CAUSE
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• Experiencer = an argument of a State-fuction having to do with mental states (see Jackendoff 
(1990, p. 140)).
By giving such a structural explanation of traditional thematic roles, Jackendoff is able to extend 
the notion of thematic roles to embrace conceptual roles having no traditionally acknowledged 
label. Also, in his theory not only NPs receive thematic roles. For example, in the sentences
(18) a. The light changed from red to green, 
b. Bill talked Harry into shutting up.
green receives the thematic role of Goal in (a), and PRO shut up is also a Goal in (b).
8.3.9 The Action Tier
One of the most interesting points in Jackendoff's theory is his drawing parallels between seman­
tic and phonological theory (Jackendoff (1990, pp. 125-151.)). Jackendoff uses two tiers (familiar 
from phonological theory such as Autosegmental Phonology), the Thematic Tier and the Action 
Tier. Paralleling autosegmental phonology, Jackendoff allows there to be syntactic units sharing a 
thematic and/or action role as well as units having more than one thematic role. This obviously 
violates 0-criterion. However, Jackendoff has arguments showing that it is possible to encounter 
well-formed sentences containing NPs that share the same thematic role (or have more than one). 
Consider the following sentence as an example:
(19) The box has books in it.
Here, the box and it do not have distinct 0-roles. For example, it is not possible to question the 
object of the preposition
(20) *What does the box have books in?
and (2 2 ) can be paraphrased so that it will not contain the participant in question twice:
(21) There are books in the box.
Also, the object of the preposition cannot be made reflexive (even though it ought to be):
(22) *The box has books in itself.
To see that there are NPs that have more than one 0-role, consider the verb buy. Buy involves (at 
least) the following two components:
X buy Y from Z
(a) Y changes possesion from Z to X
(b) money changes possession from X to Z
Here X and Z have two semantic roles apiece. And it is not possible to find a way out by saying 
that the roles in the countertransfer (b) do not count, because precisely the presence of the coun­
tertransfer distinguishes buy from (for example) obtain.
What is the reason why Jackendoff introduces the two tiers, one for such thematic roles as 
Source, Goal, Theme, etc., and one for the couple Actor-Patient? If we use the frame
(23) What NP did was ...
as a test frame for Actors, then in the following sentences we can identify Actors as in Source, 
Theme and Goal, respectively (Jackendoff (1990, p. 126.)).
(24) a. The sodium emitted electrons. (What the sodium did was emit electrons.)
b. Bill roll down the hill. (What Bill did was roll down the hill.)
c. The sponge absorbed the water. (What the sponge did was absorb the water.)
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Thus it is reasonable to suppose that conceptual roles fall into two tiers: a thematic tier dealing 
with motion and location, and an action tier dealing with Actor-Patient relations6. As the intuitive 
definition of Actor could be "the doer of the action," while that of Patient could be 'the affected 
entity," Jackendoff introduces the formal elaboration of Events in the action tier as follows:
(R 3 g ) [EVENT] -> AFF(([THING]), ([THING]))
Here we can give a structural account of Actor and Patient as Actor being the first argument 
and Patient being the second.
Jackendoff uses the action tier to formalize Talmy's account of causation. Talmy in Talmy (1988) 
claims that causation is one instance of a broad system of concepts he calls force-dynamics. Force 
dynamics involves two characters one of which, the agonist, has a tendency toward performing 
(or not performing) some action, whereas the other character, the antagonist, tries to oppose the 
agonist's tendency. The agonist-antagonist dyad shows up on the action tier: the agonist as Patient 
and the antagonist as Actor. For example, the conceptual structure of
(25) Harry forced Sam to go away.
will be
(a) CAUSE ([HARRY],
GO([SAM], [AWAY]) 
AFF([SAM], )
AFF([HARRY], [SAM]))
Similarly, the conceptual structure of
(26) Harry prevented Sam from going away.
will differ from (a) in that Harry's efforts are directed toward Sam's not leaving:
(b )
CAUSE([HARRY],
AFF(
NOT ' GO([SAM], [AWAY]) 'AFF([SAM], )
HARRY], [SAM]))
8.4 Conclusion
In the foregoing sections we took a brief look at the outlines of Jackendoff's semantic theory. We 
saw that the basic presuppositions of cognitive semantics and truth-conditional semantics are 
thought to be very different. This might be due to the fact that model-theoretic semantics is of­
ten mistaken to hold realist (or even physicalist) commitments, which, as a matter of fact, it does 
not imply at all. On the other hand, cognitive semantics (such as Jackendoff's) is often criticised be­
cause it does not lend itself very easily for treating those aspects of natural language that have been 
handled successfully by model-theoretic semantics, such as, for example, quantification. However, 
there are encouraging signs that the two paradigms might get closer in the future (see for exam­
ple Pinon (1993) and Zwarts and Verkuyl (1994); the pronounced goal of the latter is to provide a 
model-theoretic interpretation for Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures). Obviously, both traditions 
would be able to profit from joining forces with each other.
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Chapter 9
Ambiguity and Vagueness
9.1 Introduction
A linguistic utterance can often be interpreted in more than one way. An important distinction can 
be made on the basis of what the source of the variability of possible interpretations is. The two 
kinds of sources to be distinguished are lexical ambiguity and vagueness or generality of meaning. 
The distinction is also an important lexical issue because it is reflected in the lexical representation 
of the entries that can have various interpretations.
In this chapter, besides making clear what the difference between ambiguity and vagueness 
is, some tests will be introduced that have been proposed for deciding between ambiguity and 
vagueness. It is also going to be discussed how those tests really work and whether they can really 
be used to for the purpose of identifying how a word should be lexically represented and if yes, 
then how they should be used. 1
9.2 Ambiguity tests
9.2.1 A basic test
In order to clarify the notion of vagueness as opposed to ambiguity, a very basic 'test' can be 
introduced. In fact, this can not usually be used as a real test, because it involves prompting the 
utterer, which device is not usually available. The 'test' is the following:
An utterance is said to be vague (as opposed to being ambiguous) if the utterer himself can be 
uncertain about the details of the situation described by the utterance that are not clear from the 
utterance. This means that when he is prompted to clarify the vague details, he may say T do not 
know'.
The sentence in (1), for example, is vague concerning who ate how much:
(1) The four kids ate three pizzas.
Vagueness is often the characteristics of sentences involving collectives (such as the one in (1)). 
But the source of vagueness is often lexical. Some tests have been proposed specifically for the 
detection of lexical ambiguity vs. vagueness.
9.2.2 The absence of crossed readings
In sentence (2), the word teachers can refer to a mixture of male and female teachers, i.e. the word 
is lexically vague concerning sex (gender).
(2) John and Bill both like their teachers.
On the other hand, the word file in sentences (3) and (4) is not vague (but ambiguous) in the sense 
that we do not interpret (3) and (4) as John having a tool and Bill a dossier.
'Most of the examples and the explanations in this chapter are based on Lascarides, Copestake, and Briscoe (1996).
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(3) John and Bill each have a file.
(4) John has a file and Bill does too.
(3) and (4) are examples of a test for lexical ambiguity. This test seems to be much more usable 
than the basic ambiguity test since it does not involve prompting the utterer. Instead, the possible 
interpretations are considered. Here the lexical ambiguity of the word file leads to the impossibility 
of crossed readings. Note that in sentence (2) we used basically the same construction as in (3) and 
thus the possibility of crossed readings in (2) (i.e. John and Bill liking any combination of male 
and female teachers) and its impossibility in (3) seems to reflect a difference between the lexical 
representation of teacher (underspecified sex) and file (ambiguous, unrelated senses).
9.2.3 Zeugma
The absence of crossed readings along with a figure of speach known as zeugma are often taken to 
be the most reliable tests for lexical ambiguity as oppsed to vagueness (Zwicky and Sadock (1975), 
Cruse (1986)). Zeugma is a word punning effect, in which two terms are inappropriately linked 
together. It can occur with a variety of syntactic constructions, as the examples (5) to (8 ) indicate:
(5) Some dam busters blew up banks and so did some bank robbers.
(6 ) I tried to take the plane to Chicago, but it was too heavy.
(7) Heseltine left with a smile, a wave and his wife.
(8 ) Mr. Pickwick took his hat and his leave.
Zeugma in all of these cases arises from the use of an ambiguous lexical item: hank in (5) take in (6 ) 
and (8 ) and with in (7).
The zeugma test gives the same result for the word teacher as the crossed readings test, in that 
the lack of zeugmatic effect in (9) indicates that the word teacher is vague (i.e. underspecified) 
concerning gender.
(9) Teachers may take maternity or paternity leave.
The phenomena of zeugma and the absence of crossed readings are closely related: intuitively 
zeugma occurs when incompatible crossed readings are strongly suggested by other information 
in the sentence.
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9.3 How the tests work
9.3.1 The case of multiple lexical entries
The traditional picture of lexical organisation is that distinct word senses should be represented as 
discreet units, i.e. multiple lexical entries, or MLEs (e.g. Kempson (1977, 81f)). Let's look at how 
MLEs could account for the absence of crossed readings in e.g. (10).
(10) Texas and Alabama have preservation orders for their most beautiful banks.
First, there must be (at least) two lexical entries for bank: bank-ground (the mound sense) and 
bank.org (the finantial organisation sense). Moreover, there is no entry for bank that is general 
between these two senses. Then two logical forms are created for (10): one containing the pred­
icate bank-ground and the other the predicate bank.org. So (10) cannot refer to a mixture of earth 
mounds and finantial institutions, because neither logical form would be satisfied in this case.
(11) Bank robbers and dam busters blow up banks.
In order to explain zeugma featuring the same lexical items such as in sentence (11), more than just 
the existence of multiple lexical entries must be assumed. It is necessary to link the compositional 
semantics to a model of pragmatic reasoning (which is open-ended and involves arbitrary knowl­
edge and interactions as opposed to the relatively simple taxonomic lexical semantic knowledge 
utilised in linguistic processing), because as with lexical ambiguity in general, the interpreter uses
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pragmatic information to decide which interpretation of bank should be used. Using pragmatic rea­
soning, a semantically ambiguous sentence like A bank robber blew up a bank can be disambiguated. 
However, in uie case of (11) die interpreter cannot use both interpretations of bank at the same time, 
even in the case of the distribute interpretation of (11). Knowledge about bank robbers favours the 
bank.org interpretation, while knowledge about dam busters favours bank.ground. The pragmatic 
clues conflict and since neither is more specific than the other, the interpreter cannot decide which 
interpretation should take precedence. Because of the irresolvable conflict in pragmatic reasoning, 
the semantic ambiguity cannot be resolved, which produces a zeugmatic effect.
The previous account for zeugma and non-crossed readings is adequate for homonymous 
words such as bank, where senses are unrelated (synchonically). But the cases where the senses 
are related (such as the physical object and the contents sense of the word book) are more frequent. 
Unfortunately, zeugma and non-crossed readings do not provide reliable tests in these cases; nor 
is the previous explanation applicable to them.
Another class of examples which cannot be explained the way sketched above involve the 
repetition of the ambiguous word form, such as (12) and (13).
(12) John banked the money and then he banked the plane.
(13) John had a file and Bill had a file.
(12) is zeugmatic, though the effect is not as pronounced as in (11). Also the crossed readings of
(13) are at least strongly dispreferred in spite of there being a possible logical form for them.
9.3.2 The case of constructional polysemy
It can be argued that in many cases when senses are related, multiple aspects of a word's meaning 
should be encoded in a single entry (see e.g. Copestake and Briscoe (1995)). This is referred to as 
constructional polysemy (in contrast to sense extension, where the senses are related but have distinct 
lexical entries, see Copestake and Briscoe (1995)). Without assuming a single lexical entry, it would 
be very difficult to account for sentences like those in (14), where the two senses of the word book 
are involved simultaneously.
(14) a. The books on the top shelf are about syntax.
b. That thesis has thousands of pages and is quite unreadable.
On the other hand, sentences featuring the word book can also be zeugmatic, as in example (15).
(15) That thesis is orange and unreadable.
Moreover, sentence (16) cannot refor to a situation where Kim wrote and sold two novels to a 
publishing house while Sandy sold two books in a shop as a saleswoman, that is a crossed reading 
is not available.
(16) Kim and Sandy both sold two books.
The account of zeugma and the unavailability of crossed readings in Section 9.3.1 depended on 
there not being a lexical entry which is general between the senses involved. The grammaticality 
of ((14)a,b), on the other hand, indicates that there must be such an entry. In fact, the zeugmatic 
effects and non-crossed readings can be explained on pragmatic grounds even when there is a single 
lexical entry.
Note that the non-zeugmatic (14-b) basically differs from the zeugmatic (15) only in that in the 
latter the predicate orange is used instead of the predicate has thousands of pages. The two related 
senses thus either yield a zeugma or not, depending on the particular assertions being made. 
Moreover, the zeugmatic effect depends also on how those assertions are presented. In contrast to 
(15), the sentence (17), in which orange is not used predicatively, is perfectly acceptable.
(17) That orange thesis is unreadable.
It seems that whether coordinating constituents is zeugmatic or not does not only depend on 
whether the lexical structure permits co-predication on different aspects of thesis, but also on how 
the assertions rhetorically link together, to contribute to the coherence of discourse. In (14-b) the
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rhetorical link is strong since the size of books is clearly relevant to their readability so a causal 
link is inferrable between the two, and the strong rhetorical link makes the discourse coherent, in 
the case of (15) on the other hand, the discourse is incoherent since the colour of the cover of a 
book is not relevant to its readability. In (17) there is no conjunction of predicates, so there is no 
need to find a rhetorical link.
9.4 Pragmatic reasoning
As we have seen in the previous section, in the case of single lexical entries zeugmatic effects are 
explainable by the lack of coherence of discourse. We now sketch a model of pragmatic reasoning 
that makes possible to define how the coherence of discourse affects word interpretation.
9.4.1 Rhetorical relations
As it was mentioned, the coherence of discourse is to a great degree determined by the rhetorical 
relations that link the assertions that make up the text. Some of the relations are listed in Table 9.1.
Relation Example
Narration Max stood up. John greeted him.
Result John pushed Max. Max fell.
Elaboration Max painted a picture. He used oils.
Contrast Max has black hair, but Mary has brown hair.
Parallel Max has black hair, and Mary has black hair too.
Table 9.1: Rhetorical relations
The different rhetorical relations impose different constraints on the semantics of the assertions 
they link together. These constraints are summarised in Table 9.2.
Relation coherence constraints
Narration
Result
Elaboration
Contrast
Parallel
entails that order of events = temporal order 
requires causal relation between events 
entails that the event elaborated is the topic 
partial structural isomorphism required 
partial structural isomorphism required
requires distinct common topic
subtype relation between events 
contrasting theme required 
common theme required
Table 9.2: Coherence constraints on rhetorical relations
9.4.2 Interpretation Constraint and Weak Coherence
Lexical sense disambiguation in a discourse context is subject to a constraint that captures the fact 
that people try not to infer propositions that lead to weakly coherent or incoherent discourse. Specifically, 
interpretations of words that give discourses which are only weakly coherent or incoherent are 
avoided. We are going to term this constraint the Interpretation Constraint.
Many of the the rhetorical relations listed in Table 9.2 require that a topic be identified. In most 
of the zeugmatic cases, the weak coherence of discourse follows from the fact that the topic of 
discourse that can be identified is strange. A strange topic results in weak discourse coherence if 
no explanation for that being the topic of conversion can be nonmonotonically deduced from the 
interpreter's real world knowledge and the information gathered in the course of the discourse.2
2The formal pragmatic theory assumed in Lascarides, Copestake, and Briscoe (1996) is dice (Discourse in Common- 
sense Entailment). The non-monotonic logic DICE is based on is Asher and Morreau's Commonsense Entailment (CE). 
DICE and CE are not described here, see Lascarides, Copestake, and Briscoe (1996), Lascarides and Asher (1991) and Asher 
and Morreau (1991) for details.
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9.5 More on how the tests work
9.5.1 Another case of constructional polysemy
In Section 9.3.2, the case of the word book was discussed, which we assumed to have a single 
lexical entry that encodes the physical object and the information container senses of the word simul­
taneously. Another type of constructional polysemy is involved in the case of the word brush in 
the sentences in (18).
(18) a. Nylon bristles and plastic handles are used to make cheap brushes.
b. Rembrandt used a brush and so did our janitor.
c. Rembrandt and our janitor used a brush.
The fact that (18-a) is a perfect sentence indicates that there is a vague sense of brush the telic 
('purpose') attribute of which is underspecified (e.g. Pustejovsky (1991)). On the other hand, 
(18-b) and (18-c) are zeugmatic. The MLE account of zeugma and the unavailability of crossed 
readings in Section 9.3.1 cannot explain zeugma in this case, because there is only one logical form 
for the zeugmatic sentences. An alternative account can be formulated that explains zeugma again 
on pragmatic grounds. The explanation is based on the way pragmatics affects interpretations. 
Pragmatic inference involves default reasoning based on real world knowledge and assumptions 
about the speaker's intentions. (19-a) is thus interpreted as Rembrandt used a paint brush by default, 
while (19-b) as the janitor used a cleaning brush. Pragmatic reasoning is needed in the case of (18-b) 
and (18-c), because the word brush is the object of the very general verb use in those sentences, so 
its telic attribute must be specified in order to get an interpretation for the sentences that is not 
completely devoid of meaning.
Sentence (18-c) is equivalent to the conjunction of (19-a) and (19-b), since applying the gener­
alized quantifiers AQ3a;(Rembrandt(a;) A Q(x)) and AQ3z(janitor(x) A Q(x)) of the coordinate NP 
to the meaning of the predicate Az(used_a_brush(x)) yields the same conjunctive formula as the 
sequence of (19-a) and (19-b).
(19) a. Rembrandt used a brush, 
b. Our janitor used a brush.
In order to make the sequence of (19-a) and (19-b) coherent, a rhetorical link that could connect 
the two sentences must be found. In the case of (19-a) and (19-b), the candidate link would be 
the Parallel relation. The sequence of (19-a) and (19-b) is by default interpreted as (20). Thus the 
coherence of Parallel must be checked in (20).
(20) Rembrandt used a paint brush. Our janitor used a cleaning brush.
But, although it is logically consistent, (20) is at best weakly coherent. Parallel requires a common 
theme. The best theme we could find in this case could be glossed as people doing something with 
a brush. This is not a very good theme, and strong coherence would require that an explanation 
can be deduced from the information gathered in the course of the discourse why the speaker 
would want to talk about people using brushes for very different activities. Context could be 
such that it would make possible such a deduction, but we assume that (18-c) is not uttered in 
such a context. Since the word interpretations brush —> paint brush and brush —> cleaning brush 
result in weak coherence, one or both of these interpretations are invalidated by the Interpretation 
Constraint, which states that such interpretations must be avoided. But the interpreter cannot 
decide which interpreatation to drop. So although (18-c) is only pragmatically ambiguous, this 
ambiguity cannot be resolved and this produces the zeugmatic effect.
9.5.2 Incremental processing
It is established that interpretation of language proceeds incrementally (e.g. Marslen-Wilson and 
Welsh (1978), Frazier (1979), Crain and Steedman (1985)). The interpreter calculates the seman­
tic content and the pragmatic implicature as soon as enough information is available to make an 
initial decision. This is a necessary strategy, because of limitations of memory, the utility of rapid
comprehension and so forth. But this sometimes makes reinterpretation necessary which leads to
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zeugma. In the case of (18-b) the pragmatic implicatures of Rembrandt used a brush are calculated 
before beginning to parse and so did our janitor. This includes specializing brush to paint brush, 
which must be retracted when processing and so did our janitor, for the same reason as in the case 
of (18-c) and the same unresolvable conflict occurs. The zeugmatic effect is more pronounced in 
(18-b) as in the case of (18-c), because it is amplified by the enforced reinterpretation. In the case 
of (6 ), here repeated as (2 1 ), the zeugmatic effect is caused exclusively by reinterpretation.
(21) I tried to take the plane to Chicago, but it was too heavy.
9.5.3 Zeugma and non-crossed readings with word repetition
Zeugma is created in the case of (22), which features the polysemuous word bank having multiple 
lexical entries, by the need of reinterpretation and weak coherence.
(22) John banked the money and then he banked the plane.
The similarity in the syntactic structure and the word forms implies a Parallel relation (besides 
Narration) between the propositions in (22). But as the two occurences of banked are pragmatically 
disambiguated (the meanings of the object arguments provide the clue for the disambiguation), 
the meaning of the sentence amounts to (23).
(23) John deposited the money. He turned the plane.
(23) is at best weakly coherent. There is in fact no Parallel and not even an acceptable common topic 
for Narration can be found. So the interpretations of banked are blocked again by the Interpretation 
Constraint. Moreover, due to incremental processing, the reinterpretation of the word bank is 
forced when processing the second part of the sentence. (24) is zeugmatic for exactly the same 
reason.
(24) Rembrandt used a brush and our janitor used a brush.
9.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed what ambiguity and vagueness are, and we reviewed some tests that 
can be used to decide whether an utterance or a lexical item is ambiguous or vague. The tests that 
were proposed for lexical ambiguity are the absence of crossed readings and zeugma. We have 
seen how these tests work, and that they have to be used with caution in the case of words that 
feature constructional polysemy. In the case of such words the zeugmatic effects and the absence of 
crossed readings are exclusively created during the disambiguation process involving pragmatic 
reasoning by the lack or weakness of coherence in the discourse.
In the case of words with multiple lexical entries, pragmatic reasoning also plays a role in the 
creation of zeugma, but unless word repetition is involved, it is not weak coherence that results in 
zeugma but the fact that a single occurence of a word cannot have two unrelated interpretations. 
The zeugmatic effect is often amplified (and in some cases exclusively caused) by the fact that due 
to incremental processing, reinterpretation is enforced at some point of processing the sentence. 
Finally, Table 9.3 summarizes the examples, their interpretations and the mechanisms involved.
T U
entry type word example effect occurence mechanism
MLE“ file John and Bill each have a file. “ NCR5 single no crossed logical form
MLE bank Bank robbers and dam busters blow up banks. zeugma single multiple pragmatic interpretations of a single word are 
impossible
MLE file John has a file and Bill does too. NCR anaphor weak coherence and the need for reinterpretation ex­
clude crossed readings
MLE file John has a file and Bill has a file. NCR repeated weak coherence and the need for reinterpretation ex­
clude crossed readings
MLE take I tried to take the plane to Chicago, but it was too heavy. zeugma single reinterpretation is enforced
SLE/MA1 book The books on the top shelf are about syntax. no zeugma single one predicate is attributive, thus there is no rhetorical 
linking
SLE/MA book Kim and Sandy both sold two books. NCR single weak coherence excludes crossed readings
SLE/MA thesis That thesis has thousands of pages and is quite unreadable. no zeugma single strong coherence (causal link)
SLE/MA thesis That thesis is orange and is quite unreadable. zeugma single weak coherence (strange topic for Parallel)
SLE/VF1* teacher Teachers may take maternity or paternity leave. no zeugma single strong coherence (world knowledge)
SLE/VF teacher John and Bill both like their teachers. vagueness/CR‘ single vague feature may remain vague (disambiguation not 
needed for interpretation)
SLE/VF brush Nylon bristles and plastic handles are used to make cheap brushes. vagueness single vague feature may remain vague
SLE/VF brush Rembrandt and our janitor used a brush. zeugma single weak coherence blocks disambiguation of vague feature
SLE/VF brush Rembrandt used a brush and so did our janitor. zeugma anaphor reinterpretation and weak coherence
SLE/VF brush 1 Rembrandt used a brush and our janitor used a brush. zeugma repeated reinterpretation and weak coherence
“multiple lexical entries
'’non-crossed readings
‘single lexical entry with multiple aspects
^single lexical entry with vague (underspecified) feature
‘crossed reading
Table 9.3: Summary of examples
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Chapter 10
Metonymy
This chapter mainly focuses on a phenomenon called constructional polysemy. This kind of poly­
semy called constructional because the items involved in it are disambiguated on the phrase level 
(i.e., when put into a construction). The type of metonymy which, at the same time, qualifies as 
constructional polysemy is called logical metonymy.
The first section gives the reader a general idea of what we call logical metonymy and explains 
whether and what kind of a lexical semantic treatment of the phenomena is necessary.
The second section begins with a survey of lexical decomposition and the conception of Gen­
erative Lexicon Theory (Pustejovsky (1995; Pustejovsky (1996b; Pustejovsky and Boguraev (1995)) 
about it. One of the central issues in GL is the treatment of constructional polysemy, the formal 
treatment of which is discussed afterwards.
The third chapter discusses to what extent and in what ways metonymic constructions are 
constrained in the lexicon.
The chapter is concluded with an exposition of further issues related to constructional poly­
semy and logical metonymy.
10.1 Logical metonymy as constructional polysemy
10.1.1 Logical metonymy and the lexicon
Metonymy is essentially a figure of speech, i.e., a rhetorical rather than linguistic device. How­
ever, there is one type of metonymy, called logical metonymy, which seems more linguistically 
anchored than the general case. We will only deal with this type in what follows.
The verb phrases in (1) are well known examples of logical metonymy.
(1 ) a. finish the book/beer/sandwich/cigarette
b. begin the book/beer/sandwich/cigarette
c. enjoy the book/beer/sandwich/cigarette
d. want a book/beer/sandwich/cigarette
Logical metonymy is not restricted to verb + direct object structures.
(2) a. The book took two days.
b. The movie annoyed me a lot.
c. During my hourly cigarette, someone came to me.
Observe that, for instance, (1-a) can be paraphrased as "finished reading the book" in which the 
verb's argument is of semantic type event which is not normally the type associated with book.
The question immediately arises whether this is a pragmatic or lexical problem. After all, 
knowing in what ways one's finishing a book differs from one's finishing a beer is nothing more 
than knowing in what ways a book differs from a beer, in particular what one normally does to 
them. The use of these constructions, however, is much more restricted than what simply the 
possibility of drawing colloquial inferences based on chunks of world knowledge would alone 
justify. Note also that, though the natural interpretation of logical metonymies can be overridden
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given strong contextual information (see (3)) (see Copestake and Briscoe (1995) for a discussion), 
these constructions doubtlessly have default and conventionalized readings (see Viegas (1995) on 
lexicalisations).
(3) a. My goat enjoyed the book.
b. Book-sellers prefer postcards around Christmas.
An adequate explanation of this phenomenon therefore is only feasible if one imagines the distinc­
tions are a result of the different lexical (semantic) features of the items involved. Therefore GL, in 
accordance with many other theories, chooses to give an account of logical metonymy — at least 
partly — within the lexicon.
10.1.2 Metonymy is not verbal polysemy
Note that in order to be able to draw the desired inferences from the various uses of say finish, 
one may introduce meaning postulates stating, for instance, that every time you finish a book, it 
is implied that you f in i s h  read ing  i t .  This, however, is not necessarily true, as in an appro­
priate context finish the book can fairly mean f in i s h  w rit in g  the  book, which leads to either 
exclusively disjunctive meaning postulates or to the explicit introduction of two senses for finish.
One could choose the latter solution anyway without using meaning postulates. This is what 
traditional sense enumeration lexicons do when they enumerate the possible senses of finish, one 
of which would be f in i s h  read ing  and which selects for an argument denoting "something 
that one usually reads".
Even though sense enumeration leads to an immense proliferation of lexical entries, it is still 
unable to cover each sense, given the very general and creative use of metonymic constructions.
An even more serious problem with sense enumeration of the verb senses is that the polyse- 
mous behavior is independent of the actual verb. The default interpretations of the phrases below 
are a uniform indication that the resolution of the elliptical metonymic link is determined by the 
argument, and often remains constant with different verbs.
(4) a. finish/begin/enjoy/want a book
b. finish/begin/enjoy/want a sandwich
Note that in (4-a), the missing link is reading, in that it is really reading the book that one finishes, 
begins, enjoys or wants. Enumeration of verbal lexical entries corresponding to different phrasal 
senses misses this generalization. (See Pustejovsky (1995, chapter 4) for further discussion.)
10.1.3 Metnonymy is not nominal polysemy
Based on the above observations, one could alternatively say that book is metonymically inter­
preted as read in g  th e  book. If again we wish to enumerate the metonymic senses of words, 
the most serious problem is that there will be a symmetry between the available senses in the lex­
icon. As a matter of fact, a very strong asymmetry is apparent between a word's basic or primary 
sense and its metonymic interpretations. This intuitively very clear statement is confirmed by the 
fact that the use of metonymic senses is much more restricted than that of basic senses in contexts 
where the semantic type would otherwise be adequate; (see section 10.3 for a discussion).
The enumeration of the various senses is also problematic in as much as it is hard to find a 
conceptual or formal difference between the treatment of contrastively ambiguous words (words 
with unrelated multiple meanings, eg. bank i n s t i t u t i o n  or mount of e a r th )  and construc­
tionally polysemous ones (Pustejovsky (1995, chapter 2)).
Their distinctness, however, is strongly suggested by the fact that in the case of constructional 
polysemy one and the same lexical item can be metonymically interpreted with respect to one 
predicate while having its original sense with respect to the other. In other words, the different 
senses (see (5)) can be copredicated. (See Copestake and Briscoe (1995) and section 10.3 and 10.4 
for more about copredication.)
(5) a. Sally finished and threw away her book.
b. Orsi began the sandwich but then dropped it.
1 0.2. GENERATIVE LEXICON THEORY AND METONYMIES 125
This is even more apparent in (6 ). Logical metonymy is not restricted to verb phrases at all, 
modifiers + noun phrases also exhibit this phenomenon.
(6 ) a. fast typist/car/runner/motor-way/coffee 
b. long record/book/dinner/road/trip/film
What was said about verb phrases carries on to this kind of construction (Boullion and Viegas 
(1994)), with the adjective being the semantic head like the verb in Verb Phrases. Observe here 
that the different senses of modification involve a metonymic interpretation though the whole 
Noun Phrase retain the semantic type of the Noun's primary sense, eg. a fast typist is t y p i s t  
who (usually ) types fa s t.
This urges one to conclude that handling logical metonymy with sense enumeration of either 
the semantically active elements or the arguments would be an approach on the wrong track. 
Instead one should provide an account in which the specific senses only emerge in constructions. 
The lexical item itself is represented in an underspecified manner, giving rise to a metonymic 
interpretation in the right context. Obviously as one and the same lexical item can be involved in 
several constructions at the same time, it may contribute to the phrase- or sentence-level meaning 
in diverse ways, ie. with different senses.
10.2 Generative Lexicon Theory and Metonymies
Generative Lexicon Theory (GL) (Pustejovsky (1995; Pustejovsky (1996b; Pustejovsky and Bogu- 
raev (1993)) provides a theory and representational formalism which integrates lexical decom­
position and underspecification as well as provides formal devices to treat constructional sense 
specification. These are explained in detail in this section. (See Pustejovsky (1995) for detailed ex­
position, Pustejovsky (1996b) for a quick introduction and J. Fodor (1997) for a critical discussion 
and T. Briscoe and Copestake (1993) for more formal issues.)
10.2.1 Lexical decomposition
According to many (Boguraev and Pustejovsky (1990; Boguraev and Pustejovsky (1994; Puste­
jovsky and Boguraev (1993; A. Copestake and de Paiva (1993; Anick and Bergler (1992)) working 
on natural language lexicology, one of the most pressing problems of semantics — namely the 
compositional interpretation of sentences — defies any kind of solution without lexical decom­
position. Lexical decomposition here is meant to suggest that in an ideal lexicon much more in­
formation about a word's meaning has to be contained than is the simplistic assumption in many 
theories (e.g., syntactic or semantic type information).
It can immediately be recognized that even if one wishes to capture some generalizations on se- 
lectional restrictions, one usually turns to features which are semi-syntactic in the sense that in a lot 
of cases they cannot be read off the unanalysed semantic characterization of the item in question. 
These features, though, in the majority of cases, very strongly related to semantic properties of the 
item. A plausible relation between semantic and selectional features even in straightforward cases 
is, however, only feasible with the introduction of meaning postulates, since non-decomposed 
(atomic) meanings assigned to lexical items deny us the chance of drawing inferences from them. 
In conclusion if one wants to be able to build semantic classes, — the semantic and syntactic be­
havior of the members of which is more similar than one could afford to miss a generalization, — 
one has to rely on a plausible and restricted method of decomposition, ie. decompose meanings 
into a small and manageable set of primitives.
10.2.2 Generative Lexicon Theory
The main objective of GL is to give an account of the different kinds of polysemies as well as to 
attempt at explaining the creative use of words in context. GL argues that by developing an on- 
tologically plausible and formally rather restrictive framework of lexical semantic representation, 
operations of which correspond to legitime semantic operations such as word disambiguation in 
constructions or metonymic interpretation, one could also get closer to an explanation of various 
aspects of syntactic behavior on grounds of well-motivated semantic classes.
126 LEXICAL SEMANTICS: METONYMY
Another very important goal is to establish clearly the notion of semantic well-formedness. 
This would stand to provide for a clear-cut characterization of possible word meanings. It is, how­
ever, very hard to limit an adequate domain for semantic well-formedness, as the highly flexible 
structure of discourse meaning is best thought to be composed from the relatively independent in­
terpretations of various semantic levels including lexical, discourse or temporal structure. Given 
this view it is obvious that lexical semantic representation is only one of the many levels which are 
at play in determining discourse interpretation.
In GL the actual implementation of lexical decomposition is driven by the intuition that natural 
language semantics is the image of nonlinguistic conceptual principles. This is to say that in many 
cases the dimensions of decomposition rhyme with the dimensions of our cognitive operations. 
(For a detailed discussion of a semantic theory built upon this principle see 8 .) The latter are 
said to be well approximated by Aristotle's Modes of Explanation (Moravcsik (1975)), which in 
turn serves as an ontological basis for Pustejovsky's qualia structure discussed in detail in section
10.2.3 (see Pustejovsky (1995, chapter 5,6)).
10.2.3 Qualia structure
GL takes the view that the semantic properties of lexical items can be defined with the help of a 
small set of "basic substances" and some universal features of these (Pustejovsky and Boguraev 
(1993; Pustejovsky (1995)). A rather workable implementation of the latter in GL is qualia struc­
ture that is inspired by and named after the Aristotelian causal categories.
Dimensions of metonymic interpretation
One of the most straightforward advantages of lexical decomposition along the categories of qualia 
structure is that it makes it possible to capture some generalizations on the nature of metonymies. 
Consider again some of the examples in (1) repeated here as (7) for convenience.
(7) a. finish the book (reading)
b. begin the beer (drinking)
c. enjoy the sandwich (eating)
d. want a cigarette (smoking)
(8) a. good knife (good for cutting)
b. bright bulb (shining brightly)
c. fast motor-way (can drive fast on it)
d. long record (playing it takes long time)
The events in brackets are the events of the most likely metonymic interpretations of the phrases. 
We argued earlier that these events are very strongly determined by the arguments' semantics. If 
one doubts that they are just arbitrary events associated with each nominal object that are available 
in the metonymy, one has to find in what ways the respective relations between the events and 
the objects are similar. Well, in (7), it is apparent that the events name the most common event 
associated with the object, ie. its usual purpose. Similarly in the examples of (8 ), the relevant 
event linking the adjective to the modified noun is the event associated with the usual purpose of 
the object.
In the examples in (9), we encounter a different dimension of metonymy. Here, the linking 
event can be the process that is responsible for the creation of the object or contributed to the 
coming into being of the nominal in question.
(9) a. finish the dinner (cooking)
b. forget the letter (to write)
c. begin a new film (making)
d. regret an article (writing)
In general then we might say that certain aspects of meaning are semantically relevant properties 
that, in order to capture generalizations on the possible dimensions of metonymic interpretation, 
have to be included in the lexicon as lexical features.
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In GL, it is assumed that these dimensions are relevant in the case of each and every lexical 
entry and qualia structure is thought to be a necessary component of the lexical representation of 
words. It is obviously not meant by this that a lexical entry has to have a fully specified value 
for each and every qualia attribute, only that these are appropriate features for all lexical items — 
though probably with a slightly diverse semantics for individual- or event-denoting words.
In the following, we give the four essential aspects of meaning assumed in GL and summarize 
what they are meant to describe (Pustejovsky (1995,5.4)).
-  CONSTITUTIVE: the relation  b etw een  an object and its con stitu en t parts
-  FORMAL: that w h ich  d istin g u ish es it w ith in  a larger d o m a in
-  T e liC: its p u rp o se  an d  function
-  AGENTIVE: factors in v o lv e d  in its orig in  or "bringing it about".
In (10), you see the tentative representation of the qualia structure for novel in an Attribute- 
Value Structure (AVS) representation. (See T. Briscoe and Copestake (1993) for representational
issues.)
novel
Constitutive narrative
(10) Formal book
Telic reading
A gentive w ritin g
Further reading on the application of qualia
It is thoroughly reported in Johnston and Busa (1996) that generalizations about the usual interpre­
tation of a great deal of nominal compounds is very easily captured with a reasonable application 
of qualia roles.
In Busa (1996b) the semantics of agentive nominals is based on GL's conception of qualia struc­
ture.
Pustejovsky (1996b) describes, among many other things, in what ways qualia roles can help 
in explaining privative metonymic reconstruction of the arguments of verbs like risk.
In GL, qualia structure is not restricted to the representation of nominals (Pustejovsky and An- 
ick (1988; Busa (1996a),Busa (1996b)) but also relevant in the case of verbal or adjectival entries. The 
dual behavior of complex events, for instance, also urges one to analyze transitions as involving 
a process that is followed by a resulting state. These two events are dimensions of the predicate's 
meaning and are directly encoded as qualia values of the FORMAL and AGENTIVE aattributes, re­
spectively as argued in Pustejovsky (1995, chapter 9). (See also Pustejovsky (1988), Pustejovsky 
(1991), Pustejovsky and Boullion (1995), Pustejovsky and Busa (1995) for more on events in GL).
In (Pustejovsky, 1995, 10.2), Pustejovsky argues that the distinction between stage-level and 
individual-level predicates is best explained with a difference in the qualia structure of predicates 
rather than not an event type distinction.
10.2.4 Problems with qualia
Metaphysics and the lexicon
The apparently plausible inventory of qualia roles as well as their formal treatment, though it 
seems convincing, is not without problems. As it is only our intuition about meaning that restricts 
what can and what can not be the qualia role of a given item, the restrictedness of the theory is 
highly questionable. Only when one can give a foolproof definition of what it means to be the 
TELIC role of a word, can GL be viable. Obviously a correct characterization can only be achieved 
if we have the intuitive metaphysical categories encoded in the structure of the world model used 
to interpret representational formalisms of our semantics. Until that time GL can only attain ex­
planatory adequacy with respect to a rather tentative model of our socio-culturally determined
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naive metaphysics. (See Pustejovsky (1995a), Copestake and Briscoe (1995), Busa (1996a) for fur­
ther discussion.)
Problems, however, already occur if one chooses to ignore the above considerations and is 
happy with relying on one's intuitions.
Qualia and flexibility
According to an intuitive interpretation of the TELIC qualia role, the usual purpose of perfume 
is to make its wearer smell better. The metonymic construction enjoy the perfume can hardly be 
properly interpreted with assuming that enjoy selects the TELIC role of its argument. Rather some 
default event of perception (see section (30)) is understood to fill in the interpretational gap in the 
construction. This is also the case with a lot of arguments whose semantic type clearly have a 
proper TELIC role at least in commonsense metaphysics (see (11)).
(11) a. *enjoy the key = enjoy opening the door with it
b. *enjoy the chair = enjoy sitting on it
c. ’"enjoy the window = enjoy opening it
In fact, it is rather a challenge to figure out whether the Aristotelian categories are too rigid or 
not fine grained enough to enable the linguist to give a purely semantic account of metonymy or 
the latter is just out of the question and one always has to turn to blind listing of unexplainable 
or exceptional use. In section 10.3, we attempt at characterizing some of the very intricate lexical 
constraints on out-of-context metonymic interpretation mainly by providing examples.
10.2.5 Means of Semantic Composition
As we saw in the previous section, the regularities of an elliptical structure such as a logical 
metonymy can be captured if one allows for the semantic argument in the compositional struc­
ture to influence the sense of the phrase. This view necessarily implies the the need to reject the 
traditional "active functor /  passive argument" view on composition. In order to allow for this 
kind of semantic composition, one has to provide an alternative formal treatment of new com­
positional rules that, however, should be fairly general and restricted for the calculus to attain 
explanatory adequacy while at the same time should preserve compositionality.
Such means of composition are achieved through some generative devices in GL. The reason 
for this somewhat clumsy name lies in the idea that generative devices — like lexical rules in other 
theories — can be thought to expand the lexicon by "productively" generating the available senses 
out of underspecified lexical entries. These generative devices include type coercion and selective 
binding among others not discussed here. (See also section 10.4.2. We refer the interested reader 
to Pustejovsky (1995, chapter 7).)
As shown below in section 10.3, some lexical items seem to be sensitive to whether their argu­
ment is a "generated" or an "original" sense. Though one can think of the operations of generative 
devices as productive, — since generated elements are not fully interchangeable with words of the 
same type — one has to keep track of how the senses came into being. For this reason as well as 
because the formal status of generative devices within the lexicon is not sufficiently clarified any­
way, we can fairly assume that these are really compositional operations the availability of which 
can in some sense be restricted by the semantic head.
Type coercion (Godard and Jayez (1993)) stands for the situation in which the predicate coerces 
its argument into the semantic type required when the former would otherwise fail to combine 
with the argument's root type. This type-mismatch resolution can be thought of as a special se­
mantic operation in the course of which the predicate functor applies not to the root type of the 
argument but to a special function of the root, say a qualia value.
Interestingly a number of logical metonymies can be explained as type coercions.
(12) a.
b.
(13) a.
b.
enjoy the novel = enjoyed reading the novel (TELIC) 
enjoy the novel = enjoyed writing the novel (AGENTIVE)
finish the beer = finish drinking the beer (TELIC) 
want a cigarette = want to smoke a cigarette (TELIC)
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As the name coercion suggests type coercion is a marked operation. Its alternative, when the se­
mantic head is applied to the argument's root type (primary sense), reduces to a very straightfor­
ward function application, an unmarked operation. This parallels the markedness properties of 
these constructions as well as the asymmetry mirrored in the feature structure representation.
The operation of se le c t iv e  b in d in g  strongly resembles type coercion with the difference that 
here the head semantic type gets the coerced interpretation in the context of a modofier. In the case 
of fast typist the head semantic type is a ty p i s t ,  but the modification translates as f a s t  typ ing .
10.3 Productivity of metonymies
It is obvious that the unrestricted use of type coercion together with lexical items having a richly 
specified qualia structure leads to a serious degree of overgeneration. In this section we briefly 
survey the constraints on qualia coercion (Pustejovsky (1993; Pustejovsky (1995c)).
10.3.1 Passive and active selection
The grammatically of coercive constructions is not simply the function of the selectional restric­
tions of the coerced event predicate. It is not the case in the f i n i s h  read in g  sense ot finish that 
the verb's selectional criteria parallel those of read as the below example illustrates, ie. you can not 
finish everything you can read.
(14) a. read the lines/advertisement/instructions/ 
b. ??finish the lines/advertisement/instructions/
The generative devices are supposed to explain in a way the seeming polysemies of lexical items 
which dissolve in a more or less predictable way when in composition. Allowing this way of com­
position might well exempt us from having to specify a potentially infinite number of senses for 
the lexical items. Coercion, however, is really not an unrestricted operation. The view is taken in 
GL that the coercion operations available in a composition are lexically restricted in the predicates' 
representation. That the applicability of the specific coercion operations is idiosyncratically speci­
fied in the case of a particular predicate is thought to be motivated by the contrast between a ctiv e -  
and p a ss iv e  s e le c tio n  p red ica tes . The next example show the diverse coercive behavior of some 
verbal predicates.
(15) a. finish/*stop a book 
b. begin/*start a book
10.3.2 Qualia selection
Note that in most cases there can be several patterns of coercion associated with a predicate. The 
choice is determined by the selectional restrictions imposed on the thematic argument. Cases arise, 
however, when there are special constraints on the accessibility of a particular quale value. This 
refers to situations where a predicate known to be able to coerce its argument refuses to coerce 
along a certain qualia path though the thematic argument would be of the appropriate type. This 
can be called q u a lia  s e le c tio n , which refers to the property of the predicate in that it selects for 
particular qualia roles to bind. The adjective long, for instance, selects clearly for TELIC and does 
not coerce the other qualia values in its coercive sense.
(16) a. long book/record = it takes long to read it/listen to it (TELIC) 
b. hong book/record = it takes long to write it/record it (TELIC)
10.3.3 Further idiosyncrasies
The problem is that qualia selection is not argument-insensitive. This is to say, — as the examples 
in (17) and (18) show, — that a normally accessible qualia value (b) is not available for semantic 
binding (a) for a predicate that is normally coercive with respect to a certain qualia role (c).
(17) a. *?enjoy the chair = enjoyed sitting on the chair
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(18)
b. use the chair = sit on the chair
c. enjoy the movie
a. “begin the road = begin driving on the road
b. use the road = drive on the road
c. begin the book
Observe that the following example show how utterly problematic it is to assume that restrictions 
on logical metonymies derive merely from the selectional properties of the active predicate and 
semantic properties of the argument.
(19) a. ?“fast liquid
b. fast water
c. fast beer
Note that fast water is best interpreted as water that runs (flows) fast, the metonymic linking event 
being a property (a quale value, eg. FORMAL) that is very likely to be shared by the supertype 
liquid. Still the semantic binding of this qualia value is impossible for one and the same (strongly 
coercive) adjective fast. This would imply that active and passive selection is not only dependent 
on the arguments semantic properties but might have to refer to arbitrary individual types — or 
even worse: to arbitrary individual lexical items.
10.4 Non standard composition in other constructions
In this section we give further examples of contextual disambiguation of certain polysemies. Given 
a more flexible theory of lexical decomposition, similar kinds of non-standard compositional de­
vices are also likely to explain these instances of constructional polysemy.
10.4.1 Non-qualia coercion: arbitrary metonymies?
The case of Remember
The different patterns for remember taking Verb Phrase or clause arguments clearly exhibit at least 
three different senses (non-factive (nonF), factive (F) and embedded question (EQ)).
(20) a. I will remember to phone you. (F)
b. I remember phoning you. (nonF)
c. I don't remember what the name of his father was. (EQ)
As a matter of fact, remember licenses an NP as an argument. One should note that a very special 
type of NP coercion is available in the case of the embedded question reading. Here, the explicit 
reconstruction of an embedded question from the NP — though not very easy — is almost unam­
biguous but still shows a striking diversity across different NP types.
(21) a. remember the book/piece/house/coffee = remember what it is like/is about (EQ1) 
b. remember the name/address/vocation/number = remember what it is (EQ2)
Interestingly, if the NP's denotation is an event the interpretation is ambiguous between the non- 
factive and the factive reading:
(22) You always make me remember the phone-call/party. (nonF[E]/F[Ej)
The next example shows that a usual coercive interpretation, that is qualia value coercion, is 
not available for remember with an NP argument.
(23) a. *?remember the book = remember to read/write the book (nonF) 
b. “remember the book = remember reading/writing the book (F)
Examples (23-a) and (23-b) show that either in a non-factive or in a factive sense remember is reluc­
tant to coerce its argument's qualia roles.
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R eferen ce  transfer
One of the commonest types of classical rhetorical metonymy, namely, when 'the name of some­
thing is used instead of the name of something else', is also the least determined lexically. In 
particular, it is a type of non-qualia coercion. Nunberg (1995) observes that metonymy is not only 
possible with contentful words, but also with pronouns:
(24) a. This is parked out back, (pointing to the keys of a car) 
b. Iam parked out back.
This phenomenon can be called re feren ce  transfer. It seems as if the pronoun referred to a car in 
(24-a), as shown by co-ordination tests:
(25) a. This is parked out back and does not want to start. 
b. #This is parked out back and fits only the left door.
On the other hand, the pronoun in (24-b) seems to refer to the speaker:
(26) a. I am parked out back and have been waiting for halfan hour. 
b. #1 am parked out back and may not start.
We will not dwell on the question what makes it possible for the pronoun this in (24-a) to refer to 
the car rather than the key; Nunberg calls this a d eferred  in d e x ic a l re feren ce , whereby a demon­
strative or indexical expression refers to an entity that stands in a salient relationship to the actual 
object. One way of telling the two types of metonymies apart is that deferred indexical reference 
is incompatible with definite descriptions, whereas the type that we are concentrating on (i.e., the 
one in (24-b)) is not:
(27) a. #The key I'm holding is parked out back.
b. OKThe man with the cigar/Mr. McDowell/ ... is parked out back.
The phenomenon illustrated in (24-b) and (27-b) must be attributed to the reference of the 
p red ica te  park rather than the noun phrase subject (I, the man with the cigar etc.) or the construction 
in which they occur. This is why Nunberg calls this phenomenon p red ica te  tran sfer. We have 
seen one argument to this effect, namely, that the reference of the noun phrase corresponds to its 
literal meaning (which is further supported by the fact that it does not matter whether the noun 
phrase is a pronoun, a description or a proper name). Another argument comes from the fact that 
the identity of the predicate matters. Consider (26-b): from the two co-ordinated predicates, park 
out back can co-occur with I in the sense 'my car is parked out back', whereas may not start cannot 
(at least not in the sense 'my car may not start'). Similarly, one cannot felicitously say #/ got broken 
yesterday in the sense 'my car got broken yesterday', and so on.
Nunberg's analysis also makes interesting predictions on predicate transfer. He formulates the 
following condition on predicate transfer:
(28) Let V and V  sets of properties that are related by a salient transfer function gt : V —> V . 
Then if F is a predicate that denotes a property P € V, there is also a predicate F', spelt 
like F, that denotes the property P', where P' — gt{P)-
Clearly, the type of predicate transfer that we have seen in (24-b) and (27-b) is much more special 
than this formulation, namely, it involves a salient function h from the bearers of property P to 
the bearers of property P' (e.g., a function from cars to their owners). The reason why Nunberg 
opts for this rather general formulation is that, in this way, the type of phenomenon at hand can 
be treated on a par with others, such as metaphors, where no such direct association between the 
bearers of the properties is involved. (For example, the association between the symbol U and the 
word cup does not involve a mapping from particular instances of U to particular cups.)
Now, what can be the relation between the functions gt and the functions hi There are two 
typical cases, according to Nunberg, namely:
(29) a. gt{P) = \yVx({h(x) = y) -» P(x)); 
b. gt(P) = Xy3x(h(x) = y A P(x)).
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If we replace P with T>e parked out back' and h with 'owner of [a car]', we get gt(P) meaning 'peo­
ple all cars of whom are parked out back' in (29-a), whereas 'people some car of whom is parked 
out back' in (29-b). Since we normally assume people have just one relevant car when something 
like (24-b) is uttered (hence, the two readings coincide), we have to pick different examples to see 
that predicate transfer is in general ambiguous between these two readings:
(30) a. We are in Chicago (says the accountant of his firm); 
b. I am in the Whitney (says the painter).
These examples are truly ambiguous between the universal and the existential readings, although 
(30-a) is preferably interpreted existentially because of the fact that, according to our knowledge 
of the world, it is not costumary to have all one's paintings in musea.
The interesting aspect of the above treatment based on predicate transfer is that it can be easily 
extended to other cases of metonymy, namely, the cases of systematic metonymy studied by Puste- 
jovsky (1995b). For example, finish a beer may be analysed as involving the transfer of the meaning 
of finish using a function h assigning quantities of beer to the event of their drinking. As a matter 
of course, the existence of such functions h may depend on the lexical content of the predicate as 
well as on the meaning of its relevant argument. This means that the approach based on predicate 
transfer is a possible formalization of, rather than an alternative to, Pustejovsky's solution. Still, it 
may have interesting consequences for semantic analysis.
Lexically fixed coercions
It seems, however, that remember can actually coerce its argument into an underspecified event type 
that denotes some sort of "bringing along". What is more interesting is that this is only available 
for the non-factive use.
(31) a. remember the book = remember to bring/have the book (nonF) 
b. ^remember the book = remember bringing/having the book (F)
Such underspecified event coercions (see (32)) are very common, though in most cases it is speci­
fied by an available qualia role of the same type.
Some orientation verbs (eg. (32-a)) generally coerce into an event of an underspecified percep­
tion type, which gets specified by the arguments properties, whereas some of them (eg. (32-b)) 
coerce into events of type possession. Aspectual verbs prefer events of type creation as their 
default coerced event type (eg. (32-c)).
(32) a. like the perfume/picture/play/music
b. want a key/bird/child/bike
c. finish the chair/sculpture/bike/road
The following phrases in (33) show how very strange the interpretation of metonymic construc­
tions is. Note that exclamation marks indicate that the a default coercive reading is unavailable or 
at least a coerced specific qualia value reading is preferred.
(33) a. enjoy this ?road/movie/book/cigarette/apple/beer
b. want a road/movie/!?book/!cigarette/!apple/!beer
c. finish/begin the road/!?movie/!book/!cigarette/!apple/!beer
Different senses?
The reason we called the default coerced sense of want coerced at all was simply because we 
wanted to generalize over its semantics in order to further reduce the set of different senses. This 
is also what we had to do with words enabling more than one type of true coercion. The tests, 
however, show that differnent types of true coercions go together in one coordinate argument of 
the verb while the verb's lexical default event coordinated with a true coerced argument triggers 
a zeugmatic effect in the case of luant:
(34) a. ?#I want a bike and a cigarette, (i.e. having/smoking) 
b. I want a beer and a cigarette.(i.e. drinking/smoking)
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Note also that the different NP-complemented uses of forget are also mutually exclusive in as much 
as they sound funny when coordinated:
(35) a. #1 forgot the keys and the house. (nonF + EQ1)
b. #1 forgot her name and my phonebook. (EQ2 + nonF)
c. #1 forgot the phone-call and therefore the party. (F[E] + nonF[E])
d. #1 forgot the birthday and the presents. (nonF[E] + nonF)
e. #1 forgot the journey and his name. (F[E] + EQ2)
f. #1 forgot the visit and the faces. (F[E] + EQ1)
10.4.2 Qualia non-coercion: light verb specification
There are actually other phenomena where qualia values seem to be important in the explanation 
of polysemous behavior. The following example shows that light verb use when combined with its 
NP argument, undergoes sense modification. Needless to say that these senses are disambiguated 
in the local context and systematically depend on the NP argument's semantic structure.
(36) a. use the knife/contact lenses/pills/chair/road 
b. have a shower/meal/party/class
We might say that here also semantic composition provides access to the argument NP's qualia 
value for semantic binding. Here the non-root (coerced) type will not be the argument of the 
uniform event-taking predicate, but actually replaces the underspecified predicate itself. As it 
needs distinct formal treatment — namely unification (specification) of a general event type with 
a qualia value of the argument —, in GL this phenomenon is treated with another distinct device 
called lig h t  verb  sp ec ifica tio n .
10.4.3 Non-qualia non-coercion: further instances of constructional polysemy
In what follows we shall show some examples of polysemous adjectives, which by virtue of clever 
decomposition allow treatment that shows the explanatory power of underspecification and non­
standard composition.
(37) a. noisy dog/room 
b. sad event/man
Note the different kinds of modifications in the case of the adjectives in (37). Totally diverse kinds 
of inferences can be drawn from one phase than the other, and nevertheless one has the intuition 
that sad just means the same.
The idea would be to turn this into a structural ambiguity. If one would decompose sad into 
a "causation" and a "state", one would end up with a scene where semantically there are two ar­
guments. If the adjective/noun (adjectival modification) construction in syntax is stated generally 
enough and the adjective's restrictions enable the binding of more than one semantic argument, 
the polysemy is simply a result of underspecification. In our case man would be a different the­
matic argument in the semantic representation of sad than the word event. The unambiguity of 
which results from obvious type restrictions on thematic argumetns. Before existential closure of 
the unexpressable implicit argument, the phrases' semantic representation would look something 
like (38).
(38) a. a sad man = lPlex(P(x) A MADE(e, SAD(x))) 
b. a sad event = lPlxe(P(e) A MADE(e, SAD(x)))
And finally observe that there are several other (constructionally) polysemous adjectives that 
would allow a similar underspecification/decomposition treatment and that also have their own 
arbitrary restrictions saying which arguments are available for semantic binding.
(39) a. sad/happy dog/event/day/?room
b. frightened/nervous dog/*event/*day/*room
c. sunny *dog/*?event/day/room lively dog/*?event/*?day/?room
134 LEXICAL SEMANTICS: METONYMY
d. noisy/silent dog/*?event/*?day/room
e. quiet dog/event/day/room
10.5 The need for generalizing constructional polysemy
Finally we would like to argue that the types of metonymy discussed so far could be viewed as 
special cases of a much more general mechanism, at work in a much larger domain of language, 
which is usually referred to as bridging.
As we have pointed out, logical metonymy is characterized by a great deal of context de­
pendence. We have said that, presumably, the identity of the event left implicit in such cases 
can always be overridden by external context (cf. (3)). The question arises, then, whether logical 
metonymy can be seen as analogous to other phenomena related to implicit information, such as 
the retrieval of antecedents of anaphors or the retrieval of rhetorical relations between consecutive 
sentences.
The fact that there are severe semantic restrictions on what the missing event can be does not 
falsify the claim that metonymy proper is analogous to other cases of retrieval of implicit infor­
mation. Similar restrictions apply in those cases as well. As a matter of fact, the severeness of the 
restrictions on the type of metonymy illustrated in (1) can be explained by the fact that a gram­
matical relation (namely, the direct object relation) holds between the verb (i.e., finish/begin/ ... ) 
and the noun phrase. The grammatical relation between the verb and the noun phrase may allow 
us to argue that the restriction on what the missing event can be is due to a separate construction, 
associated with verbs like begin, which prescribes a particular type of metonymical interpretation. 
Note that the same assumption has been argued independently by Michaelis and Lambrecht (1994) 
for the metonymical interpretation of noun phrases in the 'nominal extraposition' construction:
(40) It's amazing, the people my sister knows.
'The types/number of people my sister knows are/is amazing'
*'The people my sister knows are amazing'
Michaelis and Lambrecht (1994) argue that it is the nominal extraposition construction that is re­
sponsible for the obligatorily metonymical interpretation of the noun phrase the people; the same 
explanation can be applied to the type of metonymy related to verbs like begin in (1).
Once we recognize that metonymy is analogous to other instances of 'bridging', i.e., of es­
tablishing missing links, what remains to be seen is whether the restrictions on metonymy, as 
explained by Pustejovsky (1995b), for example, are the same in all these cases (disregarding, of 
course, the construction specific constraints mentioned above).
For example, consider:
(41) Joe got married yesterday. The minister spoke very harshly.
The accommodation of the definite noun phrase the minister in the second sentence makes it nec­
essary to establish a link with entities present in the context of utterance. Obviously, the lexical/ 
encyclopedic knowledge associated with marry will legitimate such a link. However, a simple 
qualia value coercion will not take care of this, because the path connecting the event of marrying 
someone with the existence of a minister leads through a wedding ceremony (which is part of a 
marriage) to the minister (who takes part in the ceremony). As far as we can see, such paths are 
always composed of relations corresponding to the qualia features. This corroborates the idea that 
logical metonymy should be seen as a special case of bridging.
The same holds for rhetorical relations between sentences of a discourse seen as missing links: 
the possible implicit relationships between the situations described by two consecutive sentences 
again correspond to the qualia features, yet there is usually no single lexical source for the resolu­
tion:
(42) Joe went home earlier. He met his boss.
With a little effort, we can get three different rhetorical relations between the two sentences in (42). 
In general the cause ('he went home because he had met his boss'), the goal ('he went home to meet 
his boss') and the elaboration ('he met his boss while going home') interpretations are parallel to
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